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This dissertation lays out a conceptual model for managing beach erosion on barrier 
islands.  Households affected by erosion management are identified as beach visitors 
and coastal homeowners.  The returns from beach quality accruing to beach visitors 
are assessed via travel cost theory, combining revealed preference and contingent 
behavior data, while the returns from beach quality accruing to coastal homeowners 
are assessed using hedonic price theory and data from multiple housing markets.  An 
optimal control model is formulated, which takes into account (i) distinct beach user 
groups, (ii) joint services of beaches (both recreational and loss-mitigating), (iii) 
active and passive beach management options, (iv) costs of beach maintenance, and 
(v) the dynamic motion of beach quality.  Optimality conditions define efficient 
beach nourishment operations, as well as the optimal terminal time for active 
management (i.e. beach nourishment) on barrier island beaches.  Empirical results 
illustrate the optimal beach width for a particular site and the schedule of nourishment 
operations detailing the amount of sand to be placed on the beach in each time period.  
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Chapter 1: Coastal Erosion Management as an Economic 
Problem 
There is a consensus among scientists that we are currently in a period of eustatic 
(world-wide) sea level rise1, with estimates ranging from 30 to 80 centimeters over 
the next century (Wigley and Raper 1993).  Predictions translate a 30-centimeter rise 
in sea level into an average 30 meters of coastline recession (Klarin and Hershman 
1990).  That is, 30 centimeters of sea level rise could result in the shoreline retreating 
30 meters landward in some areas if nothing is done to stop it.  Managing coastal 
erosion, however, impacts the quality of coastal resources.  The economies of many 
modest-sized coastal towns are dependent upon the appeal of beach resources, and the 
development of these towns has been tied to the demand for beach recreation and 
leisure.   To date, there has been no comprehensive model for the management of 
barrier island beaches in response to erosion and sea level rise. 
The purpose of this research is to develop a framework for optimal 
management of barrier island beach resources when the hinterland is developed.  The 
model provides a framework for planning beach erosion control projects under 
constant sea level and a constant erosion rate (i.e. the short run).  The framework is 
also used to examine beach erosion control under sea level rise, with increasing 
erosion levels (i.e. the long run).  It is shown that this conceptual framework can 
identify the time horizon of management responses under sea level rise.  One of the 
main objectives of this research is to explore whether active management 
                                                 




(specifically, beach nourishment)2 might be economically justified in the foreseeable 
future, or if passive management (shoreline retreat—i.e. letting erosion proceed 
unabated) is more likely to become optimal in the long run.  In the event of the latter, 
this research aims to estimate the timing of a shift in management regimes.  The long-
term feasibility of beach nourishment as a management strategy depends upon: (i) the 
rate of sea level rise, (ii) the costs of nourishment, and (iii) the benefits of preserving 
the current shoreline.   
The long-run application of this model differs from conventional approaches 
to coastal protection by focusing on the stream of services derived from barrier 
beaches, rather than the value of threatened property at some future time (i.e. the 
opportunity cost of protection).  The received literature that considers coastal 
protection largely ignores external costs of such schemes.  Structural fortification of 
the shoreline protects threatened property, but imposes external costs on beach 
resources.  The expected value of threatened property is appropriate as a primary 
decision criterion if the value of beach resources is a small portion of the total 
economic value associated with a site (e.g. large coastal cities).  The approach is less 
appropriate for most U.S. barrier islands, for which the value of beach resources can 
be a significant portion of total economic value, not only locally but nationally as 
well.3 The methods utilized in this dissertation place beach resources at the focal 
point of the analysis, and are designed to address the problem of barrier island 
                                                 
2 Active management may also include shoreline armoring—the construction of large-scale protective 
devices on the shoreline.  This research examines only beach nourishment, as this is the more common 
form of active management.  Shoreline armoring is illegal in a number of coastal states (e.g. North 
Carolina). 
3 Beaches are a leading U.S. tourist destination.  Approximately 180 million “person-visits” are taken 




management in response to short-term erosion problems and the long-term problem 
of sea level rise.  
An analytical model is developed that characterizes the optimal management 
response to erosion on barrier islands.  The model focuses only on the average beach 
profile, and thus does not consider the distribution of beach quality along the shore.  
This simplification is made for analytical tractability.  The resource problem is 
essentially loss of beach width, which is considered a deterministic process.  Beach 
erosion is a dynamic process, and thus the model is necessarily dynamic in nature.  
Optimality conditions are derived and discussed.  The model is used to characterize 
optimal management under constant sea level and a constant erosion rate, as well as 
under sea level rise and the attending increases in erosion activity.  The management 
tool is beach nourishment—adding sand to the beach.   
An empirical application of the model estimates the optimal schedule of beach 
nourishment operations for a specific coastline in the southeastern U.S., allowing for 
a corner solution at any point in time (i.e. no beach nourishment).  The empirics also 
examine whether beach nourishment is a tenable management practice in the long 
run, given assumptions about sea level rise and costs and benefits.  A termination of 
beach nourishment in the long run implies a policy of shoreline retreat, which would 
entail gradual migration of barrier islands and associated losses in property and 
infrastructure.  A primary goal of this research is estimation of the optimal timing of 
such a transition.  Information on the optimal timeline of shoreline retreat could be 




to the risk of sea level rise4 and invaluable for coastal planning and investment 
purposes.  This research does not consider the distribution of cost and benefits 
engendered by beach erosion control (though this is certainly a topic of concern for 
many parties). 
The Coastal Erosion Problem 
The coastal environment is one of the most dynamic places on earth.  The position 
and form of the coastline are influenced by the interaction of the ocean, atmosphere, 
and coastal landforms; the shore attains a dynamic equilibrium, determined by waves, 
wind, ocean currents, sediment supply, storms, and sea level.  As such, the coast has 
never been a particularly stable environment.  This instability is not obvious to the 
casual observer, however, because the changes are very gradual in some cases, and 
sporadic in others. 
Barrier islands dominate the eastern and gulf coasts of the U.S. Most of these 
islands exhibit sandy beaches—a common characteristic of the dynamic coastal 
equilibrium.  Wave energy dissipates as waves strike land, and fine sediments can be 
deposited on the shore.  This process gives rise to the sandy beach, an environmental 
resource often of considerable economic value.  Despite the inherent instability of the 
coastline, a natural beach usually persists, albeit in possibly different forms and 
locations. 
Coastal erosion is the loss of coastal land, resulting in a recession of the 
shoreline (the demarcation between land and sea).  More specifically, beach erosion is 
the loss of beach area.  From hereon, when I refer to beach quality, I mean beach area 
                                                 
4 As Yohe, Neumann, and Ameden (1995) recognize, the trajectory of threatened property values is 




or beach width.  (Beach width is the dimension of beach quality that can be controlled 
by the coastal planner, which in turn determines beach area.)  There are two main 
causes of erosion on the coast5—coastal storms and sea level rise.  Beaches can be 
decimated by energetic waves associated with coastal storms.  These storms can 
move a great deal of beach sand offshore, but most of the sand subsequently returns 
to the beach in the majority of cases.   This oscillating process, in fact, protects land 
behind the beach from the direct attack of storm waves, but can create erosion 
problems in the short run as the position of the shoreline fluctuates.  Oscillation of the 
shoreline is difficult to predict, but is only a concern on developed coastlines.  When 
the coast is developed, fluctuations in the shoreline can cause extensive property 
damage.  Thus, many developed barrier islands are currently protected against storms 
by periodic beach renourishment, sometimes in conjunction with shoreline armoring 
(e.g. seawalls).  It should be noted that there is also substantial movement of sand 
along the shore due to the longshore (littoral) current.  This dimension of the problem 
is essentially distributive in nature, and is not considered herein. 
The stochastic oscillation of the shoreline in response to coastal weather 
patterns is tied to a baseline sea level, which is currently rising at an average of 1 – 2 
millimeters per year (Edgerton 1991).6 With a rise in sea level, undeveloped barrier 
islands move landward by rolling over, as sand is transported from the ocean to the 
land side; the beach, being an equilibrium characteristic, will tend to migrate 
landward over time as the island recedes (Dean and Maurmeyer 1983; Leatherman 
1988; Pilkey and Dixon 1996).  Developed barrier islands differ from their 
                                                 
5 These are aside from the potential problem of reduced sediment supply (e.g. damming of rivers). 




undeveloped counterparts in that they are anchored to a specific location by the 
existence of infrastructure, housing, businesses, etc.  Since these islands are not 
allowed to migrate, they can become increasingly threatened by inundation and 
increased storm wave heights.  The quality of the sandy beach usually suffers under 
the increased erosive pressure.  If the island is not protected by sea walls and such, 
the beach may migrate landward though the island is not allowed to rollover due to 
the presence of development. In this respect, it is the hinterland behind the beach that 
can be lost in the long run; houses that end up on the beach are typically condemned.  
This can create social pressure to stabilize the shoreline as erosive forces escalate.  
These facts characterize an especially difficult public policy problem.  
Beaches are a source of recreational value for households.  Development on the 
coastal fringe facilitates access to beaches and provides for enjoyment of scenic 
amenities, but limits the shoreline’s ability to evolve in response to coastal hazards.  
Attempts to fortify property with protective devices can further degrade beaches.  As 
such, the sandy beach—an important recreational amenity—may diminish or 
disappear.  Beach nourishment can ameliorate the effects of coastal armor and 
provides some protection in its own right, but the improvement is most often only 
temporary.  Once the decision is made to armor the coast, beach quality usually 
suffers. 
Optimal coastal management depends upon balancing benefits and costs of 
remedial actions, incorporating the dynamic effects of management decisions on all 
relevant services and user groups.  In the short run (assuming constant sea level and 




(beach nourishment).  In the long run, sea level rise increases erosive pressure on the 
shoreline and may render some settlements indefensible.  The optimal management 
strategy in the long run depends on the degree of erosive pressure (i.e. sea level rise) 
and how this affects management costs.  Existing literature on coastal protection has 
focused on the value of coastal property that is threatened by sea level rise.  As Yohe, 
Neumann, and Ameden (1995) point out, with full information on the risks of sea 
level rise, market depreciation over 30 years time could drive the value of this 
property to zero.  While this outcome is complicated by uncertainty regarding sea 
level rise and the inherent lack of reliability in a commitment to abandon property, it 
can clearly be problematic to rely on such a subjective decision criterion for coastal 
policy making.  Also, this line of research has considered shoreline armoring as the 
primary policy tool, but has largely ignored the effect of this type of coastal 
protection on beach resources.  The methods utilized herein are different in that they 
focus on the stream of services derived from barrier island beaches. 
Erosion Management Options 
Coastal erosion management options can be classified as active or passive.  Active 
shoreline management consists of beach nourishment and/or shoreline armoring.  
Beach nourishment has come into favor as an active management tool in recent years.  
This activity consists of placing sand onto the beach face in order to maintain beach 
area and location.  The quality of a nourished beach is generally much better than a 
structurally protected beach.  The beach protects coastal property from hurricanes and 
nor’easters by absorbing the energy of incoming storm waves.  The beach also buffers 




maintains recreational and leisure opportunities, in addition to offering some 
protection for coastal properties.  The costs of beach nourishment include search costs 
(for adequate sand resources), extraction and transportation costs, and placement 
costs.  These costs can be significant and are incurred any time sand has to be placed 
on the beach.  Nourished beaches typically last 2-10 years (i.e. after 2-10 years the 
beach typically returned to its original state), so periodic replenishments are usually 
required.  Thus, the benefits of a single beach nourishment operation are transitory.  
The dynamic nature of the management model captures the movement of these 
benefits.  For example, nourishment in the current period will bolster beach quality, 
but that quality will decay in subsequent periods according to the rate of erosion. 
Shoreline armoring can involve construction of shore-parallel structural 
devices, such as seawalls and rockpiles.7  While indemnifying coastal properties, 
these structures can engender a number of negative side effects on beach quality.  
They interrupt sand movement across different parts of the beach face (Everts 1979; 
Leatherman 1988; Clayton et al. 1992), prevent beach movement in response to 
storms and sea level rise, and reflect wave energy, scouring the beach and 
augmenting erosion (Pilkey 1999; Bird 2000).  Shoreline armoring is currently 
present on many shorelines, but has come under heightened scrutiny for its negative 
side effects, both in terms of safety and aesthetics.  Some states have outlawed the use 
of shoreline armoring (e.g. North Carolina and Maine), and it has generally become 
an unpopular management tool.  For purposes of this research, it is not considered a 
relevant management option for barrier island beaches. 
                                                 
7 Other armoring devises include groins, built perpendicular to the shoreline, and breakwaters, built 




Some coastal geologists and environmentalists have advocated a policy of 
retreat from the shoreline—a type of passive management (Chasis et al. 1985; Pilkey 
and Dixon 1996).  Moving buildings and infrastructure away from the shoreline 
would allow natural coastal evolution to continue, which would maintain a natural 
beach.  Terminating active management would save public monies allocated for 
shoreline management; however costs associated with retreat would include losses of 
private property and public infrastructure.  The size of these losses primarily depends 
upon the degree of development existing at the time of abandonment and the value of 
the housing stock.  Both of these factors, quantity and price, are obviously determined 
within the market for coastal housing.  Thus, expectations of buyers and sellers and 
the time horizon in which the market can adjust to policy changes are crucial to an 
assessment of shoreline retreat. 
Beach nourishment can be considered a coastal erosion control—a 
management variable that is under the discretion of the coastal planner.  The 
sustained absence of control under positive levels of erosion implies a de facto policy 
of shoreline retreat, and under certain regularity conditions it can be shown that this is 
indeed the case.  Following Landry, Keeler, and Kriesel (2003), agents affected by 
beach management are classified into two groups: beach visitors and coastal property 
owners.  The former includes households that participate in recreational and leisure 
activities at the beach and are thus concerned about beach quality, but do not own a 
stake in island property.  The latter are similarly concerned with beach quality, but are 
also concerned about maintaining their property, which can be threatened by coastal 




Beaches provide for recreational and leisure services for beach visitors and 
coastal homeowners alike.  Beach area is an important attribute of beach quality 
because it provides space for recreational activities and contributes to the overall 
aesthetics of the beach environment.  Parsons, Massey, and Tomasi (2000) find an 
increasing and concave relationship between recreational willingness to pay (WTP) 
and beach width.  The beach also provides protection from coastal storms.  If the 
hinterlands are developed, the beach provides a buffer that protects property 
improvements from storm waves and storm-induced erosion.  Under this 
characterization, recreation and protection are joint services of the beach on 
developed barrier islands.  Both should be considered in beach management 
decisions. 
Economist’s Thinking on Coastal Erosion 
There are two branches of literature that have examined the economics of coastal 
management—the first primarily considering the short run problem of efficient 
management in response to episodic erosion and the second addressing the long run 
problem of coastal protection under sea level rise.  My conceptual model aims to 
integrate these two branches in a consistent framework, and thus to draw clear link 
between decisions in the short and long run.  This linkage is important because 
management decisions in the short run affect the state of beach resources, which in 
turn affects the coastal housing market.  A number of papers have shown that the 
value of coastal property partially capitalizes the value of coastal resource quality.  It 
is precisely the value of housing, however, that has played a central role in evaluating 




problem.  If we nourish beaches in the short run, housing values will be bolstered due 
to both the recreational and loss-mitigating values of beaches.  If we let beaches 
degrade in the short run, the value of the housing stock will be somewhat diminished. 
The framework proposed in the next chapter allows for an integration of these short 
and long term aspects of beach management.   
Efficient Coastal Management in the Short Run 
The existing literature on beach erosion management in the short run is fairly limited 
in scope.  Most studies consider only one beach service (recreation vs. storm 
protection) or one user group (beach visitors vs. coastal homeowners) in isolation.  
This branch of the literature has made use of primarily static models.  As such, no 
study has adequately incorporated the dynamics of the beach management problem.   
Bell (1986) and Silberman and Klock (1988) estimate the recreational benefits 
of beach nourishment, but fail to consider its protective benefits thus producing 
underestimates.  Bell (1986) estimates the optimal square-footage of beach space per 
beach user, and then compares the estimated benefits of maintaining optimal beach 
area with a rough cost estimate.  He concludes that nourishment is efficient at twenty-
four Florida beaches.  In an attempt to incorporate time, Bell assumes that the beach, 
once it is nourished, provides for increased benefits at some constant level.  This 
assumption will generally not hold, since erosive forces immediately begin to work 
on a newly nourished beach.  Typically when it is time for a replenishment operation 
(2-10 years after the initial nourishment), the beach has returned to its original 
diminished (pre-nourishment) state.  Benefit estimates derived under the assumption 




upward biased.  Silberman and Klock (1988) use a split-sample stated preference 
survey to estimate the differential WTP for beach recreation before and after a beach 
nourishment project.  They find a stronger effect on visitation than on benefits per 
trip, but positive net benefits overall.  This result suggests that recreational benefit 
estimates need to consider how visitation changes with beach quality. 
Edwards and Gable (1991) and Pompe and Rhinehart (1995) focus their 
analyses on coastal homeowners, using hedonic property price models to estimate 
welfare measures.  Edwards and Gable explore the recreational benefits of coastal 
beaches accruing to local residents.  They argue that proximity to the beach reveals 
implicit savings in travel cost that reflect household preferences for beach recreation, 
and they include distance to the beach as a regressor in their hedonic model.  They 
then use the marginal implicit price of distance (the derivative of hedonic price 
function with respect to distance variable) to estimate a demand equation for distance.  
Edwards and Gable use data from a single housing market.8  As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, their procedure does not identify the demand equation because there is no 
exogenous variable in the demand equation that does not appear in the hedonic price 
function.  Also, their coefficient estimates are biased because distance from the beach 
is endogenous. Moreover, proximity to the shoreline also affects the magnitude of 
expected loss in the event of a storm.  The selection of optimal distance depends upon 
the household’s valuation of coastal amenities, and its assessment of coastal risks and 
willingness to tolerate such risks.  The point estimate of marginal recreational 
benefits derived in this manner will almost certainly be downward biased if 
                                                 





households are risk averse.  That is, the implicit savings of locating further from the 
beach will be diminished because moving further from the beach also decreases 
expected storm loss, ceteris paribus.   
Pompe and Rhinehart examine the dual nature of beach services, attempting to 
disentangle protective from recreational benefits.  Following Edwards (1989), they 
estimate a hedonic property model including an interaction variable (beach width × 
distance from the beach) that they claim reflects the recreational aspects of the beach, 
and include beach width at the nearest shore to account for storm protection benefits.  
This approach is only valid if the storm protection benefits accruing to homeowners 
are independent of distance, which they are arguably not.  Pompe and Rhinehart fail 
to control for differences in storm risk across properties, and in doing so cannot 
disentangle recreational from protective benefits.  Moreover, marginal benefit 
measures are of limited use in beach management policy analysis if large changes in 
beach quality are of interest.  One would prefer to have a preference function that 
encompasses the relevant levels of beach quality.  
Other authors have addressed shoreline retreat.  Parsons and Powell (2001) 
provide an estimate of the costs of shoreline retreat on property owners on the 
Delaware coast.  They use a parameterized hedonic property model to simulate fifty 
years of unabated shoreline retreat on the coastal housing market.  For those houses 
that are lost to erosion, the value of proximity is purged from housing value before it 
is removed from the stock of housing (since proximity value is transferred to 
remaining properties).  Their findings suggest that the costs of nourishment are less 




similar simulation approach, Landry, Keeler, and Kriesel (2003) compare beach 
nourishment, shoreline armoring, and shoreline retreat over 25 years, taking account 
of property effects and recreational benefits accruing to both beach visitors and 
coastal homeowners.  They find that the efficiency of active management depends 
upon the erosion rate and how management costs evolve over time (given sea level 
rise and changes in resource stocks and technology).  While both these models 
incorporate dynamics in the retreat scenario, they are static in other regards.  Neither 
considers the dynamic adjustment of the beach under an active management regime, 
nor do they allow for adjustment in the value of the housing stock (which would 
lower the property losses associated with shoreline retreat).  Nor do these studies 
consider storm protection benefits engendered through physical changes in the beach.  
Moreover, both papers take the time horizon as given, rather than making it an 
instrument of optimization. 
Part of a retreat management scheme can include enforcing mandatory setback 
provisions (requiring houses to be a certain distance from the shoreline) on new 
construction or significantly damaged buildings.  Frech and Lafferty (1984) examine 
the effect of setback provisions on the housing market in California.  They find that 
housing prices increased as a result of the institution of setback provisions.  Their 
results suggest that the increase in property values was due to a restriction on the 
supply of land suitable for building rather than the increase in coastal amenities 
associated with the setback provision. 
The existing literature on erosion management is primarily empirical.  Many 




coastal management decisions.  Most of these papers are fairly narrow in scope, 
examining only one beach service and/or one user group.  No study has adequately 
incorporated the dynamic adjustment process of beaches that characterizes the beach 
erosion management problem. 
Switching our attention to the long run, the beach erosion management 
literature has yet to give serious consideration to drastic changes in sea level.  The 
existing studies are primarily static in nature, making them inappropriate for long-
term analysis.  For example, Bell (1986) concludes that beach nourishment is a cost 
effective management tool, but does not consider how rising seas (which Bell cites as 
a cause of erosion) might increase management costs over time, potentially changing 
his conclusion.  The introduction of changes in sea level provides further justification 
for a dynamic model, as the problem becomes non-autonomous. 
Coastal Protection in the Long Run 
Titus, et al. (1991) estimate the nationwide costs of (i) protecting developed property 
and (ii) losses associated with undeveloped lowlands and wetlands, for a range of sea 
level rise scenarios in the U.S.  Their analysis assumes that raising barrier islands by 
pumping sand is the preferred response, while levees and pumping systems will 
protect developed portions of the mainland.  They make use of engineering cost 
estimates, appraised undeveloped land values, a range of estimated values for 
wetlands, and assume no further development on the coastal lowlands in compiling a 
current value cost figure.  Their results suggest that the cost of protecting developed 
property from a one-half (one) meter rise in sea level would cost between $55 and 




and 45 percent (29 and 69 percent) of its coastal wetlands.  The estimated market 
value of the lost wetlands is between $11 and $82 billion ($17 and $128 billion), but 
the authors state that the environmental effects associated with lost wetlands could be 
catastrophic.  As such, they recommend a gradual abandonment of undeveloped 
coastal lowlands in order to allow wetland migration. They suggest that confining 
coastal development to presently developed areas and protecting those areas should 
be cost-effective, with a price tag of roughly $2,000 per quarter-acre lot. 
The analysis of Titus, et al. presumes that all developed coastal land will be 
protected and presents a positive economic assessment of the costs associated with 
that scenario.  Their estimated price tag of $2,000 per quarter-acre lot is an average 
figure, which does not allow for a determination of which areas should be protected.  
Recognizing this, Yohe (1991b) offers a framework for a normative economic 
assessment of coastal protection schemes.  His framework utilizes a stochastic sea 
level rise trajectory and a corresponding trajectory of marginal property damages.  
The benefits of coastal protection are the foregone property losses, measured as the 
net present value of the expected change in damages attributable to protection.  He 
uses pre-existing cost estimates for Long Beach Island, NJ to evaluate either raising 
the island by adding sand or constructing a dike under a range of sea level rise 
scenarios.  He finds raising the island is the best course of action under gradual sea 
level rise; building a dike is preferred under accelerated sea level rise.  This line of 
research does not consider the external effects of shoreline armoring on beach 
resources.  If barrier island beach resources are indeed the locus of economic value on 




destroy the beach.  Yohe’s analysis takes property values as exogenous.  His benefit 
measures are determined by the trajectory of those property values, but these in turn 
depend crucially upon how the market reacts to the potential for abandonment.  Thus, 
they are endogenous.  If policy analysts conclude that property should be protected at 
all costs, then property values can be fortified by this information, and the prophecy 
fulfills itself.  
This latter problem is considered in Yohe and Neumann (1995) and Yohe, 
Neumann, and Ameden (1995).  These papers explore coastal protection under two 
property value scenarios: one in which property values increase “business as usual”, 
and one in which property values depreciate in anticipation of sea level rise.9 Their 
optimization problem is represented by a simple dynamic model that posits the choice 
of beginning and terminating active management times as a function of the present 
value of benefits (property value trajectories) minus the present value of costs 
(management expenditures and property losses at terminal time).  Their model 
abstracts from the actual micro-level decisions regarding the amount of beach 
nourishment (or shoreline armoring). 
Yohe, Neumann, and Ameden (1995) consider protection of five areas around 
Charleston, S.C., utilizing three sea level rise trajectories: 33cm, 76cm, and 100cm 
through the year 2100.  They find that protection is warranted in some cases, but not 
in others.  The scenario of adaptation and foresight (i.e. depreciation) in the property 
market decreases the amount of protection, but the likelihood of this scenario is 
sensitive to uncertainty regarding sea level rise and the credibility of a retreat policy.  
                                                 
9 They also consider a scenario under which benefits are ignored and protection is guaranteed 




They assume protection of mainland locations involves the construction of levees, but 
they note that this option is not feasible on the one barrier island they examine.  They 
find that Sullivan Island should be protected immediately, through beach 
nourishment.  In the case of this barrier island, the only real timing decision is 
deciding when to stop protection.  This is precisely the question I intend to address.   
The development of the U.S.’s Eastern and Gulf Coast barrier islands has been 
primarily due to an increased demand for beach and coastal recreation, and the 
economies of many of these small towns is centered around the appeal of coastal 
amenities.  For barrier islands, coastal beaches are the primary attraction.  To consider 
management of these islands with a disregard for effects on the beach seems a 
misplaced exercise.  The management problem is focused upon land that is not 
merely located near the beach, but rather land that confers upon owners and occupiers 
the array of benefits associated with the barrier island environment.  The value of the 
land is implicitly tied to the quality of this environment.  Decisions regarding its use 
and protection should not be made irrespective of the effect that these decisions have 
on the coastal environment.  The theoretical model explored in the next chapter posits 
management decisions as relying on the stream of services derived from the beach. 
The dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents a conceptual 
model of optimal erosion management on barrier islands.  Chapters 3 and 4 offer 
details on the empirical models that are used to assess economic returns of beach 
quality accruing to beach visitors and coastal homeowners, respectively.  Chapter 5 
puts together the pieces and derives solutions to the optimal control problem under 




Chapter 2: Theory of Optimal Beach Erosion Management 
This chapter presents an economic model of optimal beach erosion management on 
barrier island beaches.  The model accounts for distinct household demands for beach 
services (both recreational and loss-mitigating aspects), and incorporates a number of 
dynamic phenomena.  Most importantly, the dynamic nature of the beach is addressed 
within a transition equation.  For simplicity, I assume that the beach erodes in a 
uniform and deterministic manner, reflecting the permanent loss of beach width due 
to storms and the background sea level rise (1-2 mm/year).  Additional sea level rise 
is introduced as an evolving erosion rate.  The dynamic nature of the model is critical 
in accounting for the evolution of beach quality as a dynamic resource.   
Economic Returns from Beach Quality 
Assume there is a time-dependent variable that represents the quality of the beach in 
terms of average beach width, qt.  Initial beach width is taken as given, but subject to 
erosive force that reduces beach width in a deterministic manner.  The coastal planner 
can augment beach width by adding sand to the beach system.  I assume that any 
additional sand is of a similar quality to the existing sand, so there are no other 
qualitative or aesthetic effects associated with beach nourishment.  I take the length of 
the beach as given and assume that nourishment is applied to the entire length.  With 
length given, beach width determines beach area, which provides space for 
recreational and leisure activities for both visitors and local residents and contributes 
to the aesthetics of the coastal landscape.  Beach width also provides protection from 




Maintaining the aforementioned distinction, agents affected by beach 
management are classified into two groups: beach visitors, represented by b, and 
coastal homeowners, represented by r.  I assume that beach visitors are only 
concerned with beach quality as it relates to recreation and aesthetics associated with 
beach use.  Household utility for beach visitors is ub(v,y;q), where v represents visits 
to the beach, y is a composite good, and q is beach quality.  Visitors making trips to a 
single site cannot freely choose beach quality, but it partially determines the value of 
the trip.  Utilizing the standard expenditure-minimization framework, one can derive 
a measure of economic welfare arising from changes in beach quality.  A beach 
visitor’s willingness-to-pay for a change in beach quality will depend upon the level 
of prices (py, where y represents a composite commodity), initial utility (U0), and the 
extent of the change.  For the representative beach visitor, the measure is: 
 
WTPb(q0,q1 )= Eb(py,pv,U0,q0)-Eb(py,pv,U0,q1),   [2.1] 
 
where E(.) is the minimum expenditure function, and pv is the price of a beach visit.  
Expression [2.1] is non-negative if the subsequent quality (q1) is greater than the 
initial quality (q0), and non-positive if the subsequent quality is less than the initial 
quality.  I assume that [2.1] is increasing and concave in q.  The empirical approach 
to estimating [2.1] is detailed in Chapter 3. 
Deriving a welfare measure for coastal homeowners is slightly more 
complicated, as beach quality affects the level of risk faced by the household.  Coastal 




aspects.  Household utility for coastal homeowners is u(a,y,q), where a is a vector of 
housing characteristics, y is a composite good, and q is beach quality.  Coastal 
homeowners can choose the quality of their local beach when purchasing a property.  
I hypothesize that this value will be reflected in housing prices.   
For simplicity, assume that coastal households face only two states of 
nature—(1,0) with associated annual probabilities of ρ and (1-ρ), where 1 represents 
landfall of a major coastal storm and 0 is the converse.  The expected loss in the event 
of a storm is L(qt).  Assume L is a continuous function of beach quality, which 
represents the loss-mitigating service of the beach.  Thus, ∂L/∂q < 0.  In choosing a 
home associated with higher beach width, households are decreasing their expected 
loss, thus insuring themselves against coastal storms.  Self-insurance of this sort 
decreases the expected loss conditional on a hurricane making landfall.  Ehrlich and 
Becker (1972) have shown that self-insurance is a substitute for formal insurance.   
Both the recreational and loss-mitigating services of beaches should increase 
the value of coastal homes in the vicinity of good quality beaches, but the relationship 
is complicated by the existence of other forms of indemnification, including formal 
flood insurance and other forms of self-insurance.  Chapter 4 offers a detailed 
theoretical model relating property values to beach quality.  The model utilizes an 
expected utility framework to incorporate the probability of storm landfall, and also 
incorporates other forms of indemnification, including formal flood insurance. For the 
time being, a preference function for coastal residents is taken as granted.  Utilizing 




representative coastal resident for changes in beach quality can be represented 
implicitly as: 
 














where Vr(m,p,q) is the indirect utility function for coastal homeowners and 
WTPr(q0,q1) represents willingness to pay for a change in beach quality.  Willingness 
to pay will also depend on income (m), prices, the probability of loss, and the 
expected loss.  
Other factors affect the risk profile of coastal homeowners.  The probability of 
storm landfall (ρ) is assumed constant within a region, while the determinants of an 
individual household’s expected loss will vary across properties.  Elevation above 
base flood elevation (BFE) is a primary structural determinant of flood losses.  
Houses with more elevation should expect lower storm damage losses.  The expected 
loss can also be affected by building standards and proximity to the shore.  Including 
these characteristics in addition to beach quality, and solving for WTP in [2.2] gives 
rise to the welfare measure WTPr (q0,q1,ρ,L(q0,q1,loss),m), where loss is a vector of 
expected loss determinants other than beach quality.  Let q1 = q0 + , with qq̂ 0 
representing initial beach width and  representing the increment to beach width.  
The slope of the coastal homeowner’s preference function in beach quality space is: 
q̂
 





where µL and µ0 are the marginal utility of income in the loss and no-loss states, 
respectively.  The first term in the numerator on the RHS of [2.3] is the direct effect 
of beach quality on utility.  This represents the recreational and aesthetic value of 
beaches for coastal homeowners.  The second term represents beach quality’s role as 
self-insurance.  The denominator in [2.3] is the expected value of marginal utility of 
income.  By assumption, ∂L q̂/ ∂  < 0, representing self-insurance.  Thus, willingness 
to pay is an increasing function of .  Before considering the management problem in 
detail, we must define the physical processes that give rise to the process of coastal 
erosion on barrier islands. 
q̂
Beach Geomorphology 
The dominant coastal land feature in the Eastern and Gulf regions of the United States 
is the barrier island (Nummedal 1983).  The balance between sea level and sediment 
supply generally determines whether these barriers will be transgressive (long-term 
retreating landward, i.e. shoreline recession) or regressive (long-term expanding 
seaward) (Nummedal 1983).  This distinction is crucial to the geological evolution of 
the coastline.  Transgressive barrier islands currently dominate the coastal landscape, 
due to sea level rise (and also possibly due to damming of rivers which decreases 
sediment supply).  Transgressive barriers move landward as erosion diminishes their 
seaward extent and overwash from storms deposits sediment in the back-barrier 
region (Clayton et al. 1992). 
Waves are the primary agent in coastal erosion.  They carry energy into the 




disperse the sediment (Komar 1983).  Waves can be beach-building or beach-
reducing (Hardistay 1990).  Swell waves, which are less energetic and shallower, 
deliver sediments to the beach, building it up.  Storm waves are steeper and break 
more forcefully on the beach, transferring sand to offshore bars.  The oscillation 
between swell and storm waves leads to fluctuations in the width of the beach, but the 
process protects the hinterland from direct wave attack.  In some cases—hurricanes 
and nor’easters, in particular—property may become threatened by this oscillation of 
the beach.  Most sand that is carried offshore during storms returns to the beach 
afterwards, but this is not always the case.  Sand can be lost from the littoral system 
for various reasons. 
There is a considerable strand of engineering literature related to predicting 
the two-dimensional, orthogonal profile10 of the beach (see Figure 2.1) as a function 
of wave and sediment characteristics.  Empirical evidence posits the relationship as a 
power law: 
 
d = a xb,        [2.4] 
  
where d is underwater depth of the beach surface, x is horizontal offshore distance, 
and a and b are coefficients (Hardistay 1990).  The b exponent is approximately 2/3.  
The magnitude of a depends upon the grain size and specific gravity of sediment as 
well as wave height, but for typical values of beach sand a usually varies between 
                                                 
10 The orthogonal profile is the side-view transect which is orthogonal to the shoreline.  Other 
geomorphological literature has focused on the influence of tidal and longshore currents, which 
influence the distribution of sand along the shoreline.  This aspect of the erosion problem is not 




0.04 and 0.11.  Finer sand is associated with lower values of a, and thus more gently 
sloping beaches.  Equation [2.4] governs the shape of the beach below the high-water 
line; this line fluctuates with tides, storm surge, and sea level.  Relationship [2.4] 
describes equilibrium.  A natural beach approaches this equilibrium state 
exponentially with a half-life of approximately “a few hours” (Hardistay 1990).  The 
beach form above the high-water line is affected by wind and wave run-up, but is 
typically taken as constant.  
beach berm beach slope
 
A typical beach orthogonal profile is presented in Figure 2.1.  The beach 
berm, on the far left, is the highest portion of the beach.  The back section of the berm 
often contains dunes and scrub vegetation.  Vegetated dunes provide additional 
protection from storms.  The sloping portion of the beach, in the middle of the figure, 
is typically the widest.  This portion is also the most geomorphically active.  While 
the beach berm is often not compromised except during major coastal storms, the 
sloping portion can vary over the course of a year.  It is the beach slope that responds 
to storm and swell waves in the short run.  Fluctuations in this portion of the beach 
can affect recreational use.  If the fluctuations are great (possibly affecting portions of 
high-water line
qt: beach width
M: berm height W: active profile width 
h: closure depth 




the berm), coastal property may be threatened.  Also depicted in 3.1 is the depth of 
closure—approximately equal to the depth of breaking waves.  At this depth, the 
beach profile is relatively inactive. 
Beach width is defined as the distance from the average high-water line to the 
back of the beach.  The back of the beach is delineated either by where the sand dunes 
begin, where maritime forest or scrub vegetation begins, or where property 
development starts.   As such, beach width determines the amount of space available 
for recreation and leisure, per unit shoreline length.      
Kana (1993) advocates use of the Ideal Present Profile (IPP) in planning beach 
nourishment operations.  For relatively straight shorelines with predominantly shore-
parallel contours, the IPP represents the most likely equilibrium profile on the 
majority of the shoreline (i.e. away from inlets or other perturbing forces).  In the 
field, development of the IPP requires a detailed geomorphic model of the site and 
delineation of the littoral cells.11  The IPP is then constructed by taking depth and 
angle measurements of multiple transects of the beach in areas where the profile is 
deemed natural (in terms of approximating equilibrium).  These profiles are matched 
at a common backshore contour, and the IPP is calculated as the average of these 
representative profiles (Kana 1993).  In the theoretical model to follow, the existence 
of an IPP is presumed.  Moreover, I assume that the beach is reasonably well 
represented by the IPP, and thus only focus on this representation of beach quality. 
                                                 
11 The geomorphic model utilizes an aerial view of the site to identify the orientation and character of 
incoming waves, location of shoals, dominant tidal currents, and direction of longshore (littoral) 
transport, and how these elements interact in determining the geomorphology of the site.  Littoral cells 




Dean (1991) shows how to estimate the increment in beach width produced by 
a certain volume of beach fill (sand) using only the average beach profile (or IPP).  
The formula depends upon relative grain size of the fill and natural sediment.  For 
simplicity, I assume that the fill sediment is of the same grain as the natural beach 
sediment.  Let M represent the height of the beach berm (in meters above sea level), 
and h represents the depth of closure (in meters below sea level).  Let the increase in 
beach width per unit length be given by q .  The increase in average beach width is 
then approximated by:  
ˆ
 
q̂ (n) =  n / (M + h),       [2.5] 
 
where n is the volume of beach fill per unit of shoreline length (l)  (i.e. if N is total 
sand volume for a project, n=N/l).  Equation [2.5] is increasing and linear in n.  The 
slope of the equation is determined by the parameters M and h, which describe the 
vertical dimension of the beach profile.  
Equation [2.5] corresponds with a unit of shoreline length, which meshes well 
with the IPP approach suggested by Kana (1993).  I focus on the average beach 
profile as the representation of resource quality, and use relationship [2.5] to convert 
beach fill (n, which will serve as the management control) into incremental beach 
width (which affects the state variable, qt).  The change in beach width per unit length 
is given by q (n), and the corresponding increase in total beach area is q (n)×l.  I use 
a reduced-form equation to represent the costs of beach nourishment as a function of 





detailed exposition on estimation of a beach nourishment cost function for the 
southeastern U.S.  
Shoreline Recession 
Equation [2.5] only applies in the case of constant sea level.  Rising seas push the 
shoreline landward.  In this case, the amount of sand required to extend beach width 
must also take into account the countervailing effects of shoreline recession.  Bruun 
(1962) offered the first model to predict shoreline recession due to sea-level rise.  His 
model assumes a constant equilibrium beach profile and is based on the concepts of 
conservation of sediment and dynamic adjustment of the beach profile: 
 
R = - W ∆S /(M + h) = - ∆S / tan α,     [2.6] 
 
where R is horizontal retreat distance (conceptually equivalent to - q ), W is the width 
of the active beach profile (the horizontal distance from the mean high-water line to 
the depth of closure—see Figure 2.1), ∆S is the increase in sea level, α is the average 
beach slope (in degrees), M is height of the beach berm, and h is the depth of closure 
(as before) (Dean and Maurmeyer 1983).   Assuming the average beach slope is 
strictly less than 45 degrees (tan α < 1), equation [2.6] characterizes shoreline 
recession as an amplification of the change in sea level, with shallow sloped beaches 
retreating more rapidly for a given sea level change.
ˆ
12   
                                                 
12 The depth of closure is the critical assumption of [2.6].  By limiting the depth of motion for beach 
sediment, shoreline recession is the only possible response to sea level rise.  Dean (1991) also 
considers a case in which onshore movement of sand is possible.  In this case, the horizontal retreat 




The Bruun model has been altered to account for various other considerations 
and complexities.  Dean and Maurmeyer (1983) generalize the Bruun rule to barrier 
island recession as: 
 
R = ∆S (W + w + Wl) /[(M + h) - (Ml + hl)],    [2.7] 
 
where W and Wl are active profile width on the ocean and lagoon sides of the island, 
respectively, w is the width of the island, M and Ml are the ocean and lagoon berm 
heights, and h and hl ocean and lagoon breaking wave depths (closure depths), 
respectively.  The model of barrier island recession due to sea-level rise is depicted in 
Figure 2.2.   
 
By [2.7], barrier island recession is greater than shoreline retreat on the mainland.  
Adding a positive quantity to the numerator and subtracting a positive quantity from 








Figure 2.2: Barrier Island Recession due to Sea Level Rise – Initial forms of 
island (gold) and sea level (blue) are indicated by solid lines; subsequent forms are indicated 
by dashed lines; ∆S is the change in sea level; R is horizontal retreat distant; Ml and M are 
berm heights on the lagoon and ocean side; hl and h are closure depths on the lagoon and ocean 
side; Wl and W are active profile width on the lagoon and ocean side; and w is island width. 




is multiplied by the change in sea level, ∆S.  Equation [2.7] reduces to [2.6] if there is 
no deposition on the lagoon side (in the back-barrier, i.e., Wl, Ml, hl = 0 and removing 
w from the equation).  Further, if the denominator is zero, i.e., (M + h) = (Ml + hl), 
the island will “drown” in-place, as there is no yield of sediment to allow the island to 
migrate. 
Dean (1991) explores the change in beach fill quantities required to maintain 
average beach width under sea level rise.  The relationship is derived by combining 
[2.5] and [2.6].  For mainland shores (or stabilized barrier island shorelines), the 
change in beach width per unit length is simply: 
 
q̂ (n) =  (n - W ∆S) / (M + h),      [2.8] 
 
Equation [2.8] clearly shows that the balance between nourishment and shoreline 
recession determines net change in beach width.  Consider the discrete time analog of 
[2.8], with n representing nourishment sand per period of time and ∆S representing 
the change in sea level per unit time. Since W > 1 meter, nourishment fill needs to 
increase at a rate greater than or equal to that of sea level rise in order to prevent 
beach erosion.  For example, for an active profile width of 500 meters and sea level 
rise of 0.3cm/year, nourishment volume per unit length will need to increase by 1.5 
m3/year to maintain the current position of the shoreline.  While equation [2.7] 
suggests that the active profile of barrier islands is larger than that of mainland shores 




barrier islands because they are not in a natural state that would allow them to 
migrate.   
 Equation [2.8] will hold as long as the position of the island can be maintained 
by replenishing the beach—that is, as long as mean sea level is well below the height 
of the beach berm.  Once the berm is compromised, overwash will begin to deposit 
sand in the back-bay, and the island will begin the process of migration.  At this 
critical threshold of sea level rise, nourishment quantities would need to increase 
dramatically in order to maintain the position of the island.  No longer would the aim 
of shoreline management be simply maintenance of the beach; equation [2.8] would 
no longer apply.  Rather, sand must be added to the entire island, including the surf 
zone and back-barrier lagoon (Yohe, et al. 1991).13    
To maintain the elevation of the island relative to sea level, the requisite 
volume of sand per unit shoreline length is approximately (Wo + w + Wl)∆S.  This 
would entail quite an engineering feat, and this type of operation is not reflected in 
any historical beach management data.  Nonetheless, I will use the historical cost data 
to estimate what these costs might be.  At significantly high sea level (i.e. above the 
critical threshold), the change in beach width per unit length is given by: 
 
q̂ (n) =  (n – (W + w + Wl) ∆S) / [(M + h) - (Ml + hl)],  [2.9] 
 
where W and Wl are active profile width on the ocean and lagoon sides, respectively, 
and w is the width of the island.   
                                                 
13 Buildings would also have to be elevated, and infrastructure would have to be rebuilt.  I don’t 




The following stylized facts will govern beach dynamics in the analysis to 
follow. With a relatively constant sea level (i.e. the short run), the relationship 
between average beach quality and nourishment quantities is defined by [2.5], and the 
erosion parameter, θ, is assumed constant.  With a rising sea level (i.e. the long run), 
the sand volume required to produce a unit of beach width is still defined by [2.5], but 
the erosion parameter evolves following equation [2.6].  The net effect on average 
beach quality is given by equation [2.8].   
Equation [2.8] only applies as long as sea level does not threaten to inundate 
the island.  Once sea level rises to the point of inundation, barrier island migration 
becomes the natural response and [2.7] becomes the relevant model of shoreline 
change.  The change in the erosion rate under this scenario would be quite large, 
reflecting not only the width of the active offshore zone, but also the width of the 
barrier island and the width of the active lagoon zone.  Assuming the beach profile 
parameters remain the same, the sand volume required to produce a unit of beach 
width is still defined by [2.5].  But, the erosion parameter evolves following equation 
[2.7], with the net effect on average beach quality is given by equation [2.9].  Clearly, 
the required nourishment volume per unit length will witness a rather large discrete 
jump at this critical point.  Combining [2.8] and [2.9], one can map a non-stationary 
transition equation for any barrier island beach, conditional on the beach profile and 
the rate of sea-level rise.   
In summary, the relationships given by [2.5], [2.8], and [2.9] will be used to 




equation for beach management with constant sea level.  Equations [2.8] and [2.9] 
define the transition equation for beach management under sea level rise. 
Optimal Beach Management 
The coastal planner’s problem is to maximize the difference between the benefits (as 
indicated by [2.1] and [2.2]) and management costs subject to the relationship 
between beach quality, erosion, and beach nourishment.  The coastal planner chooses 
the amount of beach nourishment to be conducted in each period.  This problem is a 
non-renewable resource management problem, but differs from the conventional non-
renewable problem because society benefits from preservation rather than extraction.  
The non-renewable resource exhibits a decaying tendency, and the management 
control represents a contribution to the level of resource quality that counters the 
tendency for decay.   
A sustained corner solution implies a de facto policy of shoreline retreat in the 
long run.  By “sustained corner solution” I mean a lack of control for a period of time 
sufficient to lead to significant diminution of beach resources and associated losses of 
property.  Returns from beach quality are represented by [2.1] and [2.2], and these 
preferences are taken as static.  Since nourishment costs are expected to increase with 
sea level, one can define the point at which shoreline retreat becomes the optimal 
policy response by the balance of benefits and costs.  If costs rise to a certain point, 
they will eclipse the benefits of preservation, thus triggering a policy shift.  
Interestingly, barrier island beaches may be considered a renewable resource under a 




The problem as non-renewable is related to maintaining quality and the present 
location of the beach and thus preserving coastal developments as well.   















η       [2.10] 
subject to qt+1  - qt = - θ  + τ nt     [2.11] 
Nt =nt×l  nt ≥ 0    [2.12] 
  qt=0 = q0, qT = free q0 ≥ 0    [2.13] 
 
where WTP functions reflect mean willingness-to-pay14 of the appropriate user 
groups; ηt = 1/(1 + δ)t is a discount factor; B is the number of beach visitor 
households, and R is the number of coastal homeowners; C(Nt) represents the costs of 
beach nourishment,15 with Nt representing the total volume of sand (or “beach fill”) 
added to the beach in period t;  τ is a parameter that converts sand volume to 
incremental beach width;  qt+1 - qt describes the dynamic motion for beach width 
(bolstered by beach nourishment and naturally decaying at some rate θ); and q0 is the 
initial beach quality condition.  The terminal level of beach quality (qT) is free, but 
could be specified as a specific value. 
                                                 
14 The WTP functions in the objective functional represent total WTP for the given quality level, q.  
For example, WTPb(q)= Eb(p,L,U0,0)-Eb(p,L,U0,q), where the ‘0’ represents a beach quality level of 
zero. 




Equations [2.10] through [2.13] describe an optimal control problem with one 
control variable (nt) and one state variable (qt).  As indicated in the discussion on 
beach geomorphology, the τ parameter is given by: 
 
τ  = (n)/n = 1 / (M + h)      [2.5’] q̂
 
The erosion parameter, θ, reflects average annual beach erosion caused by coastal 
storms and the background rate of sea level rise.  Assuming relatively constant sea 
level (i.e. the short run) the erosion control problem may be considered autonomous, 
and the beach quality transition equation is constant over time.  This setup can be 
used to evaluate beach erosion management programs in the near term.   
Alternatively, one may set up the model to examine the problem of sea level 
rise (i.e. the long run).  With rising seas, erosive pressure will be increasing, as the 
barrier island becomes prone to migrating.  This characterization of the problem 
suggests that the erosion parameter, θ, will be increasing over time, and we must 
estimate the path of θt.  Equation [2.6] indicates how θ will change with sea level rise, 
and equation [2.8] gives us the net effect on beach quality.  Let ∆S be the change in 
sea level per unit time (a positive constant).  Equation [2.8] can be separated into two 
parts: 
 
q̂ (nt) =  nt / (M + h) - W ∆S×t/ (M + h),     





The first gives us the change in average beach width due to nourishment (nτ), and the 
second gives us the change in the erosion rate (∆θt) as a function of sea level change 
(∆S), physical characteristics of the beach, and time.  Thus we have: 
 
∆θt =  (W∆S×t) / (M+h),       
 
which applies only as long as sea level rise is below the critical threshold that would 
engulf the barrier island.  Then, the trajectory of the erosion rate parameter under 
these conditions is given by: 
 
θt = θ + ∆θ(t) = θ  + (W∆S×t) / (M+h),      [2.14] 
 
where θ is the background erosion rate.   
Once sea level rise reaches the critical value, the barrier island will be prone 
to landward migration and [2.7] becomes the model of shoreline response.  The net 
effect on average beach width is given by equation [2.9], which can be separated into 
two parts: 
 
q̂ (nt) =  nt/ [(M + h)-(Ml + hl)] – (W + w + Wl) ∆S×t / [(M + h)-(Ml + hl)]
 (nq̂ t) =  ntτ~   - ∆ tθ
~        [2.9] 





The first term on the RHS is the change in average beach width due to nourishment 
when sea level rises above the critical value, and the second term is the change in the 
erosion rate due to sea level rise above the critical value.  Thus, when aggregate sea 
level rise reaches a critical value, our τ parameter changes and our erosion trajectory 
undergoes structural change.  The new rate of change for erosion is: 
 
∆ tθ
~ =  (W + w + Wl) ∆S×t / [(M + h)-(Ml + hl)],     
 
which applies after the critical threshold that will engulf the barrier island.  The 
complete trajectory of the erosion rate parameter under these conditions is given by: 
 
     θt| critical sea level = θ + ∆ tθ
~ =  θ + (W + w + Wl) ∆S×t / [(M + h)-(Ml + hl)],  
          [2.15] 
where θ  is the background erosion rate. 
Under conditions [2.8] and [2.9] the coastal erosion problem is non-
autonomous.  The erosion trajectories specified in [2.14] and [2.15] are increasing 
monotonic functions of time.  They represent the escalating erosive pressures 
associated with sea level rise.  In the long run, we consider the selection of the 
terminal time as a management parameter.  The time horizon of beach nourishment 
will depend upon the number of households (B and R), recreational and protective 
services of the beach (represented by WTP), the rate of sea level rise, the sensitivity 




The present value Hamiltonian for the constant sea level (short run) problem 
















  [2.16] 
 
where λt+1 is the present shadow value of an additional unit of beach width delivered 
at time t+1.  Applying the Maximum Principle to this control problem gives the first-
order conditions for optimality,16 which include: 
 
 , n0// 1 ≤+×∂∂−=∂∂ +tt
t
t lNCnH τλη t ≥ 0        ∀ t [2.17] 
0)/( 1 =×+×∂∂− + ttt
t nlNC τλη     
 λt+1 - λt = -∂H/∂qt        ∀ t  [2.18] 
=   }







qt+1  - qt = ∂H/∂λt+1  = - θ  + τnt         ∀ t [2.19]  
  
Condition [2.17] allows for a corner solution to the optimal amount of beach 
nourishment, thus the attendant complementary slackness condition.  For beach 
nourishment to be undertaken in any period t (nt > 0), optimality condition [2.17] 
requires that the present value of marginal cost of an additional unit of beach width be 
 
16 The Mangasarian Sufficiency Theorem requires that both 




equal to the present shadow value of beach quality in the next period.  That is, 
.   1/)/( +=×∂∂ tt
t lNC λτη
 Equation [2.18] is a first-order difference equation that defines how the 
shadow value of beach quality evolves over time.  Assuming aggregate marginal 
benefits of beach quality are strictly positive, equation [2.18] implies that the present 
shadow value of beach quality decreases over time, at a rate equal to the discounted 
value of the marginal benefits of beach quality.  If marginal WTP is linear in qt, then 
equation [2.18] is a first-order linear difference equation; otherwise, it is non-linear. 
Equation [2.19] imposes the transition equation on our control solution.  It is a first-




















          [2.20] 
which equates the present value of the marginal cost (RHS) of beach nourishment 
with the present value of its marginal benefits (LHS). 
 In addition to [2.17] - [2.19], we require a transversality condition to 
completely identify the time-paths of the state, control, and costate variables.  There 
are two management strategies in this regard.  We can require that the shadow value 
of beach quality be zero in the last period.  That is: 
 





This condition requires that either (i) the present value of beach quality be driven to 
zero in the final period, or (ii) the resource stock be driven to zero in the final period.  
This condition embodies the notion that efficiency requires all surpluses from beach 
quality be extracted before the termination of control.  Thus, the stock of the resource 
is determined such that it has no residual value in the final period.  Alternatively, we 
could specify some terminal amount of beach quality.  This may be a more reasonable 
approach for the short run problem, as the beach is a public resource that is not likely 
to be extirpated in the short run.  In this case, the transversality condition is: 
 
 qT = q         [2.21’] 
 
The present value Hamiltonian for the increasing sea level (long run) problem 
takes the following form: 
 
















where θt follows either equation [2.14] or [2.15] and the τ parameter will vary 
dichotomously, both conditioned upon whether the critical level of sea level rise has 
been broached.  The first-order conditions are equivalent to [2.17]-[2.29], with the 
exception being that the transition equation for beach quality [2.19] is now: 
 




qt+1  - qt = ∂H/∂λt+1  = ntτ~ - θ   - ∆ tθ
~  for  t ≥ Scrit/∆S,       [2.19’] 
 
 where Scrit is the critical level of aggregate sea level rise that threatens to flood the 
entire barrier island.  The state path for beach quality only need be piecewise 
differentiable, so condition [2.19’] poses no difficulties for the beach erosion control 
problem.  
In the long run, we are also interested in determining the terminal 
management time.  If T is free, it should be chosen such that the Hamiltonian 
evaluated at the terminal time is zero (Chiang 1991).  Since erosion is increasing 
monotonically with sea level rise, the nourishment costs of producing a given beach 
width, conditional on some arbitrary starting point, should be increasing 
monotonically as well.  Economic returns from beach quality are represented by 
concave functions, and the parameters that define the extensive margins of beach use 
(B and R) are assumed constant.  Thus, the benefits of beach quality are bounded, and 
the balance of benefits and costs implicitly defines the terminal time.  In the long run, 
transversality condition [2.21] applies, but the introduction of a free terminal time, T, 
necessitates an additional transversality condition.  If λT=0 then the condition is: 
 
)())(,()( 1111 lnCqLqWTPRqWTPB TTT
r
T
b ×=×+× −−−− .  [2.22] 
 
Condition [2.22] indicates that the benefits of beach management must equal the costs 
in the penultimate period.  Given that costs will be increasing monotonically and 




the time at which beach nourishment should be abandoned.  In the absence of beach 
nourishment, a policy of shoreline retreat is implicit.  The other possible condition 
associated with [2.21], qT=0, does not give rise to a reasonable transversality 
condition.   
 The following chapter focuses on estimating the preference function for beach 
visitors in [2.1] in the context of recreational beach demand.  Chapter 4 presents a 
hedonic price analysis of coastal properties that is used to estimate the preference 
function for coastal homeowners defined implicitly in [2.2].   Chapter 5 first focuses 
on estimation of a beach nourishment cost function.  Then, the components are 






Chapter 3: Recreational Demand and Beach Quality 
This chapter focuses on welfare effects stemming from changes in beach quality 
accruing to beach visitors.  The goal of the analysis is to estimate an approximation of 
the preference function in [2.1].  Since this expression is meant to embody the 
preferences of the representative beach visitor, coastal residents (i.e. those residing on 
the barrier island) are excluded from the analysis.  The approach utilized is that of a 
single-site recreational demand model using pre-existing survey data from two barrier 
islands in Georgia.  
The data were gathered on-site over three seasons.  The data include ex-post 
revealed trips to the beach under current conditions, as well as ex-ante stated number 
of trips under hypothetical improvement scenarios.  A separate set of models is 
estimated for each island.  First, the survey and data are described.  Then, a 
theoretical model that incorporates particular aspects of the data is derived.  The 
specific assumptions of the model are then discussed and the empirical results are 
presented.  The last section outlines the procedures used to approximate a marginal 
value function for changes in beach quality, which is then integrated, producing an 
estimate of [2.1]. 
Beach Visit Demand Data 
The recreational demand model uses travel cost and contingent behavior data 
gathered on-site of two barrier islands—Tybee and Jekyll—in Georgia in 1998.  Data 
were gathered in the winter, spring, and summer.  Surveyors intercepted individuals 




names and addresses were recorded, along with observable characteristics (i.e. 
gender, race, party size, etc.), age, the number of years they had been visiting the 
island, whether the beach was their primary destination, and one-way transit time to 
the island.  Participants were given a survey and a postage-paid, return mailing 
envelope.  If the survey was not returned within a month, a reminder postcard was 
mailed to the participant’s home address.  This was followed by a replacement survey 
two weeks later if the original survey was not returned (Dillman 1979).   
The survey instrument was designed around a contingent choice question, 
allowing respondents to choose between current and improved beach conditions.  The 
survey provided (i) background information on beach erosion, including the causes of 
beach erosion, potential results of erosion and how these results might affect 
recreation, and (ii) a review of management responses to the erosion problem.  The 
hypothetical improvement scenarios offered amelioration of portions of the beach 
with the poorest quality (i.e. no beach at high tide or narrow beach at high tide).   
Most of the surveys were ambiguous as to how the improved beach would be 
attained, but a sub-sample of the surveys specified either beach nourishment or 
shoreline retreat as the prospective management tool. 
Beach width on each island was measured at various transects during high and 
low tide; measurements were taken with a laser range finder during the summer of 
1997.  The distributions of current beach quality conditions, in terms of beach width, 
were described using maps and pictures, and also summarized in a table.  The status 
quo distributions of beach quality conditions for each island are presented in column 




improvement scenarios offered a decrease in the frequency of poor beach conditions 
along the shore of each island, as indicated in columns B and C of Tables 3.1a and 
3.1b.  As shown in Table 3.1, under Case I the worst portions of the beach are 
improved (i.e., those with no beach at high-tide), while Case II offers a more sizeable 
improvement of not only the worst, but also portions of the beach with moderately 
poor quality (those with an average beach width of 9 meters at high-tide on Tybee 
Island, and 11 meters at high-tide on Jekyll Island).  Within the survey instruments, 
these improvement scenarios were described on the same page as the status quo, with 
the distribution of improved beach quality indicated on a map, described with 
pictures, and summarized in a table.  The status quo case is denoted ‘0’; the moderate 
improvement scenario is denoted ‘I’, and the greater improvement scenario is denoted 
‘II’.   









55 meters 0.46 0.46 0.46 
22 meters 0.19 0.19 0.54 
11 meters 0.11 0.35 0 
0 meters 0.24 0 0 
sum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 









28 meters 0.76 0.76 0.76 
23 meters 0.07 0.07 0.24 
9 meters 0.07 0.17 0 
0 meters 0.1 0 0 
sum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
The beach quality indicators focus on average beach width, and its distribution 




scenario.  The state of the beach resource under each scenario can be represented as a 
weighted average of the distribution of different beach types.  For example, on Jekyll 
Island the average beach width implied by the current distribution of beach types is 
31 meters.  On Tybee Island, the average beach width under current conditions is 23.5 
meters.  I calculate these weighted averages by summing the average widths in each 
cell weighted by the proportions from the beach width distribution under the current 
scenario.  I focus on the change in average beach width as a signal of the change in 
resource quality between the scenarios.  Thus, I assume that average beach width 
adequately captures the state in the resource from the perspective of beach visitors.  
The increases in average beach width for Jekyll Island under the alternative scenarios 
are 2 meters for Case I and 6 meters for Case II.  For Tybee Island, the improvement 
scenarios specify increases in average beach width of 1 meter for Case I and 3.5 
meters for Case II.  Again, these improvement scenarios were based on ameliorating 
areas of the shore with the poorest beach quality.  Thus, the effect on average beach 
width was determined by the distribution of beaches with poor quality and the degree 
of improvement.  The improvement scenarios were randomly distributed among 
respondents.  Thus, each observation is associated with only one of the two 
improvement scenarios.   
Associated with the improvement scenarios were increased parking fees, an 
element of on-site cost.  Increased parking fees serve as the payment vehicle for the 
contingent choice portion of the survey.  Pre-tests of the survey questionnaire 
indicated that increasing fees associated with the use of beach resources was a more 




price levels.  The survey instrument presents increases in both daily and annual 
parking fees (ranging from 10 to 1200 percent) in conjunction with the improvements 
in beach quality.  The prospective fee increases were randomly distributed among the 
subject pool.  Increasing the cost of a visit under improved conditions, however, can 
induce a change in demand not attributable to the quality change.  Visitation data, for 
both before and after the change in beach quality, were collected. 
Visitation under the current conditions was elicited on the first page of the 
survey: 
1. A.  Over the last year, how many days did you visit this island?: _____ days 
    B.   How many of these days involved an overnight stay?: ______ days 
2. Do you currently own an annual parking sticker?     ___ Yes       ___No. 
 
With this information, one can calculate the number of trips and the average days on 
site.  I refer to this data as ex-post trip demand.  Question number two tells us whether 
the household pays for parking on a daily or annual basis.  To provide information on 
how visitation would change, a contingent behavior question inquiring about 
visitation under the alternative scenario of improved beaches was included after the 
valuation question.  What follows is an excerpt from the survey instrument: 
The alternative management scenario would require an increase in the parking 
meter fee to X cents/hour, the city parking lot to $Y/day or the annual pass to 
$Z/year.  This money would be used for beach nourishment or for financing a retreat 
policy. 
 
5.  Considering the beach conditions and the price of using the beach, which 
would you prefer to see at this island?   (circle one) 
a. Current Conditions  (at $0.50/hour or $5/day or $50/year) 
 b.  Alternative Management (at $X/hour or $Y/day or $Z/year) 
 
6.  In either scenario, residents and frequent users would most likely buy an 
annual pass while occasional users would not.  What option would you 
choose?  (circle one) 
a. Parking meter fee 
b. City parking lot 





7.  Suppose that the alternative management plan happens and beach 
conditions in the right-hand map result.  At the new fees of $X/hour or 
$Y/day or $Z/year, how would you change the number of days you visit this 
island in a one-year period?  (circle one) 
a. Visit the same number of days. 
b. Reduce the days you visit.  How many fewer days?          (fill in blank) 
c. Increase the days you visit.  How many more days?          (fill in blank) 
 
Question five is the contingent choice valuation question, the responses to 
which are not utilized in this analysis.  (See Landry, Keeler, and Kriesel (2003) or 
Kriesel, Keeler, and Landry (2003) for analysis of this data.)  Question six allows us 
to estimate how payment arrangements change under the alternative scenario, and 
with responses to question seven, I construct what I refer to as ex-ante trip demand.  
Following the valuation and behavioral questions were a series of questions on 
recreational experience and the standard socio-economic characteristics.  This 
analysis utilizes only the ex-post behavioral travel data and the ex-ante stated travel 
data. 
Surveyors made initial contact with 6,101 households during the three seasons 
on the two barrier islands.  Of the initial contacts, 3,228 surveys were returned, for a 
response rate of 52.9%.  The dataset is comprised of 2,341 usable observations (i.e. 
those with complete data) on respondent’s current visitation and stated number of 
visits under hypothetical, improved beach conditions.  The distinct, but functionally 
equivalent, survey instruments for each island fully describe current beach conditions 
and offer one of two improvements in beach quality.  Overall, there are six quality 
levels to be found in the pooled data.  In addition, there are approximately 300 
observations, a sub-sample of the main dataset, on travel and on-site costs incurred 
with current visitation.  These data are used to estimate average trip cost per mile and 




subsequent empirical analysis.  First, however, we must review the theory that 
supports the use of these data. 
Model of Recreational Demand with On-site Time 
McConnell (1992) explores the problem of on-site time in travel cost models.  In 
contrast to McConnell, I attempt here to apply this model in a setting where multiple-
day trips are common.  The model is formulated on a single beach recreation site.  
(The models for each island are estimated separately.)  Households choose v, the 
number of visits to the site, dos, the number of days on-site per visit, and y, a Hicksian 
composite commodity, to maximize a quasi-concave utility function: u(v,dos,y;q).  
The variable q represents beach quality, and is beyond the control of the household.  
Assuming no utility is produced by travel, beach visits have no effect on utility unless 
time is spent on-site.  Likewise, on-site time cannot produce utility unless the 
household invests in at least one visit.  We impose joint weak complementarity to 
account for this: ∂u(v,0,y;q)/∂v = ∂u(0,dos,y;q)/∂dos = 0.  Assuming households do not 
exhibit any non-use value for beach quality, we can make a further restriction 
involving joint weak complementarity between visits, on-site time, and beach quality: 
∂u(0,dos,y;q)/∂q = ∂u(v,0,y;q)/∂q = 0. 
Budget and time constraints are given by: 
 
 m = m + wdw = ctrv + cosvdos + cyy 





respectively, where ci is the cost of travel for a visit (for i=tr), cost of a day on-site 
(for i=os), and cost of the Hicksian commodity (for i=y); m is total income, 
composed of unearned income, m , and returns from labor, wdw; w is the wage rate; di 
is the number of days spent working (for i=w), the number of days spent in transit per 
trip (for i=tr), the number of days spent at the recreation site per trip (for i=os), and 
the number of days spent consuming the composite commodity (for i=y); and D* is 
the number of days available for consumption activities.  That is, D* = D - dw, with D 
representing the total days in the planning period.   
Total days spent at the beach site are calculated as bdays = v × dos.  One could 
posit utility as a function of bdays, but this implies no preference over how days are 
dispersed within the planning period.  It is highly plausible that household utility 
exhibits diminishing returns to both visits and days on-site, and thus the household’s 
willingness to substitute visits for day on-site will depend upon their relative 
quantities.  The form u(v,dos,y) is more general. 
Assuming the household chooses the number of days to devote to work, and 
substituting for dw = D - D* = D – (dtrv + dosv + dyy) in the budget constraint, we 
obtain an expression for full income: 
 
m = m + wD = (ptr + posdos)v + pyy, 
 
where ptr = ctr + wdtr,  pos = cos + w, and py = cy + wdy.  This constraint is nonlinear 
in visits/on-site time space.  McConnell (1992) recognizes that only the interior 




not reasonable for a household to consume dos > 0 if v = 0, because on-site days do 
not augment utility if no visits are taken; the household can save money by moving to 
a corner solution in visits/on-site time space.  The same argument holds for v > 0 and 
dos = 0, and it is thus reasonable to assume interior solutions for the population of 
current users. 
 The household’s problem is: 
 
             ))(();,,(max
,,
ypvdppmqydvu yosostrosydv os
−+−+ µ .                 [3.1] 
 
The result of this optimization process is the indirect utility function V(ptr,pos,py,m;q), 
or V(ptr*,pos*,m*;q), where the asterisks represent normalization by the price of the 
Hicksian commodity.  I will work with the latter form from here, but drop the 
asterisks for ease of exposition.  The price of a beach visit is pv = ptr+pos×dos.  The 
nonlinear budget constraint in [3.1] causes a breakdown of the standard system of 
Marshallian demand functions because one cannot ensure that the first-order 
conditions for maximization hold (Bockstael and McConnell 1983).  One may easily 
verify, however, that Roy’s Identity still applies for trip demand: 
 
 v(ptr,pos,m;q) = - [∂ V(ptr,pos,m;q)/∂ptr] / [∂ V(ptr,pos,m;q)/∂m] [3.2] 
 
(and we might note also for Hicksian commodity demand).  Roy’s identity does not 
apply for on-site time demand, and the on-site time demand function has no welfare 




a unique on-site-time compensated demand function.  McConnell (1992) further 
shows that measuring the area under the visit demand curve above price will still 
provide an estimate of consumer surplus attributable to the recreation site.  Note that 
in doing so, the number of days on-site must be adjusted optimally as ptr changes.   
If on-site time is indeed endogenous, McConnell suggests treating on-site 
price as a parameter and directly estimating the visit demand equation on the left hand 
side of [3.2].  However, if on-site time varies across households and is endogenous, 
this regression will produce a biased estimate of the coefficient on ptr.17  This is 
problematic because βtr figures prominently into estimation of consumer surplus.  The 
standard linear regression model implied by [3.2] is 
 
v(ptr,pos,m;q) = β0 + βtr× ptr + × posβ̂ os + βm× m + ε, 
 
where ososos d×= ββ̂  , with osβ representing the true coefficient and  osd representing 
the average days on-site, and ε = u + βos(pos×dos-pos× osd ).  Because dos is by 
definition a function of ptr, the coefficient βtr will be biased, as will the coefficients of 
other variables which are correlated with dos.  Rather than the specification implied by 
[3.2], I specify trip demand as a function of the visit price pv = ptr + pos×dos. 
 Using the area under the appropriately specified demand function above 
price, one can produce an estimate of the value of access to the study sites under 
various beach quality conditions.  The specification of the relevant portion of the 
demand system is: 
                                                 





 v = v(ptr+pos× dos,psubs,m,X;q)                                     [3.3] 
dos = dos(ptr,pos,psubs,m,X;q),                  [3.4] 
 
where dos is included in [3.3] to make clear that it is simultaneously determined.  
Thus, equation [3.3] is a quasi-Marshallian demand curve.  An instrumental variables 
approach can be used to account for the endogeneity of on-site time.  The variable 
psubs represents the price of travel to a substitute site, and X is a vector of socio-
economic covariates associated with the household.     
 As recognized by McConnell (1992), the assumption that on-site price (pos) is 
constant is made for convenience, and in many cases may be wrong.  In general, 
direct on-site costs (cos—a component of pos) are likely to depend upon endogenous 
attributes of the trip, such as the quality of accommodations and party size.  
Endogeneity of the on-site price variable is another argument for dispensing with the 
demand equation in [3.2], but will also lead to biased and inconsistent estimates for at 
least some of the parameters in [3.3] and [3.4].  Moreover, lacking detailed 
information on on-site costs for each observation in the sample necessitates using an 
estimated value (as will be done in the empirical analysis to follow).  This will 
introduce measurement error into the on-site price variable.  Luckily, all that is 
required for consistent estimation of [3.3] is the total on-site expenditures—pos× dos –
which suggests the following form for [3.4] 
 





Assuming a suitable instrument can be found, the linear prediction from equation 
[3.4’] can be used to define an exogenous visit price—pv = ptr + Θ, where Θ is the 
predicted on-site expenditures–which can be used to consistently estimate the trip 
demand function in [3.3]. 
This demand system of [3.3] and [3.4’] is conditional on q, and presumably 
will change with changes in q and pos.  Since beach quality is a viewed as a good, we 
expect that consumer surplus will increase with q, controlling for on-site price.  Since 
we have measures of ex-post visitation and projections of ex-ante visitation under 
different levels of q, we can estimate this demand system for each of the beach 
quality levels.  A marginal value function for beach visitors can be estimated by 
calculating the change in consumer surplus per unit increase in beach width 
conditional on the final width. 















∫ Θ+= ,                 [3.5] 
 
where CS represents consumer surplus, ptr0 is the current trip price, ptrch(qj) is the 
choke price at which trip demand is zero, for j=0 (current beach quality) and j=I or 
j=II (subsequent beach quality).  Again, Θj is predicted on-site expenditures from the 
first-stage instrumental variables regression [3.4’].  In order to estimate [3.5], we 




The accuracy and uniqueness of [3.5] as a welfare estimate depends upon: (i) 
the price flexibility of income (i.e. how does marginal willingness to pay change as 
income changes?), and (ii) the size of consumer surplus attributable to access to the 
site relative to consumption of the numeraire (Randall and Stoll 1980), as well as (iii) 
substitution possibilities among the non-market resource (i.e. recreation site) and 
private goods (Hanemann 1991).  In particular, if marginal willingness to pay for 
visits to the site does not change with income and the site is not unique (implying lots 
of substitution possibilities between the non-market resource and private goods) then 
[3.5] will be equivalent to willingness-to-pay for access.  In general, consumer 
surplus will be a reasonable approximation to the Hicksian compensated welfare 
measure if marginal willingness to pay for visits to the site are relatively unresponsive 
to changes in income, if the total value of access is relatively small (less than or equal 
to about 5 percent) compared to consumption of the composite, and if the site is not 
particularly unique.   
Recreational Demand, Beach Visitors, and Beach Quality 
There are a number of practical issues that must be addressed in estimating the single-
site demand model of [3.3] and [3.4’].  First, residents of Tybee and Jekyll Island are 
removed from the dataset, since the purpose of the analysis is to focus on beach 
visitors.  Next, the data must be cleaned of observations that do not appear to be 
primarily related to the demand for beach recreation.  This requires a subjective 
assessment of each household’s number of trips, time spent on-site, and distance 
traveled.  Excluded from the analysis are those respondents who spent over six weeks 




western United States or other countries.  Households spending over six weeks on-
site or making over 50 trips are less likely to be doing so for beach recreation and 
more likely to be working on the island.  Households traveling from great distances 
are less likely to be doing so for the sole purpose of beach recreation, but rather are 
likely to be engaging in many types of activities, of which beach recreation is only a 
portion of the value attributable to travel cost.  While these assumptions can be 
criticized for their subjective nature, they are arguably more innocuous than doing 
nothing to purge the data of dubious observations. 
The sample must also be tailored to address a potential problem for 
accounting welfare effects from changes in beach quality across the two user 
groups—visitors and coastal homeowners.  Specifically, there exists a potential for 
double counting when the recreational demand data are combined with the other 
benefits component of the optimal control model.  As indicated in Chapter 2, a 
hedonic model will be used to estimate coastal homeowners’ demand for beach 
quality.  The hedonic approach presumes that beach quality is capitalized in the 
market price of coastal housing.  Asset theory posits the market price of housing as 
the present discounted value of the stream of property rents in perpetuity.  Thus, there 
is a close theoretical relationship between market price and rental rate; however, the 
sales and rental markets are, in reality, distinct.  One would imagine that the rental 
rates of coastal properties would similarly adjust with beach quality, but it is difficult 
to know a priori how this adjustment would play out.  Nevertheless, the increase in 
consumer surplus accruing to those visitors that rent beach houses could very well be 




that associated with recreational users and that associated with coastal homeowners—
would overlap, thus the potential for double counting.   
To circumvent this problem, visitors that rent beach houses could be discarded 
from the analysis, but such visitors must be identified.  A stylized fact is helpful in 
this regard: beach houses are typically only rented on a weekly basis, and weekly 
rates are usually competitive with (if not cheaper than) other accommodations.  It 
seems reasonable to assume visitors staying over five days will tend to rent beach 
homes, while those staying five days or less will utilize other accommodations (hotels 
or campgrounds).  To remove the potential for double counting, visitors staying over 
five days, on average, are removed from the dataset.  One can be reasonably sure that 
the remaining data points represent visitors that are not participants in the beach 
house rental market.   
As aforementioned, a subset of the data included travel expenditures.  As an 
additional survey item to a portion of the intercepted beach visitors, 492 expenditure 
surveys were randomly distributed.  The response rate for the expenditure survey was 
higher (72%) than the overall contingent choice survey response rate.  The 
expenditure survey apportioned expenditures into transit and on-site costs, so that 
these costs could be separated accordingly.  Average vehicle transit costs per mile and 
average on-site costs per person, per day were calculated for each island separately.  
The average automobile transit cost for Jekyll Island visitors is $0.3283 per mile.  The 
average automobile transit cost for Tybee Island visitors is $0.3795 per mile.  





Monetary transit costs were calculated assuming an average rate of speed of 
45 miles per hour.  Transit and on-site time costs were approximated using a portion 
of the wage rate and assuming an average workday of 8 hours.  Annual income was 
indicated by categorical response to a survey question, and the midpoint was used as 
an estimate of net household income.  Daily wage per household was calculated as 
(annual income)/250, where 250 represents annual work days minus two-weeks 
vacation.  Full income was estimated as 260×(daily household wage).  The survey 
questionnaire inquired about foregone income associated with the beach trip.  For 
respondents that indicated they gave up a chance to earn income, travel and on-site 
time was valued at the full daily wage.  For others, transit and on-site time was valued 
at 1/3 the daily household wage.  The transit and daily on-site prices where calculated 
as ptr = ctr + αwdtr and pos = cos + αw, where α = 0.33 or 1 depending upon the 
respondent.  In all, 1946 observations were available for analysis—822 for Jekyll 
Island and 1124 for Tybee Island. 
Parking fees at each island were payable on either a daily or annual basis (see 
survey excerpt, above).  Thus, in some cases parking is part of the on-site cost of 
visiting the beach, while in others it is a lump-sum investment made before any visits 
are undertaken (a subtraction from income).  The current parking cost arrangement 
(daily or annual) is elicited in the survey, and the present expenditures on daily 
parking should be embedded in the on-site cost data.  For purposes of assessing the 
value of beach improvements, information on the desired method of payment (daily 
or annual) under subsequent conditions was elicited.  In order to completely identify 




cases: (i) those who pay on a daily basis under the current conditions and will 
continue to do so under the improvements, (ii) those who currently pay on an annual 
basis and will continue to, and those who switch one way (iii) or the other (iv).  This 
complexity can be addressed by considering two monetary sources of welfare effects, 
price and income changes.  See Table 3.2 for a breakdown of the cost changes.  
Table 3.2: Price and Income Changes Associated with  
Current and Projected Quality Levels and Parking Fees 
Current fee (q0) Projected fee (qj) Price change Income change 
Daily Daily Pdailyj – Pdaily0 0 
Annual Annual 0 Pannual0 – Pannualj
Daily Annual – Pdaily0 – Pannualj
Annual Daily Pdailyj Pannual0
The ‘0’ superscript represents current conditions and the ‘j’ superscript represents subsequent 
conditions. 
 
For households that currently pay on a daily basis and will continue to do so 
under the subsequent conditions, the price change is simply the additional daily cost 
imposed.  There is no income change stemming from the policy scenario for this 
group.  For households that currently pay on an annual basis and will continue to do 
so, the income change reflects the incremental cost of an annual pass, and there is no 
relevant on-site price change stemming from the policy scenario.  For households that 
indicate a change in their preferred method of payment, there are both price and 
income changes associated with the improvement scenario.  Those currently paying 
the daily fee, but preferring the annual fee under subsequent conditions, witness a 
decrease in an on-site cost parameter equal to the current daily fee and a decrease in 
income equal to the subsequent pass price.  Those currently paying the annual fee, but 
preferring the daily fee under subsequent conditions, witness an increase an on-site 
cost parameter equal to the subsequent daily fee and an increase in income equal to 




quality encompass the parametric changes in the model.  Variations in visits, on-site 
time, and utility encompass the endogenous changes.   
Other covariates included in the model are the travel price to a substitute site, 
a dummy variable indicating whether the trip was taken for multiple purposes (i.e. not 
solely for the purpose of beach recreation), and seasonal dummy variables.  The 
multi-purpose trip dummy variable is meant to represent the unobserved increment in 
the price of travel due to joint consumption activities (Parsons and Wilson 1999).  
Substitute price (psubs) measures only the transit cost to an alternative beach site.  Data 
on on-site time and expenditures at the alternative site were not available.  Roughly 
40 percent of the survey respondents did not indicate a substitute site.  These 
respondents were assigned a substitute site based on their state and city cohort (and 
the assign dummy variable was set to 1).  Thus, there is some error in the psubs 
variable.  Other covariates that could be included in the model are the number of 
years the household has been visiting the island and socio-economic characteristics 
(age, gender, race and education).  Education was measured by a dummy variable set 
equal to one if the head of household had at least some college, zero otherwise.  All 
of these variables, except the price of substitutes, are included in the vector X.  
Descriptive statistics for the raw data are displayed in Column A of Tables 3.3a and 
3.3b.   
On-site expenditures (pos× dos) in equation [3.3] is an endogenous variable.  
While average days spent on-site is elicited in the survey, on-site price at each island 




Table 3.3a:  Descriptive Statistics for Jekyll Island 
       Mean 
Variable Definition     A (Raw)         B(Weighted)* 
v0  ex-post revealed trip demand (visits)  4.26  3.63       
        (7.14)  (6.43) 
v1  ex-ante stated trip demand (visits)  2.78       2.48    
        (5.31)   (4.80) 
dos0  ex-post revealed on-site days demand  2.42      2.53    
        (1.44)  (1.46) 
dos1  ex-ante stated on-site days demand  2.10      2.23    
        (1.57)   (1.59) 
ptr  transit price (1998$)    412.83    520.46    
        (461.39) (561.96) 
pos0  ex-post on-site-day price (1998$)  229.89     240.40    
        (113.72) (122.96) 
pos1  ex-ante on-site-day price (1998$)  237.32    247.84    
        (114.55) (123.89) 
pv0  ex-post price per visit (1998$)   894.00     1050.32    
        (672.91)  (796.75) 
pv1  ex-ante price per visit (1998$)        964.27     1122.80    
(687.60)  (794.06) 
finc0  ex-ante full income (1000s 1998$)  57.190          59.564    
(29.194)  (29.954) 
finc1  ex-post full income (1000s 1998$)  57.179    59.554     
(29.199)  (29.959) 
psubs  travel price to substitute site (1998$)  366.26     440.92    
(430.61)  (529.23)    
assign  dummy variable=1 if substitute assigned, 0.3795     0.4071    
0 otherwise              (0.4856)  (0.4927) 
mpurpose dummy variable=1 is multiple purpose trip, 0.0912     0.1150    
0 otherwise     (0.2881)  (0.3199)  
spring   dummy variable=1 if spring season,  0.2384     0.1975    
      0 otherwise     (0.4264) (0.3994) 
summer  dummy variable=1 if summer season,  0.6496     0.6770    
0 otherwise     (0.4774) (0.4690) 
years   Number of years the household has  9.70         8.91    
visited Jekyll Island    (12.23)  (11.85) 
age   age of head of household (in years)  42.76     43.22    
(12.79)  (12.86) 
male  dummy variable=1 if male respondent,  0.3929     0.4023    
0 otherwise     (0.4887) (0.4918) 
nonwhite  dummy variable=1 if nonwhite respondent, 0.0340     0.0350    
0 otherwise     (0.1815) (0.1842) 
heduc  dummy variable=1 if college educated,  0.6594      0.6693    
0 otherwise     (0.4742) (0.4718) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
* The inverse of the expected value of trips is used as a weight to correct for endogenous 
stratification.        




Table 3.3b:  Descriptive Statistics for Tybee Island 
         Mean 
Variable Definition     A (Raw)         B(Weighted)* 
v0  ex-post revealed trip demand (visits)  9.45      8.14    
        (11.84)  (11.19) 
v1  ex-ante stated trip demand (visits)  7.15      6.21    
        (10.51)   (9.84) 
dos0  ex-post revealed on-site days demand  1.71       1.81    
        (1.16)  (1.23) 
dos1  ex-ante stated on-site days demand  1.52      2.61    
        (1.25)   (1.33) 
ptr  transit price (1998$)    295.25     426.01    
        (440.99) (623.53) 
pos0  ex-post on-site-day price (1998$)  196.59     207.99    
        (100.55) (114.23) 
pos1  ex-ante on-site-day price (1998$)  206.79       218.43    
        (101.51) (115.22) 
pv0  ex-post price per visit (1998$)   587.20     748.66    
        (557.34)  (752.23) 
pv1  ex-ante price per visit (1998$)        657.34     821.12    
(568.06)  (753.77) 
finc0  ex-ante full income (1000s 1998$)  59.053      60.47    
(29.292)  (30.334) 
finc1  ex-post full income (1000s 1998$)  59.021     60.442    
(29.292 )  (30.335) 
psubs  travel price to substitute site (1998$)  332.11     433.24    
(479.10)  (674.54)    
assign  dummy variable=1 if substitute assigned, 0.4306     0.4261    
0 otherwise              (0.4954)  (0.4965) 
mpurpose dummy variable=1 is multiple purpose trip, 0.1779      0.2271    
0 otherwise     (0.3826)  (0.4206)  
spring   dummy variable=1 if spring season,  0.3220      0.3143       
      0 otherwise     (0.4675) (0.4662) 
summer  dummy variable=1 if summer season,  0.5222     0.5269    
0 otherwise     (0.4997) (0.5013) 
years   Number of years the household has  13.46     12.23    
visited Tybee Island    (15.31)  (14.99) 
age   age of head of household (in years)  40.56     40.81    
(13.40)  (13.29) 
male dummy variable=1 if male respondent,  0.3790     0.3909         
0 otherwise     (0.4854) (0.4899) 
nonwhite  dummy variable=1 if nonwhite respondent, 0.0489     0.0488    
0 otherwise     (0.2158) (0.2163) 
heduc  dummy variable=1 if college educated,  0.6823     0.6840    
0 otherwise     (0.4658) (0.4668) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 * The inverse of the expected value of trips is used as a weight to correct for endogenous 




person, per day and party size (recorded in the survey data).  The number of children 
in the household is used as an instrument for on-site expenditures.  Number of 
children should be correlated with on-site expenditures, but not with the number of 
visits to the island, so assuming it has some explanatory power in equation [3.4’] it 
should serve as a suitable instrument.  An OLS regression of the exogenous 
covariates of [3.3] and the number of children in the household on on-site 
expenditures is used to predict on-site expenditures for Case 0, while the tobit model 
is used for Cases I and II.  These regression results are included in Tables A.1a and 
A.1b of the Appendix.  The predicted value of on-site expenditures (Θ) is utilized in 
place of pos× dos in [3.3]. With the predicted values of on-site expenditures on hand, 
equation [3.3] can be estimated for the three levels of beach quality (q) on each 
island.  The estimation procedure must take account of correlation among trip 
decisions, censoring of ex-ante trip demand, the truncation of non-users, and 
endogenous stratification due to on-site sampling.  Each observation contains data on 
status quo visitation, while roughly 30% of the observations contain additional stated 
preference data associated with Case I, with the remaining 70% associated with Case 
II.   
After estimating the demand equations for each island, I combine the results 
of the two models in estimation of a marginal value function for beach quality.  
Marginal WTP is approximated by the change in consumer surplus per unit change in 
average beach width.  Change in consumer surplus per unit of beach width is 
estimated for each household in each sample, and is conditioned on the vector of 




quality (beach width).  I thus regress subsequent beach quality—33 meters for Jekyll 
Island Case I, 37 meters for Jekyll Island Case II, 24.5 meters for Tybee Island Case 
I, and 27 meters for Tybee Island Case II—on the estimated marginal valuation of 
beach quality and expect a negative coefficient on the subsequent beach quality 
variable.  To make use of information from both series of demand equations in 
estimating the slope of the marginal value function, I use a fixed effects model. 
Econometric Specification for Beach Visit Demand Model 
We begin by specifying a family of visit demand equations as in [3.3], each 
associated with a different level of beach quality.  We have: 
 
 vj = vj(ptr + Θj,psubs,mj,X;qj),                                  [3.6] 
 
where j=0 for the status quo conditions, j=I for the first alternative (modest 
improvement level), and j=II for the second alternative (greater improvement level).  
The symbol Θj represents the predicted value of on-site expenditures from the first-
stage regressions.  Equation [3.6] could be estimated by two-stage least squares, but 
this procedure fails to account for certain aspects of the data—correlation of error 
term across the ex-post and ex-ante trip demand, censoring of trip demand, truncation 
of non-users, and endogenous stratification.  Recall that we will have two such series 
of demand curves, one for Jekyll and one for Tybee Island.   
The demand equations in [3.6] are assumed additively separable in 





vij = zi’βj + εij                                           [3.7] 
 
for j=0, I, II, where i=1,..,N demand observations for case 0, i=1,..,NI demand 
observations for case I, i=1,..,NII demand observations for case II, with NI + NII = N; z 
is a (k+1) × 1 vector of covariates, βj is a (k+1) × 1 vector of constant but unknown 
coefficients, and εj is an independent and identically distributed error term for each j.  
The errors will, however, be correlated across cases 0 and I, and 0 and II, because 
each household appears twice in the dataset.  Stacking the ε in [3.7] we have Ε, and 




















































,         [3.8] 
 
for j = I and II, where  is the correlation coefficient between Case 0 and Case j.  
The joint probability density function for beach visits under both the status quo and 
improvement scenario can be written as the product of the conditional and marginal 
density functions:  f(v
jρ̂
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where N is the number of observations, φ represents the standard normal probability 
density, and CaseII is a dummy variable = 0 for alternative I and =1 for alternative II.   
The likelihood function in [3.10] accounts for correlation across the ex-post 
and ex-ante trip demands, but does not account for censoring or endogenous 
stratification.  I will first address censoring of ex-ante trip demand.  Corner solutions 
in ex-ante trip demand are found in the following frequencies—13 percent for Jekyll 
Island Case I, 15 percent for Jekyll Island Case II, 14 percent for Tybee Island Case I, 
and 12 percent for Tybee Island Case II.  Applying the tobit model to the ex-ante 




































where κ = {φ(- β/σ)/(1-Φ(- β/σ))}'iz 'iz
2 - φ(- β/σ)/(1- Φ(- β/σ))×(- β/σ), and 
Φ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  The j superscripts 
have been suppressed, but equations [3.11] apply for cases I and II.  Following 




































































































where vj> 0 for all vj ∈ , vN̂ j= 0 for all vj ∈  N*, and  + NN̂ * = N.  The first four lines 
of [3.10’] correspond with Case I, while the last four correspond with Case II.  Within 
each case, the first product sign relates to the non-limiting observations, while the 
second relates to the censored observations.   
Since the beach visitor data were gathered on-site, we have two inherent 




do not include non-users of the resource.  The first problem causes biased regression 
coefficients; the second excludes potential beneficiaries of improvement projects 
because current non-users may become active users after the improvement.  This 
could be especially important for beaches, as more beach area provides for less 
congestion and thus more visitors.  Shaw (1988) explains how to correct for 
endogenous stratification due to on-site sampling.  He shows that the on-site density 
of trips is related to the population trip density by: 
 




)(/)]([)( ,     [3.12] 
 
where vk represents trips taken, f(vk) is the population density, and h(vk) is the 
observed on-site density.  Equation [3.12] indicates that individual observations need 
to be weighted by the inverse of the expected value of trips.  In general, it makes no 
difference whether we use the expected value of a censored or truncated variable, 
because the truncation correction factor (1/Prob(vk>0)) appears in both the numerator 
and denominator of [3.12].  For the likelihood function in [3.10’], however, we are 
conditioning on the truncated data.  In this case, the truncated mean should be used in 
equation [3.12].  This weight should also be used in calculation of summary statistics; 
the weighted means are presented in column B of Tables 3.3a and 3.3b. 







































































































          [3.10’’] 
where  represents the expected value of the truncated ex-post trips variable. This 
likelihood function is identical to [3.10’], except that the density for ex-post trips has 
been modified following [3.12].  This likelihood function accounts for correlation 
across ex-post revealed demand and ex-ante stated demand, and is thus efficient.  The 
likelihood function incorporates the censored and truncated nature or the recreational 
demand data.  Moreover, applying Shaw’s correction for on-site sampling, our 
likelihood function should produce unbiased parameter estimates that can be utilized 
in welfare analysis for current resource users.  With additional assumptions, the 
results can be extrapolated to the population of potential resource users for analysis of 






The improvement scenarios introduce multiple changes that must be 
considered in computing welfare effects.  While the resource is improved, which we 
might expect could increase visitation on both the intensive and extensive margin, 
parking fees have increased, which could diminish visitation.  In valuation of the 
resource change, the former effect is what we want to capture, while the latter is 
something we wish to control.  In the raw data, 59% (63%) or respondents indicated 
that they would continue to visit Jekyll (Tybee) Island in the same frequency after the 
change (improved beach and higher parking fees).  Thirty-four percent (thirty-one 
percent) indicated they would visit Jekyll (Tybee) less, while 7% (6%) indicated they 
would increase their visits.  It seems reasonable to assume households that exhibit a 
decrease in ex-ante demand are reacting to the price change and those that exhibit 
increasing demand are reacting to the resource improvement.  In the analysis of 
welfare effects, predicted ex-ante demand will be adjusted to reflect ex-post visit 
price and income levels. 
Valuation of Changes in Beach Quality 
The likelihood function in [3.10’’] was maximized using the Newton-Raphson 
algorithm.  The estimation results for each island are presented in Tables 3.4a and 
3.4b.  A number of household characteristics—years of visitation, age, gender, race 
and education—were dropped from the model due to statistical insignificance.  The 
likelihood ratio test statistics for joint significance are 233.89 for the Jekyll Island 
model and 328.63 for the Tybee Island model, each with 23 degrees of freedom, 
indicating that the estimated coefficients are jointly different from zero at 




Table 3.4a: Jekyll Island Visit Demand Equations 
A. Ex-post (0)  B. Ex-ante (I)  C. Ex-ante (II) 
 
pv  -0.004328***  -0.002234***  -0.001770***      
(0.000509)   (0.000872)   (0.000543) 
psubs  0.001577**   0.000414      0.000674      
(0.000732)   (0.001201)   (0.000815) 
finc  0.016644***    0.006168   0.014627**        
(0.007145)   (0.011725)   (0.008308) 
mpurpose -2.084514***  -2.477554***  -1.356066**         
(0.665073)   (1.029033)   (0.822407) 
assign  -0.722527*     1.150049*          1.695234*** 
(0.045765)   (0.644758)   (0.435605) 
spring  1.378865**    0.241793               0.775758 
(0.678088)   (1.016182)   (0.889006) 
summer -0.475521      -0.725623        0.097641 
(0.614343)   (0.924572)   (0.824842) 
nourish -------------  -------------  0.194224 
(0.489105) 
retreat  -------------  -------------  -0.446991 
(0.505043) 
intercept 4.611654***  3.12404***    1.232113*** 
  (0.713332)   (1.134599)   (0.879124) 
sigma  5.196044***  5.167735***  5.085512*** 
   (0.095290)  (0.219162)  (0.149857) 
(covariance)½ -------------  15.77768***  10.98662*** 
     (1.254723)  (0.904818) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
N = 822; lnL = -5737.5629; LRT(df=23) = 233.89; *=statistically significant at 
α=10%; **=statistically significant at α=5%; ***=statistically significant at α=1% 
 
all visit price coefficients are negative and statistically significant under a one-tailed 
hypothesis test.  A $1000 increase in the price of a visit leads to an estimated decrease 
of 4.3 beach trips before the improvement in beaches (ex-post demand), while a 
$1000 increase in the price of a visit decreases trips by 2.2 and 1.8 trips in the Case I 
and Case II visit demand models (ex-ante demand), respectively.  Each of these 
coefficients is associated with demand after the beach has been improved, and the 




Table 3.4b: Tybee Island Visit Demand Equations 
A. Ex-post (0)  B. Ex-ante (I)  C. Ex-ante (II) 
 
pv  -0.007971***  -0.005427***  -0.005703*** 
(0.000677)   (0.000970)   (0.000908) 
psubs  -0.000217   0.000022   -0.000329 
(0.000758)   (0.000914)   (0.001233) 
finc  0.034040***    0.016507   0.041427*** 
(0.009563)   (0.014795)   (0.011655) 
mpurpose -2.785504***  -0.700112  -2.79633*** 
(0.711576)   (1.227867)   (0.874234) 
assign  0.642668     1.910437**          1.716736*** 
(0.530703)   (0.869918)   (0.650779) 
spring  -0.231885    1.494251               0.543622 
(0.814111)   (1.148898)   (1.157978) 
summer -1.291379*      -0.213842        -1.345634 
(0.767210)   (1.103982)   (1.101336) 
nourish -------------  -------------  1.680381** 
(0.673106) 
retreat  -------------  -------------  0.411526 
(0.683324) 
intercept 8.942191***  4.720708***    5.050656*** 
  (0.928230)   (1.328756)   (1.235609) 
sigma  8.852646***  9.009819***  9.551774*** 
   (0.141481)  (0.316156)  (0.215188) 
(covariance)½ -------------  52.39367***  54.9174*** 
     (3.307904)  (2.580985) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
N = 1124; lnL = -8827.9851; LRT(df=23) = 328.63; *=statistically significant at 
α=10%; **=statistically significant at α=5%; ***=statistically significant at α=1% 
 
beach quality.  All coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected sign 
in the ex-post demand equation except the summer season dummy variable, which is 
statistically insignificant.   
In general, there are less significant variables in the ex-ante demand 
equations, which is expected since the datasets are smaller, but the signs of the 
coefficients are in accord with economic theory.18  Under a one-tailed hypothesis test, 
                                                 
18 The additional covariates in the ex-ante Case II model are introduced to control for survey treatment 




income is positive and significant in two of the three equations.  Those households 
making multipurpose trips take less beach trips, reflecting the incremental costs 
associated with incidental or joint consumption (Parsons and Wilson 1997).  Each of 
the covariance terms is significantly different from zero and positive, indicating a 
positive correlation between ex-post and ex-ante demand for beach visits. 
For the Tybee Island model, the coefficient on the price of a beach visit is 
negative and statistically significant in each of the demand equations under a one-
tailed hypothesis test.  A $1000 increase in the price of a beach visit is estimated to 
decrease the demand by 7.5 trips before the improvement in beach quality (ex-post 
demand).  After the improvement in beach quality, demand for beach visits is less 
responsive to changes in price.  A $1000 increase in the price of a beach visit is 
estimated to decrease demand by 5.4 trips for the Case I model, and by 5.7 trips for 
the Case II model.  The coefficient on substitute price is negative in two of the three 
demand equations—a counter-intuitive result—but none of the coefficients is 
statistically significant.  The remaining coefficients exhibit the expected sign.   
Income and the multipurpose trip dummy variable are significant in two of the 
three demand equations.  The nourish control variable is statistically significant in the 
Case II equation.  The nourish control is a dummy variable identifying those 
observations for which beach nourishment was indicated in the survey questionnaire 
as the beach-improving policy.  Results indicate that ex-ante visitation is higher in 
this survey treatment, suggesting that foreknowledge on how beaches will be 
maintained induces higher stated visitation if the management method is beach 
                                                                                                                                           
some identifying beach nourishment as the strategy and others indicating that shoreline retreat would 
be the management tool.  The estimated effects of these treatments do not have a statistically 




nourishment.  The retreat control was not statistically significant.  Each of the 
covariance terms is significantly different from zero and positive, indicating a 
positive correlation between ex-post and ex-ante demand for beach visits. 
The parameters of the demand equations were used to estimate consumer 
surplus for each household under both current and improved conditions.  Consumer 
surplus is given in [3.5] as the area under the demand curve above the current price.  
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where  is the linear combination of covariates for household i and parameters, 
other than own-site travel price ( ), from the demand equation for j = 0, I, II.  The 
final expression in [3.13] is attained by integration and simplification of the definite 





Since the demand data are censored,  in [3.13] should be expressed as the 
expected value of a censored random variable following the definition in [3.9].  To 
control for the changes in price and income that occur between the revealed and 
stated scenarios, the expected value of ex-ante trips is adjusted to reflect ex-post price 
and income levels.  Calculation of  in [3.13] produces an estimate of the value of 





j.       
Average annual consumer surplus for each beach quality level is calculated 




random variable, as a weight.  Average CS for access to the beach under status quo 
conditions is $1,296 for Jekyll Island, and $3,147 for Tybee Island (all values in 
1998$).  These are sizable welfare measures, but should be put in perspective.  The 
weighted expected numbers of trips under ex-post conditions are 3.00 for Jekyll 
Island and 6.46 for Tybee Island.  This implies consumer surplus measures per trip of 
$432 and $487, respectively.  Also, bear in mind that many of these trips include 
multiple days on-site.  The weighted mean of days on-site is 2.5 for Jekyll Island and 
1.8 for Tybee Island, giving rise to daily household consumer surplus measures of 
$173 and $271 for Jekyll Island and Tybee Island, respectively.  Lastly, the average 
household size in each sample is 3.8 persons,19 which produces daily individual 
consumer surplus measures of $46 for Jekyll Island and $71 for Tybee Island.  
Viewed in light of these facts, the welfare measures seem reasonable. 
The weighted averages of consumer surplus for Case I are $1,781 for Jekyll 
Island and $3,463 for Tybee Island.  These are sizable increases over the status quo, a 
$485 increase for Jekyll Island (about 37 percent increase) and a $316 increase for 
Tybee Island (about 10 percent increase).  These numbers may be interpreted as 
estimates of the welfare change attributable to increasing average beach width—a 2 
meter increase for Jekyll Island (about 6 percent increase over the status quo) and a 1 
meter increase for Tybee Island (about 4 percent increase over the status quo).  For 
comparison with the status quo, weighted average consumer surplus per household, 
per trip under the Case I scenarios are $667 and $600 for Jekyll and Tybee, 
respectively.   
                                                 
19 Household size is defined as the number of persons in the beach party for whom the survey 




Weighted average CS measures for Case II are $2,243 for Jekyll Island and 
$4,286 for Tybee Island.  These numbers represent larger increases in the economic 
value of access to the beach over the status quo relative to the Case I scenarios.  The 
increases over status quo CS are $947 for Jekyll Island (an increase of 73 percent) 
and $1139 for Tybee Island (an increase of 36 percent).  The corresponding changes 
in beach quality are 6 meters for Jekyll Island (about 19 percent over the status quo) 
and 3.5 meters for Tybee Island (about 15 percent over the status quo).  For 
comparison with the status quo and Case I, weighted average consumer surplus per 
household, per trip under the Case II scenarios are $828 and $648 for Jekyll and 
Tybee, respectively.   
Overall, the results of the model suggest that the value of access to beaches 
increases with improvements in beach quality.  The magnitudes of the benefit 
measures do not seem unreasonable when viewed in light of visitation, the number of 
days spent on-site, and the average household size.  Within each model, the relative 
change in consumer surplus is consistent with the relative change in beach width—
larger improvements in beach quality are associated with larger increases in the 
estimate of willingness to pay for access to the beach.   
The change in consumer surplus between j=0 and j=I or j=0 and j=II will 
serve as our approximation of willingness to pay for changes in beach quality.  In 
order to standardize this measure, we divide by the change in beach quality producing 












where  represents the change in average beach width associated with the 
improvement scenario.  Note that the welfare measure is conditioned on the 
subsequent level of beach quality, a treatment variable that varied randomly within 
each sample.   
q∆
The marginal WTP in [3.14] is estimated for each household in the dataset.  I 
then regress subsequent beach width on marginal willingness to pay, and use the 
consumer surplus measures associated with initial beach width as constraints on the 
parameter estimates.  That is, I require that the area under the marginal value curve 
evaluated at the initial beach quality condition be equal to the estimated average 
consumer surplus from the travel cost model.  (Each island has its own intercept, so 
each constraint relates to the common slope parameter and a unique intercept.)  In this 
way, initial consumer surplus serves as a bench mark to calibrate the marginal value 
function.  I thus estimate a constrained linear regression model with fixed island 
effects to estimate the slope and intercept of the marginal value function, with the 
constraints relating the parameters to the estimated welfare measures under initial 
conditions.  The results are given in Table 3.5.    The parameter estimates are derived 
by minimizing the sum of squared errors of the linear regression subject to the 
following two constraints: 
 
       31×(jekyll + q×31 ) + 0.5× q×31 = 1296  






where the definitions of the variables are defined in Table 3.5.  All of the coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.  This regression is meant to 
provide a prediction of willingness to pay that varies with average beach quality. 
Table 3.5: Beach Quality Marginal WTP Function 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable Definition    Coefficient           Standard   
        error 
 q  subsequent beach width (qI or qII) -16.81942***    1.351028     
 tybee  intercept for Tybee Island  726.7994***          47.62375 
 jekyll   intercept for Jekyll Island     823.9094***          62.82282      
N = 1828; Root MSE = 583.8 
 
Utilizing the tybee intercept from the results in Table 3.5, we have a marginal 
value function for beach width on Tybee Island: 
 
MWTPb (qt) = 726.80 –16.82 qt,      [3.15] 
 
where qt represents average beach width on Tybee Island in meters and WTP is in 
1998 dollars.   Integrating [3.15], we obtain an expression for total benefits of beach 
width per household, per year: 
 
WTPb (qt) = 726.80qt – 8.41 qt 2 + Kb,     [3.16] 
 
where Kb is a constant of integration.  This marginal value function is depicted in 
Figure 3.1.  This preference function will be used to represent WTP for beach area by 












































Chapter 4: Hedonic Prices and Beach Quality 
This Chapter presents an empirical analysis of the benefits of beaches accruing to 
coastal homeowners.  I use hedonic property models from multiple housing markets 
to estimate the demand for beach quality.  This approach is a valid method for 
identifying demand only if preferences for beach quality are identical across markets 
segments; that is, households cannot self-select into the different markets based on 
the housing attribute we intend to value.  I first discuss the difficulties that arise in 
using housing market data for welfare analysis when risk is a factor, then develop a 
theoretical model that addresses some of these issues.  An econometric model is 
developed.  I discuss the data utilized, and then present the results of the empirical 
analysis.   
House Values, Risk, and Beach Quality 
Deriving a welfare measure for coastal homeowners is more complicated than for 
beach visitors because beach quality also serves to mitigate risk of damage from 
coastal storms.  Houses in the coastal zone are generally susceptible to hurricanes and 
nor’easters.  These coastal storms bring with them flooding (due to storm surge), high 
velocity waves, high winds, and beach erosion.  Beaches offer protection in at least 
two ways—they inhibit high velocity waves, and they serve as a buffer from storm-
induced beach erosion.  Aside from beach quality, there exist other forms of 
indemnification from storm risk—formal flood insurance, self-insurance, and self-




In many cases, market insurance for protection against flood hazard is 
required under the terms of the property mortgage agreement.  There is ample 
evidence, however, that such provisions have not been strictly enforced (FEMA 
1997),20 so even in these cases insurance coverage may be a under household 
discretion.  The price at which formal flood insurance is offered reflects (i) the flood 
zone in which the house is located, (ii) attributes of the insured structure (location of 
contents, number of stories, presence of basement, elevation, etc.), and (iii) whether 
the structure predates the “regular” phase of the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) (existing structures are “grandfathered” at subsidized rates) (Kunreuther and 
Sheaffer 1970; Shilling, Sirmans and Benjamin 1989). 
In the parlance of Ehrlich and Becker (1972), self-insurance involves reducing 
the size of the potential loss should a disaster occur.  Common examples are 
expenditures on protective items, such as a sprinkler system or motorcycle helmet.  
For coastal properties, there are no such items that can be subsequently purchased by 
a homeowner to reduce the potential size of storm losses.  But homeowners do choose 
an array of attributes that mitigate the conditional expected loss when they purchase a 
property.  Assuming that participants in the coastal housing market are well informed 
about storm risk and how attributes of the property mitigate expected loss, a hedonic 
analysis of property prices seems a reasonable way to infer the value of loss-
mitigating attributes.  The implicit prices of these attributes are determined within the 
market. 
                                                 
20 The lack of compliance prompted the U.S. Congress to pass the National Flood Insurance Reform 




Beach quality can be viewed as a form of self-insurance because it inhibits 
wave action and buffers coastal properties from storm-induced erosion.21 Also, the 
beach provides for recreational and aesthetic enjoyment during times of fair weather.  
Beach quality, however, is not under the control of individual homeowners.  Rather, it 
is a natural attribute, which can be augmented by beach nourishment under the 
discretion of a coastal planner.22  The only point in time when a household can freely 
choose the quality of the beach is when purchasing a home.  Specifically, they can 
purchase a home in a jurisdiction with good beach quality or poor beach quality.  
Since beaches provide for joint benefits, I expect that homes in jurisdictions with 
better beaches will trade at a premium. 
Other factors that affect the degree of potential loss faced by the household 
are determined at the time of purchase.  These include: (i) whether the home was built 
after the publication of a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), (ii) whether the home is 
located in the V-zone, and (iii) the elevation of the home above base flood elevation 
(BFE).  Each of these requires some elaboration.  Flood-prone locations that are built 
upon after the publication of a FIRM are required to meet higher building standards 
that mitigate the amount of damage the building sustains during a hurricane or storm 
event.  However, the publication of a FIRM coincides with a community entering the 
“regular” phase of the NFIP, at which time explicit subsidies in flood insurance rates 
are removed.  Shilling, Sirmans, and Benjamin (1989) suggest that these subsidies 
can be capitalized in the price of housing, which would provide a countervailing 
effect to self-insurance.  Houses located in V-flood zones, or “velocity” zones are 
                                                 
21 Note the term “storm-induced erosion” is synonymous with the concept of short-run erosion 
problems in previous chapters. 




expected to suffer greater damage from storm waves than those located in A-zones.  
The extent of the V-zone is determined by computer simulation of the landward 
penetration of three-foot waves during the 100-year storm, and varies with local 
topography.  Lastly, elevation of the property in reference to the BFE (height of the 
“100-year flood”) is a form or self-insurance, lowering the expected loss due to 
flooding.   
While each of these attributes fits the definition of self-insurance, they could 
also be considered self-protection, defined by Ehrlich and Becker as an investment 
which skews the distribution of income across states, increasing the probability of a 
favorable outcome.  Since these three housing attributes are also considered in the 
setting of flood insurance premiums (as noted above), it is clear that they must exhibit 
some protection.  The rationale is simple—the possibility of moral hazard in the 
insurance market leads to a situation in which insurance rates should reflect 
household self-protection; otherwise the household would not have appropriate 
incentives for protecting themselves from the loss.  If insurance rates reflect the 
variation in housing attributes, then these attributes should have an effect on the 
probability of hazard.   
It is natural to ask how a housing attribute might serve as both self-insurance 
and self-protection.  An example will help to clarify:  Elevation above BFE provides 
for a lower expected loss in the event of a storm; this is self-insurance (as discussed 
above).  However, the probability of floodwaters reaching the lowest floor of the 




case elevation would be a form of self-protection.  The distinction turns on how we 
define the loss event. 
In order to focus on the protective aspects of beaches, I define the loss event 
as the annual probability of a storm occurring, with the understanding that the storm 
must be of sufficient strength to cause (i) flooding, (ii) high velocity waves, (iii) high 
winds, and/or (iv) beach erosion, in order to warrant consideration as a hazard.  Since 
beaches offer protection from high velocity waves and beach erosion, considering the 
probability of only the first hazard (flooding) would not lend itself to consideration of 
the protective aspects of beaches.  Flood insurance covers hazards (i), (ii) and (iv), 
but not (iii); wind damage is covered under separate insurance.  In practice, insurance 
price varies with the probability of hazards (i) and (ii), but not with (iv).  The 
conditional loss is the expected loss from the coastal storm.  This loss is decreasing in 
“post-FIRM construction”, elevation, and beach quality, but increasing in “presence 
in a V-zone”. 
Suppose, for the moment, that flood insurance is fair (in the sense that 
premium equals expected loss) and complete (in the sense that it pays for all 
damages).  Assume that coastal homeowners are risk averse.  Since housing attributes 
that afford self-protection decrease the price of insurance, coastal homeowners still 
have an incentive to protect themselves from coastal hazards, and their bids on coastal 
housing with different levels of protection will reflect their assessment of the 
protection, and their degree of risk aversion.  There is no moral hazard problem here 
because the property attributes are observable by both parties—the insurer and the 




self-insurance.  Since self-insurance lowers the expected loss, we should not see 
properties with more self-insurance purchasing higher insurance coverage, ceteris 
paribus.  In either event, housing prices should vary with both risk-mitigating and 
loss-mitigating attributes.   
In reality, unsubsidized flood premiums will exceed expected loss due to 
administrative costs, but if coastal homeowners are risk averse they will be willing to 
pay more than the expected value of the loss (with excess willingness-to-pay 
depending upon their risk premium).  Flood insurance is not complete because 
coverage is capped at a specific amount23, and flood insurance does not cover loss of 
land due to erosion.  In this case, housing attributes that afford self-protection and 
self-insurance will be valued more highly than if insurance offered full coverage.  In 
particular, note that since flood insurance does not cover loss of land, beach quality is 
the sole protection mechanism against storm-induced erosion.  As long as households 
recognize this aspect of beach quality its value as self-insurance should be reflected in 
housing prices. 
Expected Utility Theory and Hedonic Prices 
The household’s purchasing decision for homes in the coastal zone can be modeled 
using expected utility theory.  I assume that coastal households face only two states of 
nature, one in which a storm occurs and the other in which it does not.  The 
associated annual probabilities are ρ and (1-ρ).  The probability of storm landfall 
within a region is exogenous; it cannot be altered through mitigation measures.  Loss-
mitigating housing attributes include location in a V-zone, whether the house is built 
                                                 
23 As of 1997, flood insurance for residential property could not exceed $250,000 building coverage 




to meet post-FIRM building codes, elevation above BFE, and beach quality. An 
important spatial distinction is made in reference to Coastal Barrier Resource Act 
(CBRA) zones.  Houses located in CBRA zones are not eligible for flood insurance. 
Utility of the coastal homeowner is represented by ur(y,a,res;ξ), where y is a 
composite good that serves as the numeraire, a is the vector of structural and 
neighborhood attributes associated with the property, and res is a vector of coastal 
resource quality attributes, including beach quality at the shore nearest the property 
(q), ocean-frontage (ocfrnt), and distance from the beach (dist).  The ξ vector 
represents socio-economic variables that vary across households. The function ur(.) 
has the usual properties.24  I drop the r superscript in the subsequent discussion, but 
the reader should bear in mind that the theory applies to coastal homeowners.   
A brief review of the theory of hedonic prices is prudent at this point.  The 
household is a price-schedule taker, and thus the hedonic price function  is 
taken as given.  The household’s budget constraint is m = y + H(a), where m is 
income, the price of the numeraire is set to one, and H(a) is the hedonic housing price 
expressed as an annual rent.
)(ˆ aH
25  Assuming interior solutions for all continuous choice 
variables, maximization of u(y,a,res;ξ) subject to the budget constraint requires the 
following: 
 
∂u/∂ai= µ∂H/∂ai   ∀ ai      [4.1] 
∂u/∂y= µ        [4.2] 
                                                 
24 I assume Ur(y,a,res) is quasi-concave, twice-differentiable, and increasing in all arguments except 
dist (assuming a is defined in terms of desirable characteristics). 
25 That is, H(a) = ×δ, where is the hedonic sales price (present value of the stream of 
housing services) and δ is the annual discount rate. 




m - y - H(a) = 0.       [4.3] 
 
The symbol µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, and thus represents 
the marginal utility of income.  In equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution is 
equal to the marginal implicit price from the hedonic equation: ∂u/∂ai / ∂u/∂y = 
∂H/∂ai.   
In order to introduce coastal resource quality and loss-mitigation into the 
standard hedonic model, two vectors are included as arguments of H(.), a loss vector 
and the res vector (already specified in the discussion of coastal homeowner utility).  
The loss vector is composed of property attributes that affect the expected loss—post-
FIRM construction (pFIRM), location in the V-zone (vzone), and elevation above 
BFE (elev).  Beach quality is also related to expected loss, but is included in the res 
vector.  The household faces storm risk that occurs with probability ρ, and produces a 
loss L(q, loss) (which is a decreasing function of q, pFIRM, and elev, and an 
increasing function of vzone).  The coastal resident’s optimization problem can be set 














where s is the amount of insurance held (which may be constrained), and π is the 
price of insurance.  Note that in practice π varies with the loss vector.  Elevation 




The price of flood insurance will vary systematically with the dichotomous pFIRM 
variable due to the flood insurance subsidy for pre-existing structures.  As such, we 
should expect correlation among H(.) and π.  Since I am not considering self-
protection, however, I assume that π is exogenous.  Note also that the expected loss 
(L) and coverage amount (s) in [4.4] are expressed in annual dollars. 
As indicated by [4.3] the budget constraint is assumed to hold with equality, 
but as Palmquist (1984) has noted, it is likely non-linear due to the presence of 
H(a,res,loss).  He shows that linearizing the budget constraint at the optimal bundle 
of housing attributes is necessary for conducting welfare analysis.  The hedonic price 
function H(a,res,loss) is dependent upon q as a recreational and loss-mitigating 
attribute of the property.  Beach quality provides joint services to households.  One 
might argue that the attributes ocfrnt and dist should affect not only resource quality, 
but also expected loss.  Ocean-frontage provides for access and view amenities, but 
could increase the expected loss in the event of a storm.  Likewise, distance from the 
beach can provide protection from storms, but diminishes beach access and view 
amenities.  Note, however, that the specific flood zones (V and A) should account for 
the spatial distribution of storm losses.  As such, ocfrnt and dist should only reflect 
the amenity effects of these attributes, assuming that households view flood zones as 
accurate spatial measures of expected loss. 
Assuming interior solutions for all continuous choice variables, maximization 
of expected utility in [4.4] requires the following first-order conditions: 
 




∂Ω/∂q =∂u/∂q – ∂H/∂q [ρµL+(1-ρ)µ0] - ρµL∂L/∂q = 0    [4.6] 
∂ Ω/∂dist = ∂u/∂dist – ∂H/∂dist [ρµL+(1-ρ)µ0] = 0     [4.7] 
∂ Ω/∂elev = - ∂H/∂elev[ρµL+(1-ρ)µ0] - ρµL∂L/∂elev =0  [4.8] 
∂Ω /∂s =ρµL(1-π)+(1-ρ)µ0(-π)=0                [4.9] 
 
where µL and µ0 represent the marginal utilities of income in the loss and no-loss 
states, respectively, mL = m-H(a,res,loss)+s(1-π)-L, and m0 = m-H(a,res,loss)-sπ.26  
Equation [4.9] applies only if the home is located outside of a CBRA zone or if the 
household is not required to hold some level of flood insurance coverage by its 
mortgage lender.  The three dichotomous variables, ocfrnt, pFIRM and V-zone, are 
chosen by the following rule: If Ω(f=1)> Ω(f=0) then f=1, else f=0, for f = ocfrnt, 
pFIRM , vzone.  Location in a V-zone is positively correlated with distance to the 
shore and ocean-frontage.  Households that place a high value on proximity to the 
ocean may not be able to freely choose whether to locate in or out of this zone.  Since 
this correlation is not perfect, one would expect houses outside of the V-zone to be 
valued more highly, ceteris paribus.  But identifying the separate influence of these 
two variables empirically may be difficult. 
 Manipulating [4.5] – [4.8],27 we derive the following equilibrium conditions 
for the hedonic price function: 
                                                 
26 If the price of insurance (π) were posited as an endogenous function of the loss vector, condition 
[4.8] would include an additional partial derivative for the effect of elevation on insurance price.  This 
additional term would include the optimal insurance coverage (s), and thus would introduce 
simultaneity into the first-order contions. 
27 Manipulation of [4.9] implicitly defines the demand for insurance by µL /µ0=(1-ρ)/ρ×π/(1-π).  This 
result is not emphasized here because the focus is on the benefits of beach quality via the hedonic price 
function.  We are not interested in the demand for flood insurance, per se, but rather its effect on the 





∂H/∂ai= ∂u/∂ai / [ρµL+(1-ρ)µ0]    ∀ ai    [4.5’] 
∂H/∂q=[∂u/∂q –ρµL∂L/∂q] / [ρµL+(1-ρ)µ0]    [4.6’] 
∂H/∂dist = ∂u/∂dist / [ρµL+(1-ρ)µ0]     [4.7’] 
∂H/∂elev =–ρµL∂L/∂elev / [ρµL+(1-ρ)µ0]    [4.8’] 
 
It is common in applications of hedonic price theory, to assume that the supply of 
housing attributes is exogenous,28 and thus only treat the demand side of the housing 
market.  One can interpret the expressions in [4.5’] – [4.8’] as measures of household 
marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP).  Households are differentiated by income and 
other socioeconomic characteristics, represented by the vector ξ.  They take the 
hedonic price function as given, and the allocation of housing occurs through 
households equating their marginal rate of substitution between the housing 
characteristic and the numeraire good to the implicit price of the housing 
characteristic from the hedonic price function (Rosen 1974). 
Equation [4.5’] shows that in equilibrium, the slope of the hedonic price 
function with respect to a structural or neighborhood attribute is equal to the marginal 
WTP for that attribute weighted by the expected value of the marginal utility of 
income across the two states.  Condition [4.6’] determines the optimal amount of 
beach quality associated with the property.  The marginal implicit price derived from 
the hedonic price function is equal to the sum of marginal utility of beach quality 
                                                 
28 Palmquist (1999) states, “…since the quantities of the characteristics in existing houses are 
predetermined and costly to alter, the equilibrium price schedule is completely demand-determined…”.  




stemming from recreational enjoyment (∂u/∂q > 0) and the marginal loss-mitigation 
value stemming from the role of beach quality as self-insurance (-ρµL∂L/∂q > 0), 
weighted by the expected value of the marginal utility of income.  The expression on 
the RHS of [4.6’] is the marginal willingness to pay for beach quality, equivalent to 
the slope of the preference function derived in [2.3].  Similar to [4.5’], equation [4.7’] 
shows the marginal willingness to pay for distance from the beach as an attribute of 
the property.  Lastly, condition [4.8’] determines the optimal elevation above BFE.  
The marginal implicit price of elevation is equal to the product of the probability of 
loss, the marginal utility of income in the loss state and, the marginal loss-mitigation 
effect, all weighted by the expected marginal utility of income. 
Estimation Issues 
Estimation of the hedonic price function is often conducted by ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  A properly specified hedonic price equation can be used to assess welfare 
effects of marginal and localized, non-marginal changes in public goods (Palmquist 
1992) and provides bounds on the welfare effects of widespread, non-marginal 
changes (Bartik 1988; Palmquist 1988).  There are two closely related problems 
associated with deriving precise uncompensated measures of welfare change (i.e. 
consumer surplus), in general.  The first has to do with identification of the demand 
equations when only a single point for each agent is observed—that point of tangency 
with the hedonic price function.  The second problem stems from the non-linearity of 





Rosen’s (1974) original exposition on the theory of the hedonic price equation 
included a discussion of the derivation of demand functions for the attributes of the 
differentiated good.  Since the slope of the hedonic price function reveals the implicit 
price of an attribute, Rosen envisioned estimating inverse demand equations with the 
predicted implicit price as the dependent variable and the quantity of the attribute as 
an explanatory variable.  He further recommended household and producer 
characteristics be used as shift variables to overcome what he believed to be a garden-
variety, simultaneous equations identification problem. 
Brown and Rosen (1982) subsequently pointed out that these demand 
equations are not identified because the implicit prices are estimated, not observed.  
Identification requires restrictions.  Mendelsohn (1985) notes that even if the 
marginal prices were known with certainty, identification would still require 
restrictions since there are an infinite number of demand functions that could underlie 
the observed marginal price.  Brown and Rosen explore functional form restrictions 
and excluded variables in the demand equation.  With regard to the former, with an 
mth degree polynomial hedonic price function, demand must be of degree m-2 in the 
attribute for identification.  With regard to the latter, the hedonic price equation must 
contain exogenous variables that are excluded from the demand equations for 
identification.  (The demand equation must also contain exogenous variables 
excluded from the hedonic price function, but this is typically not a problem, as 
demand equations should include socio-economic characteristics as shift variables, 




restrictions must be defensible, and since the form of the hedonic price function is not 
known a priori, the first option can be difficult to maintain.   
Regarding the second option, Brown and Rosen suggest that data from 
multiple markets could be used to identify the structural demand equations.  Let 
demand be conditioned on observable household characteristics, indexed by ξ.  
Assume the distribution of household characteristics varies across markets, but that 
the structure of preferences (conditioned on characteristics) is the same across 
markets.  For the case of exogenous housing supply, the distribution of housing 
characteristics will also vary exogenously across markets.  Within a single market, the 
hedonic price equation will reveal only one point on the individual households’ bid 
curves.  However, since preferences differ only by ξ, observations from multiple 
markets can be used to identify demand because differences in the distribution of 
preferences and housing characteristics will give rise to variation in price (Tinbergen 
1959; Epple 1987).  Multiple markets introduce differences in the matching process 
between consumers and housing, which give rise to different marginal implicit prices.  
Since these differences in matching are not reflected in the structure of the demand 
equation, information from multiple markets can be used to identify the parameters of 
demand (Kahn and Lang 1988). 
 The second difficulty in estimating demand for attributes stems from a 
separate identification problem arising from joint endogeneity of marginal implicit 
prices and attribute quantities, first recognized by Palmquist (1984) and Mendelsohn 




marginal price and the quantities of housing attributes.29  As such, estimation of 
inverse housing-characteristic demand equations by OLS will produce biased 
coefficient estimates.  Consistent estimation can be achieved with instrumental 
variables, though the suitability of instruments depends upon the source and structure 
of modeling errors. 
Epple (1987), Bartik (1987), and Kahn and Lang (1988) show that correlation 
among producer and consumer attributes is a characteristic of the equilibrium hedonic 
price equation when demand and supply are endogenous.  The correlation arises 
through the matching process.  That is, consumers with a strong preference for 
attribute i will transact with firms that are more efficient in producing attribute i (i.e. a 
separating equilibrium).   As such, the seemingly natural approach of using producer 
and consumer characteristics as instruments in demand and supply equations will not 
work.  At least some of these characteristics will be correlated with the endogenous 
housing attribute variables.  Epple shows that even when supply is exogenous, 
estimation of the hedonic price function by OLS is inconsistent unless the error term 
is uncorrelated with the error terms from the demand equations. 
Epple (1987) considers the implications of specific orthogonality conditions 
under a number of cases regarding endogeneity of supply, mutual correlation among 
measurement errors, and the presence of unmeasured characteristics.  He assumes 
that: (i) unmeasured product characteristics are uncorrelated with all measured agent 
characteristics, and (ii) unmeasured agent characteristics are uncorrelated with 
measured agent characteristics but correlated with both measured and unmeasured 
                                                 
29 Note this problem does not arise if the hedonic price function is linear in attributes.  However, if it is 
linear there will be no variation in marginal implicit price to support second-stage estimation of the 




product characteristics.  Under these assumptions he derives conditions for 
identification of the hedonic price function and demand and supply equations.  His 
results specify a set of relationships between proxy, unmeasured, and observed 
variables that are necessary for identification. 
Kahn and Lang (1988) argue that Epple’s results are particular to his specific 
assumptions regarding the structure of errors, and in their view assumption (ii) will 
likely not hold.  They contend that unobserved agent characteristics are likely to be 
correlated with observed agent characteristics due to the matching process that 
underlies the hedonic price function.  For example, households with a taste for 
detailed carpentry work would be matched with suppliers that are carpenters.  They 
show that agent characteristics interacted with dummy variables from k-1 markets can 
be used as instrumental variables in the first stage of two-stage least squares, but 
recommend a more efficient non-linear three-stage least squares approach.  Bartik 
(1987) takes the same point of view with regard to Epple’s assumption (ii).  Bartik 
argues that if the estimation problem stems from unobserved consumer taste, any 
exogenous variable that shifts the budget constraint is an appropriate instrument.  As 
do Kahn and Lang, he suggests using market-dummy variables interacted with 
demand shifters in a first-stage regression. 
Multiple Hedonic Markets and Beach Quality Demand 
To apply the multi-market hedonic model, one must have data on housing purchases 
across a number of markets.  Many researchers take an urban area to be a single 
market, though some have suggested that multiple sub-markets may exist in a single 




support large urban centers.  Rather, most barrier islands on the east and gulf coast 
are home to rather small, somewhat bucolic beach towns, composed of vacation and 
rental homes and beach-related businesses.  As such, the local labor market has a 
much smaller impact on the extent of the housing market.  The boundaries of the 
housing market are determined more by travel distance from metropolitan areas and, 
perhaps, regional population and income.  Markets in this analysis of beach quality 
are delineated based on a judgment of the extent of the area that regional households 
might regard as reasonable substitutes in purchasing coastal housing for vacationing, 
and possibly as a source of rental income. 
The dataset used for this analysis is composed of sales of primarily pre-
existing housing.  Less than 15 percent represent newly constructed homes.  Thus, I 
assume that the hedonic price schedule is primarily demand driven and focus only on 
the demand side of the market for coastal housing.  The theory of Tinbergen (1959) 
still applies in this case.  If the distributions of consumer and housing characteristics 
differ across space, but the structures of consumer preferences are the same, then 
information from multiple markets can be used to identify the structural parameters of 
the demand equations.  The different distributions of preferences and attributes will 
give rise to distinct hedonic price functions in the different markets.  Thus, the 
marginal implicit prices will differ, but these differences will be in no way related to 
the structure of demand.  As such, the different prices allow for identification of a 
demand curve in the second stage regression. 
In order for the multiple markets strategy to work, households cannot be self-




trying to value.  Self-selection into different markets would create a situation in which 
preferences vary systematically between markets.  Suppose, for example, that one 
market exhibits a much lower degree of risk and households that are more risk-averse 
are drawn to that market.  In this case, risk preferences (and thus the value of loss-
mitigating household attributes) will differ across markets, rendering any model that 
requires identical preferences invalid. 
The hedonic price function is Hj(a,res,loss), with the j subscript representing 
market j.  Since the functional form of the hedonic price function is not known a 
priori a flexible form is desirable.  The Box-Cox transformation has been used in 
many empirical analyses and nests the more typical functional forms, namely linear, 
semi-log, and log-linear.  This flexible approach may only be utilized with strictly 
positive, continuous variables.  While the rental rate of the house certainly meets this 
requirement, the environmental and risk variables in most cases, do not.  Beach width 
can be zero; elevation above BFE and distance from the ERF can both be negative; 
pFIRM, V-zone, and ocfrnt are dichotomous variables.  Thus, only the dependent 
variable is transformed.  The j hedonic price equations are estimated as: 
 
Hij(a,res,loss) =βj0 + ai’βja + resi’βjres +  lossi’βjloss + εij  
= (hijγj-1)/ γj for γj ≠ 0 
= ln(hij) for γj = 0,      [4.10] 
 
where hij is the rental price of housing unit i in market j, βj0 and the βjl are constant 




parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood, and εij is an identically and 
independently distributed (i.i.d.) random error term with zero mean.  The Box-Cox 
transformation of the dependent variable is utilized in order to pick the functional 
form that best represents the data. 
As indicated in [4.5’] – [4.8’] the first derivatives of the hedonic price 
function with respect to housing attributes reveal the marginal implicit prices.  This 
result is conditional on the expected value of the marginal utility of income across the 
two states being a reasonable representation of the household’s marginal utility of 
income when forming their bid for housing.  Under this assumption, the marginal 
implicit price can be utilized as the dependent variable in a second stage regression 
equation that embodies the demand function for the housing attribute.  To simplify 
estimation, I assume that housing and the numeraire are weakly separable.  I also 
assume that the expected loss and resource variables are weakly separable from the 
other housing attributes.  This significantly reduces the number of endogenous 
variables in the second stage, and does not seem an unreasonable assumption.  
Inverse demand for loss-mitigating attributes is given by: 
 
    ∂H/∂lossik = Wik = φ(lossi, resi,Xi) = ψk0 + lossi’ψkloss +  resi’ψkres +Xi’ψkx  + εik,  
[4.11] 
where Wik is the marginal implicit price of risk attribute k for household i.  One can 
envision a system of demand equations for loss-mitigating (and other) attributes as 
given in [4.11], though for estimation purposes, one may focus on any portion 




attributes (loss) and socio-economic characteristics of the household (X).  The 
residuals in [4.11] are assumed i.i.d. with zero mean, and can be divided into two 
components, one representing unobservable risk preference of household i and the 
other a purely random component: εik = ωi + νik.   Given this decomposition, 
estimation of [4.11] by OLS will produce biased coefficients because Wik and loss are 
correlated with ωi.  Even if instruments are available to control this endogeneity, the 
equations will not be identified unless the restrictions identified by Brown and Rosen 
are utilized. 
Identification of the parameters in [4.11] can be obtained by using data from 
multiple markets.  Following Kahn and Lang (1988) and Bartik (1987) demand 
shifters are interacted with k-1 market dummy variables to be used as instruments.  
This approach addresses the first identification problem—that of separately 
identifying the demand equations when only one point is observed on the hedonic 
price function.  Endogeneity of housing attributes can be addressed by utilizing other 
instruments that are correlated with the optimal bundle of characteristics, but 
uncorrelated with unobserved tastes. In addition, the household’s residual income—y 
= m - H(a,res,loss) (i.e. that amount of money leftover for the consumption of the 
numeraire, y)—must be included as a regressor if the marginal utility of income is not 
constant. 
Palmquist (1984) recognizes that since the hedonic price function will most 
likely be non-linear, the budget constraint in [4.3] will be non-linear as well.  Since 
housing expenditures are usually a large share of the budget, the non-linearity in the 




budget constrain complicates welfare analysis because the standard Marshallian 
demand functions are ill-defined (Bockstael and McConnell 1983).  Palmquist 
suggests linearizing the budget constraint by adding the predicted housing price.  The 
linearized constraint will be tangent to the indifference curve at the same point as the 
non-linear one and is consistent with a Marshallian demand function underlying the 
optimizing behavior of the household.  The residual budget constrain is also 
endogenous because it includes H(a,res,loss).  As such, if it is included in [4.11], 
estimation will require further instrumentation.  In the expected utility model set up in 










  [4.12] 
 
Equation [4.12] is likely nonlinear due to the presence of H(.), but could also be 
nonlinear in L(.).  While H(.) is a large portion of the budget, L(.) is conditional on ρ, 
a relatively small number, and likely to be significantly less than H(.).  As such, I 
assume that the non-linearity due to L(.) can be ignored.  The expected loss in the 
event of a storm, L(.), must be predicted in order to estimate the expected residual 
income.  Utilizing fairly limited data (only about 120 observations) on flood 
insurance claims, a simple logit model was used for this purpose.  This model is 





Multiple Market Data 
The hedonic data used in the analysis were compiled for a study of the National Flood 
Insurance Program and coastal erosion sponsored by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.  The complete dataset includes information from 18 coastal 
counties across the U.S., with structural characteristics, market price, flood insurance 
premium and coverage, flood and erosion risk proxies, and subjective judgments of 
beach quality at the time of purchase.  The data were compiled from three sources—a 
field survey of residential properties, a mail survey of homeowners, and insurance 
records from the Federal Insurance Administration.  I focus on six coastal counties in 
the southeastern U.S., in what I construe as two distinct housing markets.  Coverage 
in the data is somewhat poor; there are many holes.  Of the 3,961 observations from 
the six counties, only about 1,400 have complete data on structural attributes, sales 
price, and other requisite items.  Further confining the analysis to thirteen years of 
sales (spanning 1986-1998) reduces sample size to around 700 observations. 
The first market is in the Carolinas, and includes Dare and Brunswick 
Counties, in North Carolina, and Georgetown County, South Carolina.  The second 
market includes Glynn County, Georgia, and Brevard and Lee Counties in Florida.  A 
series of Chow tests were run with garden-variety hedonic models in order to test the 
specification of multiple markets.  The restriction of the market segments suggested 
above could not be rejected at conventional confidence levels (99 percent), but 
combining the data across these segments was rejected.  Descriptive statistics for each 




Table 4.1a: Descriptive Statistics: Dare & Brunswick, NC and Georgetown, SC 
Variable Definition     Mean  Std Dev 
rent98       Annual rental rate of housing         22654.13        18461.85          
housage      Age of house at time of purchase (years) 11.6459       14.9676                
sqft  Square footage    2005.68          1184.72     
lotsize  Size of lot (square feet)    14425.21        12490.67         
mtstory Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.6171        0.5778 
has multiple stories; 0 otherwise  
airc  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.9150        0.3315 
has central air; 0 otherwise 
firep  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.3642        0.5720 
has fireplace; 0 otherwise 
dmsa  Distance to Charlotte, NC (kilometers)         509.66      168.94      
dcbd  Distance to central business district (meters) 3464.61         3715.75      
ocfrnt  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.5228        0.5937 
is oceanfront; 0 otherwise 
dist  Distance to beach (meters)   106.85       91.39     
medbw Median beach width (meters)   15.65       12.72        
pfirm        Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.6982        0.5456 
built post-FIRM; 0 otherwise 
vzone  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.4559        0.5920 
located in V-zone; 0 otherwise 
elev  Elevation above BFE (meters)  1.686       2.230 
hugo         Dummy variable equal to 1 if sale  0.7398        0.5215 
occurred after Hurricane Hugo (1989);  
0 otherwise 
brun         Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.3230        0.5559 
located in Brunswick County; 0 otherwise 
geor         Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.0994        0.3556 
located in Georgetown County; 0 otherwise 
cobra  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.0559        0.2732 
located in CBRA zone; 0 otherwise 
pstorm       Probability of storm landfall   0.0012      0.0009      
loss         Expected annualized loss due to storm 427.81      569.67       
s         Annualized insurance coverage  9564.32          8664.27                
π          Annual flood insurance premium   574.84      813.82                
expinc       Expected annual income   118023.83       90566.01        
insreq  Dummy variable equal to 1 if household 0.6198  0.5770 
indicated insurance was required        
mktins  Dummy variable equal to 1 if household 0.9076  0.3440 





Table 4.1b: Descriptive Statistics: Glynn, GA and Brevard & Lee, FL 
 
Variable Definition     Mean  Std Dev 
rent98       Annual rental rate of housing         40969.32        74442.83          
housage      Age of house at time of purchase (years) 23.79       21.00                
sqft  Square footage    2490.94          1766.06     
lotsize  Size of lot (square feet)    17352.46         23449.06         
mtstory Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.4429        0.6300 
has multiple stories; 0 otherwise  
airc  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.3417        0.6015 
has central air; 0 otherwise 
firep  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.1700        0.4764 
has fireplace; 0 otherwise 
dmsa  Distance to Orlando, FL (kilometers)         247.00      152.28      
dcbd  Distance to central business district (meters) 5579.14          7036.98      
ocfrnt  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.4555        0.6316 
is oceanfront; 0 otherwise 
dist  Distance to beach (meters)   110.05       90.09     
medbw Median beach width (meters)   15.57       26.47        
pfirm        Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.3326        0.5975 
built post-FIRM; 0 otherwise 
vzone  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.1111        0.3986 
located in V-zone; 0 otherwise 
elev  Elevation above BFE (meters)  1.559       3.385 
andr         Dummy variable equal to 1 if sale  0.6187        0.6160 
occurred after Hurricane Andrew (1992);  
0 otherwise 
brev         Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.4176        0.6254 
located in Brevard County; 0 otherwise 
lee         Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.4938        0.6341 
located in Lee County; 0 otherwise 
cobra  Dummy variable equal to 1 if house  0.0514        0.2802 
located in CBRA zone; 0 otherwise 
pstorm       Probability of storm landfall   0.0020      0.0036      
loss         Expected annualized loss due to storm 2613.59      8126.27       
s         Annualized insurance coverage  8623.70          13322.94                
π          Annual flood insurance premium   332.58      919.58                
expinc       Expected residual annual income  57637.89       106326.26        
insreq  Dummy variable equal to 1 if household 0.2169  0.5227 
indicated insurance was required        
mktins  Dummy variable equal to 1 if household 0.6220  0.6149 





A series of T-shaped sampling frames were used in gathering the coastal 
housing data.  The top portion of the T was oriented parallel to the shoreline at the 
oceanfront in order to ensure adequate coverage of those properties that face an 
immediate erosion hazard.  In order to correct for this over-sampling of the 
oceanfront, weighting factors were devised.  These weights are used in all 
calculations (including the descriptive statistics presented in 4.1).  
The dependent variable for the hedonic price regressions is rental rate of the 
property expressed in 1998 dollars (rent98).  The rental rate was calculated by 
multiplying the house sales price by the prevailing 30-year, fixed mortgage rate in the 
month of the sale.  Structural covariates include the age of the house (housage), 
square-footage of heated space (sqft), the lot size (lotsize), presence of air 
conditioning (airc), presence of a fireplace (firep), and whether the structure is 
multiple stories (mtstory).  The vector of structural characteristics was limited due to 
the poor coverage in the data.  Distance from the nearest metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) (dmsa) and distance from the cities’ central business district (dcbd) were 
included to control for amenities associated with proximity to urbanized areas.  The 
MSA for the Carolina market was Charlotte, North Carolina, and in the Georgia-
Florida market the MSA was Orlando, Florida. 
Presence on the oceanfront (ocfrnt) and distance from the beach (dist) were 
included as environmental amenity variables.  Defining beach quality required some 
exploration of the data.  The data include the homeowner’s subjective assessment of 
beach width at the nearest beach at the time the property was purchased.  The 




model.  In order to standardize this attribute measure, the median of the subjective 
beach width measures (medbw) in the beach community over a three-year period 
during which the house was sold was utilized as the measure of beach quality.  The 
two market segments had an appreciable number of communities (21 in the Carolinas 
and 12 in the Georgia-Florida market).  The numerous communities combined with 
the time dimension provided sufficient variation in the beach quality measure.  The 
average number of observations used in calculating median beach width was 
approximately 22.  In addition to beach quality, other loss mitigation variables 
include whether the property was built after the publication of the local jurisdiction 
FIRM (pFIRM), whether the property was located in the V-zone (vzone), and 
elevation of the properties lowest floor above BFE (elev).  Dummy variables 
accounted for whether the sale occurred in the period after a major hurricane (Hugo 
(hugo) in the Carolinas and Andrew (andr) in Georgia-Florida) and whether the 
property was located in a CBRA zone (cobra) (and thus prohibited from obtaining 
federally-backed flood insurance).  It is expected both of these qualities will reduce 
the rental price of the house, ceteris paribus. 
The data include information on flood insurance holdings.  A large proportion 
of households held flood insurance (mktins), some voluntarily while others were 
required to do so by their mortgage lender (insreq).  The high participation rate in the 
Carolinas could reflect bias in the sample.  Information on premiums (π) and 
coverage (s) was also available.  Insurance coverage was converted to an annualized 




The probability of a major coastal storm was estimated based on historical 
storm landfall data.  A procedure outlined in Green, Walk, and Altay (2003) shows 
how to calculate a threat index that roughly approximates the probability of a major 
coastal storm.  The threat index for a local jurisdiction is estimated as the ratio of 
coastline in the jurisdiction to the total coastline in the state multiplied by the average 
number of storms in the state within some time interval.  I calculated the threat index 
for each local jurisdiction using historical storm data extending back at least 150 
years.  The result is pstorm, displayed in Tables 4.1. 
 Each market exhibits adequate variation in risk and loss-mitigating attributes, 
so that self-selection should not be a problem.  The average storm “probability” in the 
Carolina market was 0.118 percent per year, and in the Georgia-Florida market it was 
0.206 percent per year.  The rough probability measure ranged from 0.018 to 0.262 
percent in the Carolinas, and from 0.022 to 1.432 percent in Georgia-Florida.  These 
probabilities are all of a fairly low magnitude.  The highest annual percentage in the 
Georgia-Florida market was associated with St. Simon’s Island in Georgia, which has 
a relatively long coastline. 
Median beach width ranged from 1.5 to 60 meters in the Carolinas market and 
from 0 to 53 meters in the Georgia-Florida market.  Likewise, elevation above BFE 
ranged from –2.8 to 9.2 meters (8.5 meters) in the Carolinas (Georgia-Florida) 
market.  Fifty-two percent of the houses were oceanfront in the Carolinas, while 45% 
were oceanfront in Georgia-Florida.  Seventy percent of the houses were constructed 
after publication of the FIRM in the Carolinas—and thus were built to be flood- and 




a much smaller proportion—33%—were constructed post-FIRM, and only 11% were 
located in the V-zone.  The smaller proportion of V-zone homes probably reflects a 
difference in topography in this market.  In each market, approximately 5% of the 
homes were located in CBRA zones; recall these homes are prohibited from obtaining 
federally-backed flood insurance. 
Hedonic Price Equation Results 
The hedonic price function in [4.10] was estimated for the two coastal housing 
markets for a span of 13 years (1986-1998).  The dependent variable is the rental rate 
of the house (in 1998 dollars).  The hedonic model is predicated on normalization by 
the numeraire, depicted in the budget constraint [4.3].  The hedonic rental rates were 
normalized for variation in the cost of living (net of housing costs) by using price 
level at the city nearest to the coastal county.30 The cost of living data are from 2002, 
and thus could be a source of error, as they do not include historical fluctuations in 
relative prices across the coastal counties.  The Box-Cox transformation parameter is 
estimated via maximum likelihood.  The parameter estimate, confidence intervals, 
and tests of nested forms are presented with the results.  The transformed, normalized 
rental rate is utilized as the dependent variable in ordinary least squares regression for 
the two markets. 
Regression results are presented in Table 4.2.  The Box-Cox parameter 
estimate for the Carolina market is 0.2555, and for the Georgia-Florida market it is 
0.0616.  A series of  likelihood  ratio  tests were conducted to test the linear and semi- 
                                                 
30 These cities were: Wilmington, NC for Brunswick County; Greenville, NC for Dare County, Myrtle 
Beach, SC for Georgetown County; Albany, GA for Glynn County; Melbourne, FL for Brevard 




Table 4.2: Hedonic Price Regression Results 
             Carolinas       Georgia-Florida 
Variable  Coefficient Std Err  Coefficient Std Err 
housage  -0.0351 0.0269  0.0019  0.0021 
sqft   0.0026*** 0.00031 0.00012*** 0.000019 
lotsize   0.00012*** 0.00003 0.000023*** 0.0000016 
mtstory  5.0447*** 0.5801  0.1518*** 0.0522 
airc   1.7463*** 0.9594  0.1870*** 0.0641 
firep   1.5356*** 0.5735  0.1084  0.0775 
dmsa   -0.0029 0.0146  -0.0030*** 0.0009 
dcbd   -0.00041*** 0.00008 -0.000016*** 0.000005 
ocfrnt   4.6412*** 0.8004  0.5265*** 0.0588  
dist   -0.0058 0.0052  -0.00088** 0.00036 
medbw  0.2344** 0.0920  0.0271*** 0.0040 
medbw2  -0.0045*** 0.0016  -0.000201*** 0.000034 
pfirm   -0.8596 0.7308  0.0663  0.0625 
vzone   -0.3463 0.7018  0.0073  0.0826 
elev   0.3303* 0.1853  0.0144  0.0147 
hugo/andr  -1.9166* 0.9914  -0.3297*** 0.0972 
time   -0.2482** 0.1207  0.0147  0.0129 
brun/brev  -1.1840 3.9161  -1.3866*** 0.2871 
geor/lee  4.8079  4.7169  -0.0204 0.1367 
cobra   -2.9940** 1.1790  -0.1233 0.1332 
intercept  34.8970*** 9.0752  10.2116*** 0.4066 
R2   0.7034    0.8546 
Fstat   41.26    82.86 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
gamma  0.25546 0.03977 0 .06156 0.02843 
LRT   625.46    900.33 
_____________________________________________________________________
Both regressions utilize data from 1986-1998; dependent variable is transformed 
rental rate in 1998$; *=statistically significant at α=10%; **=statistically significant 
at α=5%; ***=statistically significant at α=1% 
 
log forms for each market.  The semi-log form could not be rejected for the Georgia-
Florida model; both forms were rejected for the Carolina model.  Each model has 
relatively high explanatory power with R-squared measures of 70.34% (Carolinas) 
and 85.46% (Georgia-Florida).  Thirteen (twelve) of the 20 covariates are statistically 




coefficients have the expected signs, with the exception of vzone in the Georgia-
Florida model.  I focus, from this point, on the resource and loss mitigation variables. 
Ocean-frontage has a positive and significant effect on property rental rate in 
each of the models.  Distance from the shore has a negative effect on property rental 
rate, all else equal, but this effect is only significant in the Georgia-Florida model.  
Median beach width is statistically significant in each model, and the hedonic price 
functions are increasing and concave in this beach quality measure.  The dummy 
variables for post-FIRM construction and presence in the v-zone are not significant in 
either model.  With regard to post-FIRM construction, this result is not surprising due 
to countervailing effects of a home being built after the publication of the local 
FIRM.  On one hand, the property is constructed to meet higher standards of flood- 
and wind-resistance, which should increase their value relative to properties that were 
constructed earlier.  On the other hand, flood insurance rates increase after the 
publication of the FIRM, and pre-existing properties enjoy reduced rates that new 
construction does not.  If some homebuyers recognize this, it could be partially 
capitalized in the sales price.  The V-zone dummy variable is correlated with ocean-
frontage, but the degree of correlation is not exceedingly high.  Elevation above BFE 
has a positive effect on rental rate, but this effect is not significant in the Georgia-
Florida model.  Lastly, properties located in a CBRA zone are discounted, though this 
discount is not different from zero in the Georgia-Florida model. 
Table 4.3 displays descriptive statistics on rental rates and marginal implicit 
rental prices associated with the continuous resource and loss mitigation variables 




∂hij/∂resijk = Wijk = (γj Hij(.)+1)(1/ γj-1)  × γj ∂Hij/∂resijk
 
where hij is the calculated housing rental rate (observed sales price times mortgage 
rate), Hij(.) =βj0 + ai’βja + resi’βjres +  lossi’βjloss is the predicted housing rental rate, γj 
is the Box-Cox parameter, and i indexes households, j indexes markets, and k indexes 
the resource (or loss-mitigating) variables.  In general, cost of living (net of housing) 
is lower in the Georgia-Florida market, but the predicted rental rates are higher for 
this market.  The average rental rate in the Carolinas is $19,496 per annum, and in the 
Georgia-Florida market it is $36,724.  The difference in the real rental rate is 
approximately $16,000 per annum.  This evidence supports the contention that there 
are substantial differences in the distribution of consumer characteristics and/or the 
distribution of housing characteristics across these two markets.   
Table 4.3: Predicted Rental Values and Marginal Implicit Prices 
                       Carolinas       Georgia-Florida 
Variable   Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev 
housing rental rate         19495.55        12916.73          36724.73 67712.00 
marginal rental rate for q        144.53      189.47     758.92  1452.27 
marginal rental rate of elev     503.04  242.64  528.73* 974.85 
marginal rental rate of dist -8.94*  4.31  -32.46  59.86 
N    369    303 
* Marginal effect not significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
Despite this difference, the resulting marginal rental prices seem reasonable: 
the average marginal rental rate for an additional meter of beach width in the 
Carolinas is $145 per year, while in the Georgia-Florida market it is $759 per year.  
An additional meter of elevation above the BFE is worth $503 per year, on average, 
in the Carolinas.  The estimated value of an additional meter of elevation in the 




statistically significant.  The average rental rate for decreasing distance from the 
shoreline by one meter is $9 in the Carolinas model and $32 in the Georgia-Florida 
model.  The price of distance from the shore, however, was not statistically 
significant in the Carolinas model.  The influence of dichotomous variables can be 
calculated as the change in predicted rental rate as the indicator variable is changed 
from ‘0’ to ‘1’.  Presence on the oceanfront is estimated to increase the average rental 
rate by about $5,400 in the Carolinas and approximately $13,200 in Georgia-Florida.  
These effects are rather large, but not implausible. 
Coastal Homeowner Beach Quality Demand 
The individual household marginal implicit rental rates for beach quality are utilized 
as the dependent variable in a second-stage inverse-demand equation for beach 
quality.  I focus only on the demand for beach quality, rather than the demand system 
implied by [4.11].  I assume that resource and loss-mitigating variables are weakly 
separable from other housing attributes in the demand equation.  The regression 
equations include the resource quality variables, loss-mitigating variables, linearized 
residual expected income (adjexpinc) (from [4.12]), and household characteristics as 
explanatory variables.  The household characteristics were obtained from the mail 
survey questionnaire of coastal homeowners.  The included household characteristics 
are: age of the head of household, whether the head of household has college or 
graduate school as their highest educational attainment, the number of persons under 
age 19 in the household, and whether the household is required to hold flood 




Beach quality is defined as median beach width in the community over a 
three-year period during which the property was purchased.  Due to the nonlinearity 
of the hedonic price function, both the marginal implicit rental rate and beach quality 
are jointly determined.  The balance of resource (ocfrnt and dist) and loss-mitigating 
(pFIRM, vzone, and elev) variables is endogenous as well, as is the residual budget 
constraint.  Due, however, to the survey nature of the data, a wealth of instruments is 
available to identify parameters of the demand equation. 
 Following Bartik (1987) and Kahn and Lang (1988) demand shifters are 
interacted with a dummy variable representing the Carolina market to create 
instruments that are used in the first-stage of two-stage least squares.  Three-stage 
least squares was not utilized due to the potential mis-specification of either [4.10] 
and/or [4.11].  The demand shifters are: whether the head of household’s highest level 
is college or graduate school; whether the head of household works part-time, is 
unemployed, or retired; the age of the head of household and the square of age; the 
size of the household and the square of size; number of children under 19 in the 
household and the square of children; whether the coastal home is the primary 
residence of the household; whether the coastal home is primarily an investment 
property rented out year-round; and whether the homeowner upgraded the property 
after purchase.   
A series of dummy variables were used to specifically address endogeneity of 
the budget constraint.  These included: whether the state of primary residence had no 
state income tax, whether the state of primary residence had low state income tax 




high state income tax (greater than 7% for the highest bracket).  The excluded 
category is medium state income tax rate (greater than 4%, but less than 7% for the 
highest bracket).  Note the state of primary residence can differ from the state in 
which the property is located.  Primary residence was elicited in the homeowner mail 
survey.  To increase efficiency, the cross products of all of these variables are also 
used as instruments. 
 Expected residual income was approximated as follows.  Gross household 
income (m) at the time the property was purchased is approximated by the 
household’s response to a categorical question in the homeowner survey.  This 
income figure is inflated to 1988 dollars using the CPI.  The probability of storm 
landfall is approximated by the threat index, previously described.  The insurance 
premium (π) and amount of coverage (s) is obtained from the survey questionnaire.  
For households without flood insurance, the premium and coverage were set to zero. 
The expected storm loss is estimated from a logistic regression model for a 
sample (118) of properties located on the mid-Atlantic and the Gulf that experienced 
storm damage.  All of these properties held flood insurance and the loss was 
calculated as the sum of the household’s insurance settlement and deductible, divided 
by the current value of the house.  The results of this model (found in Table 4.4) 
suggest that post-FIRM construction and elevation decrease the proportion of loss to 
housing value, while median beach width and location in a V-zone are insignificant.  
Dummy variables for the Carolinas and the Gulf were included.  The excluded 
category is Sussex County, Delaware.  These results were used to calculate an 




Table 4.4: Logistic Regression Equation for Expected Loss 
Variable  Coefficient Std Err  t-stat  p-value 
 medbw  0.00835         0.00963        0.87       0.3878 
 pfirm   -0.71381         0.31517       -2.26       0.0255 
 vzone               -0.29633         0.37798       -0.78       0.4347 
 elev               -0.10744         0.03806       -2.82       0.0056 
 gulf            1.18931         0.48505        2.45       0.0158 
 carolina        -0.41657         0.42131       -0.99       0.3249 
 intercept       -2.39836         0.55405       -4.33       <.0001 
 
Dependent variable is odds ratio=ln(p/(1-p)), where 
p=(settlement+deductible)/(housing value); R2=0.3042; Fstat=8.09 
 
Hedonic price theory assumes that the household bid function is non-linear.  
As such, we expect the inverse demand function to be non-linear.  The results of the 
two-stage-least-squares estimation procedure are presented in Table 4.5.  Descriptive 
statistics for this equation can be found in Table 4.6.  The model has fairly high 
explanatory power for an empirical demand equation, with an R-squared of 18.64%.  
Six of the 13 covariates are statistically significant at the 10% level, including median 
beach width, whether the property was built post-FIRM, whether the property is 
located in the V-zone, the income measure, age of the head of household and whether 
the head of household has graduate school as the highest level of educational 
attainment.  The quadratic beach quality term is not statistically significant, thus 
results suggest that marginal WTP is decreasing and linear in beach quality.  This 
result likely reflects errors in estimation.  Post-FIRM housing construction decreases 
marginal WTP, as does presence in the V-zone.  The latter result is unexpected, as 
one would expect households located in this zone to value the loss-mitigating 




implying beach quality is a normal good.  Age and educational attainment increase 
marginal WTP. 
Table 4.5: Beach Quality Inverse Demand Equation 
Variable Definition     Coefficient Std Err 
  
medbw median beach width over 3 year period -39.2662***  13.37191   
  
medbw2 square of median beach width  0.424343  0.263193    
  
ocfrnt  dummy variable equal to 1 if home  67.00692  111.9406   
  located on oceanfront; 0 otherwise    
dist  distance from the shore (meters)  -0.36238  0.791719   
  
elev  elevation above BFE (meters)   -37.6412  24.79946   
  
pfirm  dummy variable equal to 1 if home  -202.289**  80.85934 
  built post-FIRM; 0 otherwise     
vzone    dummy variable equal to 1 if home  -406.704***  87.67625    
  located in V-zone; 0 otherwise  
adjexpinc         linearized residual expected income   0.001284***  0.000478    
  
age  age of head of household   5.512876**  2.639724    
  
college             dummy variable equal to 1 if head of  123.1723  76.48735 
  household had college as highest 
  educational attainment; 0 otherwise      
gradsch dummy variable equal to 1 if head of  131.7250*  77.40344    
  household had graduate school as highest 
  educational attainment; 0 otherwise      
hholdu19 number of household members under -9.17153  14.69722   
  age of 19    
insreq   dummy variable equal to 1 if required to 7.014555  52.28920    
  
  hold flood insurance 
intercept          ---      538.5387**  241.2555 
 
Dependent variable is marginal implicit rental rate of q in 1998$; N=467; R2=0.1864; 
Fstat=7.98; *=statistically significant at α=10%; **=statistically significant at α=5%; 






Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics for Inverse-demand Equation 
Variable Definition     Mean  Std Dev 
medbw median beach width over 3 year period 14.8711 12.6880
  
ocfrnt  dummy variable equal to 1 if home  0.5342  0.5931   
  located on oceanfront; 0 otherwise    
dist  distance from the shore (meters)  109.191 89.107   
  
elev  elevation above BFE (meters)   1.608  2.360  
pfirm  dummy variable equal to 1 if home  0.6153  0.5785 
  built post-FIRM; 0 otherwise     
vzone    dummy variable equal to 1 if home  0.3688  0.5737 
  located in V-zone; 0 otherwise  
adjexpinc         linearized residual expected income   147324.82 100174.52
  
age  age of head of household   50.42   11.43  
college             dummy variable equal to 1 if head of  0.4160  0.5861 
  household had college as highest 
  educational attainment; 0 otherwise      
gradsch dummy variable equal to 1 if head of  0.4367  0.5898 
  household had graduate school as highest 
  educational attainment; 0 otherwise      
hholdu19 number of household members under 2.69  2.07 
  age of 19    
insreq   dummy variable equal to 1 if required to 0.6405  0.5706  
  hold flood insurance 
 
Integration of the Marginal WTP function gives the total value of beach 
quality accruing to the coastal household.  To make use of the representative agent, 
all covariates are set to their weighted sample means.  The choke price is $917.  The 
marginal WTP function for the representative agent is: 
 
MWTPr (qt) = 916.70 - 39.67qt     [4.13] 
 
This equation is depicted in Figure 4.1.  The total value of beach quality for the 





WTPr (qt) = 916.70qt – 19.84qt2 + Kr,    [4.14] 
 
which is simply the integral of the marginal WTP function in Figure 4.1.  Kr is a 
constant of integration. 



































Identification of the uncompensated demand function, allows for the 
calculation of WTP in [4.14].  This function embodies what Bockstael and 
McConnell have called “pure willingness to pay”, which is, in some sense, a generic 
welfare measure associated with the change in some exogenous public good.  It is 
generic because it is not tied to a specific policy application.  This measure of welfare 
change is revealed in the market data, but it implicitly assumes that the household is 
constrained to consume the same vector of housing characteristics as before the 
change (other than the attribute that has changed).  As such, it is a lower bound to 
benefits (Bartik 1988).  This measure can be inappropriate if one wishes to value a 




household adjustments in response to the exogenous change.  This measure is 
appropriate however if the analyst desires a general representation of preferences, as 

















Chapter 5:  Optimal Beach Erosion Control 
This Chapter brings together the empirical estimates of benefits (presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4) in an application of the theoretical model of optimal beach 
nourishment (presented in Chapter 2).  First, the study site is described, including the 
specifics on the beach profile.  The parameters of the beach profile are then used to 
specify the transition equations for the study site.  Next, historical beach nourishment 
cost data are used to estimate a beach nourishment cost function.  Finally, the pieces 
of the optimal control problem are assembled.  The solutions to this problem are 
described and discussed for both the short-term and long-term applications.  Various 
specifications of the problem and sensitivity of the results are explored. 
Details of the Study Site 
The specific application of the optimal control model is to Tybee Island, the 
northernmost barrier island in Georgia.  Tybee Island is located about 19 miles east of 
the city of Savannah, and has a relatively small year-round population of less than 
3,000 people (1998 estimate).  The population grows to approximately 10,000 
between May and September (1994 estimate), and can exceed 30,000 on peak days in 
the summer (USACE 1994).  It is a primary recreational destination for Savannah 
residents, as well as visitors from Atlanta and other population centers.  Tybee is 
situated in a meso-tidal (tide-dominated) region, with tides typically ranging from 2 
to 3.5 meters.  The beach at Tybee Island is 4666 meters long, and the island is 1207 




consisting of geological formations and subjected to climatological conditions that are 
somewhat similar to other barriers in the region (Clayton et al. 1992).  The 
geographic setting of Georgia is unique in some respects, however, as the bathymetry 
and orientation of the coastline partially shelter the island from the full brunt of 
hurricane and tropical storm forces. 
Tybee Island’s beach has been intensively managed over the past 30 years, 
primarily by the USACE.  There have been six major beach nourishment operations 
since 1976.  As such, detailed information on the average beach profile is available.  
The average berm height (M) is 3.35 meters (USACE 1994).  The depth of closure (h) 
is estimated at approximately 7 meters, the background erosion rate (θ) is 0.67056 
meters per year, and the median sediment grain ranges in size from 0.16mm to 
0.22mm in the nearshore region (Applied Technology and Management, Inc. 2002).  
Based on extreme wave height and the grain size and specific gravity of sediment, the 
scale parameter for equation [2.4] is a=0.039 (Hardistay 1990; Applied Technology 
and Management, Inc. 2002).  This corresponds with an active profile width of 
W=2,377 meters (from equation [2.4]).  This is a relatively shallow beach profile, 
which suggests the potential for relatively large shoreline retreat (by equation [2.6]) 
(Applied Technology and Management, Inc. 2002). 
To fully identify the stream of management costs, one must determine the 
critical sea level—the mean sea level that threatens to engulf the island (Yohe et al. 
1991).  Given the tidal range on Tybee, 2 – 3.5 meters, and the berm height of 3.35 
meters, a reasonable guess at the critical sea level rise is approximately 1.5 meters.  




berm.  With wave run-up, this would threaten to flood the island.  I assume that sea 
level rise over 1.5 meters will require raising the island (by adding sand to its entire 
profile) to maintain Tybee’s present location.  Thus, I set Scrit=1.5. 
The lagoon sides of barrier islands are not typically nourished, and thus are 
not as intensively studied by engineers.  As a result, I do not have data on the berm or 
wave heights on the lagoon side of Tybee Island.  This information is required to 
predict the erosion rate when sea level exceeds Scrit (by equation [2.16]).  Shore 
profile on the lagoon side is generally less pronounced than the ocean side (Dean and 
Maurmeyer 1982).  Without guidance on the lagoon-side profile parameters, I assume 
they are 1/3 that of the ocean-side profile parameters.  This assumption gives a berm 
height (Ml) of 1.117 meters and a closure depth (hl) of 2.33 meters on the lagoon side.  
The corresponding lagoon profile width is Wl=462 meters.31
These physical dimensions of Tybee Island’s shore are used to determine the 
various parameters of the transition equation for the management problem.  For sea 
level rise below the critical level (Scrit) the increment in average beach width due to 
beach fill (τ) is given by equation [2.5’]—τ = 1/(M + h); plugging in the parameters 
for Tybee Island, we have τ = 0.0966.  For the case of a constant sea level, the only 
other piece of information we require is the background erosion rate, θ = 0.67056 
meters per year.  Thus, the short-run (constant sea level) transition equation is: 
 
qt+1  - qt = - 0.67056  + 0.0966 nt.     [5.1] 
                                                 
31 Alternatively, assuming the lagoon side parameters were ½ the ocean side, we have Ml=1.675 




For the case of sea level rise, we have two transition equations, which will 
closely reflect the dynamic equations in [2.8] and [2.9], the only difference being that 
the background erosion rate (-θ) must be appended.  Equation [2.8] applies for sea 
level rise below the critical level (Scrit), and equation [2.9] applies for sea level rise 
above the critical level.  For equation [2.8], the τ parameter is the same as the short-
run (constant sea level) case, and the erosion rate trajectory is given by equation 
[2.16].  The rate of change in the erosion rate is ∆θt = W/(M+h) × ∆S×t, where ∆S is 
the change in sea level per unit time (measured in meters).  Substituting the specific 
values for Tybee Island’s ocean shore, the long-run transition equation is: 
 
qt+1  - qt = 0.0966 nt - 0.67056 - 229.662∆S×t    [5.2a] 
for ∆S×t < Scrit,    
 
where ∆S is the change in sea level per unit time.   
Once sea level rise reaches the critical level (Scrit), equation [2.9], with the 
background erosion term (-θ) appended, serves as the transition equation.  Note, the τ 
parameter changes in this equation.  The new parameter is τ~ =  1/ [(M + h)-(Ml + 
hl)].  To parameterize [2.9], we require additional information on island width and the 
dimensions of the lagoon shore.  Recall, the average width of Tybee Island is 1207 
meters, and we had to make some assumptions about the lagoon shore profile.  For 





(W+w+Wl)/[(M+h)-(Ml+hl)] × ∆S×t.  Inserting the specific measurements for Tybee 
Island in [2.9] and appending the background erosion parameter, the transition 
equation for sea level rise past the critical value is: 
 
qt+1  - qt = 0.1449 nt - 0.67056 – 586.122∆S×t   [5.2b]  
for ∆S×t ≥ Scrit. 32
 
  Note that, relative to [5.2a], the τ parameter increases in [5.2b], as does the 
parameter of the erosion rate trajectory, ∆θt.  This is to be expected.  The τ parameter 
converts sand volume into beach width (or island width, as the case may be).  If we 
are applying sand to the entire island, as in [5.2b] (as opposed to only the beach, as in 
[5.2a]), we would expect the conversion parameter to be larger because the island and 
lagoon have less slope than the offshore zone.  The erosion trajectory parameter must 
also be greater, as was shown in Chapter 2.  For Tybee Island, I assume equation 
[5.2a] applies for sea level rise below 1.5 meters.  Equation [5.2b] applies for sea 
level rise greater than or equal to 1.5 meters. 
For application to the optimal control model, the rate of sea level rise needs to 
be adjusted because I assume that the background rate (1-2 mm/year) is reflected in 
the historical erosion rate, θ.  Assume background sea level rise in the vicinity of 
                                                 
32 Using the alternate assumption on the relationship between lagoon and ocean shore profile (1/2), 





Tybee Island is 2 mm/year.  Thus, 20 cm must be subtracted from any sea level rise 
trajectory over the course of the next century. 
Beach Nourishment Cost Function 
Historical data on beach fill volumes and pecuniary costs are used to estimate a 
reduced-form beach management cost function.  While my primary focus is on the 
Ideal Present Profile (IPP) of the beach as a measure of the state of the resource, I 
model nourishment costs in aggregate.  That is, I focus on nourishment sand per unit 
of length (nt) as a choice variable, but estimate the cost function as C(Nt) , where Nt = 
nt×l.  I do this in order to avoid making assumptions about returns to scale in beach 
production along the shoreline.   
The historical cost data includes 365 observations from the Gulf (Texas, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida), Southeast (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and 
North Carolina), and Mid-Atlantic States (Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware).  The 
data were obtained from Duke University’s Program for the Study of Developed 
Shorelines,33 and extend back to the early 1960s.  Monetary costs were converted to 
1998 dollars using the all-industry, producer-price index.  The dependent variable is 
total project cost.  Total sand volume (N) and the square of sand volume (N2) are the 
chief independent variables of the reduced-form equation. 
The cost function was estimated by least squares with state fixed effects and a 
time trend.34 The reduced-form equation is: 
 
                                                 
33 PSDS website: http://www.env.duke.edu/psds/index.html 





C(Nik) = cost98ik = γk +  γ1Nik + γ2Nik 2 + γ3 timeik + εik,  [5.3] 
 
where Nik = nik×lik, i represents observations on beach nourishment operations, and k 
represents jurisdictions (states). The parameter estimates are presented in Table 5.1.  
The LSDV estimates have fairly high explanatory power (41.37%), and all variables 
are statistically significant except for the Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia intercept 
terms.  Results suggest that the cost function is increasing and convex.  If these data 
encompass a sufficiently long time period (in which all inputs could be varied), then 
the results indicate decreasing returns to scale.  The time trend is positive, indicating 
that costs have been increasing with time.  This result could reflect dwindling 
reserves of beach fill sand in close proximity to the shore. 
Table 5.1: LSDV Estimates of Beach Nourishment Cost Function 
 
Variable Definition      Coefficient   Standard 
error    
      
  N   sand volume (cubic meters)                  2.70152*        1.60590 
  N2  square of sand volume   0.00000134*   0.0000007 
  texa           intercept for Texas          -3999311        3333382       
  loui           intercept for Louisiana    -4691012**     2262796   
  miss           intercept for Mississippi   -5288455        5754290       
  bama           intercept for Alabama    -5531081*       2982792       
  flor           intercept for Florida    -3542236***   797561       
  geor           intercept for Georgia    -5603137**     2674120       
  scar           intercept for South Carolina   -4803018***   1486330       
  ncar           intercept for North Carolina   -5141801***   1116034       
  virg           intercept for Virginia    1917744         1369406        
  mary           intercept for Maryland   14055147***  2642486        
  dela           intercept for Delaware   -3103231***   1056543       
  time           time trend (1961=1; 2002=42)  167171***       27904        
Dependent Variable=cost in 1998$; # obs.=365; R2=0.4137; F (14)=17.64; 
*=statistically significant at α=10%; **=statistically significant at α=5%; 




Solutions to the Optimal Control Model 
We now have all elements of the optimal control system (introduced in [2.10]-[2.13]) 
at hand.  We use consumer surplus from beach visits as an approximation of beach 
visitors’ willingness to pay for beach quality.  For beach visitors, we assume that 
beach width is an essential input into the production of “beach days”—the 
recreational good embodied by a day at the beach.  As such, the reservation utility for 
the study site with zero beach quality is assumed to be zero.  I set the constant of 
integration, Kb from equation [3.15], to zero to reflect this.  Our economic return 
function for beach visitors is: 
 
WTPb (qt) = 726.80qt – 8.41 qt 2,      [5.4] 
 
where b represents beach visitors.   
The recreational demand model of Chapter 3 takes into account not only 
changes in the intensive margin of beach use arising from changes in beach quality, 
but implicitly considers changes in the extensive margin (or how alteration of beach 
quality affects the propensity to visit for non-users) by controlling for the truncation 
of non-users.  Thus, changes in visitation for both current users and non-users are 
embodied in [5.4].  This economic return implies large benefits measures for each 
beach visitor household, but a seemingly reasonable optimal beach width for this 
group.  With no cost, the optimal beach width implied by [5.4] (at which marginal 
value becomes zero) is 43.2 meter.  Willingness-to-pay for this optimal width is 




priori.  In fact, it represents about a quarter of annual income.  Apparently, the 
constrained linear regression produces unreasonable results for economic returns 
from beach quality accruing to beach visitors.  This caveat notwithstanding, equation 
[5.4] will be used to represent the preferences of beach visitors in the optimization 
model to follow.  One should bear in mind that the economic returns from beach 
quality for beach visitors are very likely to be overestimated, perhaps by a significant 
amount.  As such, solution to the optimization problem should be considered 
illustrative. 
 For coastal homeowners, we make use of the inverse-demand equation for 
beach quality presented in Chapter 4.  Recall, the economic return function is: 
 
WTPr (qt) = 916.70qt - 19.84qt2 + Kr,    [4.14] 
 
 where Kr is the constant of integration, and r represents coastal homeowners.  
Equation [4.14] is a “pure willingness to pay” measure—a general representation of 
preferences associated with the change in an exogenous public good.  The constant of 
integration will not affect results of the short-run (constant sea level) model, because 
it drops out of the first-order conditions.  The constant will, however, affect model 
results in the long run, as total benefits partially determine the terminal control time 
by equation [2.22].  Two cases will be considered.  
The constant of integration could be set to zero if we wanted to examine the 
time horizon of active management with no regard to the residual value of property 




at the terminal time, corresponding with full depreciation of threatened properties.  In 
this case, we have: 
 
WTPr (qt) = 916.70qt - 19.84qt2.     [5.5] 
 
On the other hand, the constant of integration could be set to some positive value that 
we predict to be the average residual value of property, net of beach quality, at the 
terminal time.  This case would imply less than full depreciation, or perhaps 
appreciation, or the threatened properties.  In this case, we have 
 
WTPr (qt) = 916.70qt - 19.84qt2 + qP− ,    [5.5’] 
 
where qP−  is average property price, net of beach quality, at the terminal time.  
Previous research (Landry, Keeler, and Kriesel 2003) provides a hedonic regression 
equation that can be used to estimate the average value of property on Tybee Island.  I 
use this approach to predict the value of a house on Tybee Island with all housing 
characteristics set to their sample means and beach quality set to zero.  This measure 
represents the residual value of coastal housing in 1998 dollars.  The estimated value 
is $124,926, which is $23,172 less than the estimated housing value with beach 
quality set to its sample mean (31.39 meters).  I set the intercept in [5.5’] qP−  = 
124,926.  This is akin to the notion of “economic vulnerability” studied by Yohe 
(1991a).  Other cases of residual property value could be considered, in particular, 




of the terminal time to these cases would provide evidence about how optimal beach 
management under sea level rise responds to the trajectory of the market value of 
threatened coastal properties.  With no cost, the optimal beach width implied by [5.5] 
and [5.5’] (at which marginal value becomes zero) is 23.1 meters—a plausible result.  
Total willingness-to-pay for this level of beach quality (from [5.5]) is $10,598 per 
coastal-homeowner household per year. 
The uncompensated inverse-demand equation on which [5.5] and [5.5’] are 
based holds expected income and the quantity of other risk and resource variables 
constant.  It does not hold utility constant, as would the Hicksian measure of 
compensation.  As the threat of sea level rise becomes more imminent the threat of 
erosion loss will become more pronounced, and we might expect that willingness-to-
pay for protection would increase.  My model does not address this aspect of the 
beach erosion problem.  I do not consider erosion risk, aside from that associated with 
coastal storms.  The benefit functions of [5.5] and [5.5’] are a snapshot of preferences 
under the current expectations of sea level rise.  My intentions are to forecast 
management decisions based on current preferences in order to provide a conceptual 
framework for management and to make some predictions about the time horizon of 
management given what is currently revealed about demand for beach quality in the 
housing and recreation markets.  I feel strongly that the latter will provide useful 
information for achieving efficiency in the coastal property market and for planning 
responses to sea level rise. 
Beach nourishment cost per meter of shoreline for Tybee Island is calculated 




initially set to 38 (corresponding with technology and resources in the year 1998). 
Under these assumptions, the cost function is: 
 
C(Nt) = 749,361 +  2.7Nt  +  0.00000134Nt2       
C(nt) = 749,361 +  2.7(nt×l)  +  0.00000134(nt×l)2     [5.6] 
C(nt) = 749,361 +  12598.2nt  +  29.1739nt2,     
 
where the intercept term reflects the combined influence of the time trend (“locked-
in” at the year 1998) and the Georgia state fixed effect.  The third line follows by 
inserting the length of Tybee Island (l=4666m) and simplifying.  If we were to allow 
the time trend to evolve, costs increase over time, as suggested by the results in Table 
5.1.  This produces the following cost function: 
 
C(nt) = - 5,603,137 +  12598.2nt  +  29.1739nt2+ 167,171×time,     [5.6’] 
 
where time is count variable, starting at 1 for the year 1961. 
Let the discount rate be δ=0.1.  Previous research on Tybee Island identifies 
the number of coastal households, R=2,795, and the total number of annual visitor 
trips at 899,284 (Landry, Keeler, and Kriesel 2003).  I use the weighted truncated 
mean of ex-post trips (9.09 trips per year) to estimate the number of current beach 
visitor households at 98,931.  I then multiply the number of current users by the ratio 
of the truncated to the censored mean ([9.09 trips per year]/[6.46 trips per year] = 




Recall, visitors staying over five days on-site were removed from the sample of 
recreational users in order to avoid double-counting of benefits (see Chapter 3 for 
more details).  The number of beach visitor households must also be adjusted for this 
correction.  The raw data contain 2,467 observations, of which 1,946, or 79 percent, 
pertained to households staying less than six days on-site.  Multiplying this 
percentage by our potential user population estimate, puts the number of beach visitor 
households staying less than six days on-site at B=109,965. 
Constant Sea Level (Short-term) Control Problem 
The short-term control problem, assuming a finite time horizon (25 years) and 













η    
  subject to qt  - qt-1 = - θ  + τnt-1,  nt ≥ 0 
   qt=0 = q0 ≥ 0   
    qT = free.      
  
Initial average beach quality in the Tybee Island survey is 23.5 meters.  This estimate 
is based on beach measurements in the spring of 1998.  Substituting [5.4], [5.5], [5.6], 







H~  = 109,965×(726.80qt – 8.41 qt 2) + 2,795×(916.7qt - 19.84qt2) 
– (749,361 +  12598.2nt  +  29.1739nt2) + ηφt+1(-0.67056 + 0.09662× nt), 
 
where η = 1/(1 + δ)  is the discount factor for one period and φt+1 =λt+1×(1+ δ)t+1 is 
the current shadow value in the subsequent period.  This Hamiltonian is differentiable 
and concave in qt and nt, jointly.  Thus, the Mangasarian Sufficiency Theorem 
applies, and the necessary conditions for the maximum principle are sufficient for a 
global maximum.  The transition equation is linear in qt and nt, requiring no sign 
restriction on the costate variable (Chiang 1992).  The necessary conditions for 
maximizing H~  are: 
 
∂H~ /∂nt = -12598.2 -58.348nt + 0.09662ηφt+1 ≤ 0,   nt≥ 0    ∀ t [5.7] 
(-12598.2 -58.348nt + 0.09662ηφt+1 )× nt = 0        
ηφt+1 - φt = -∂H
~ /∂qt
  = -109,965×(726.80 – 16.82 qt ) - 2,795×(916.70 – 39.67qt)    ∀ t [5.8] 
 qt+1  - qt = /∂ηφH
~∂ t+1  = -0.67056 + 0.09662× nt,      ∀ t [5.9] 
 
as well as a transversality condition.  If we intend to extract all surpluses from the 
control problem in the short run, condition [2.21] is the appropriate transversality 
condition, and we have: 
 





where ηT = 1/(1 + δ)T  is the discount factor evaluated in the final period.  Under 
condition [5.10], either the shadow value of beach quality or the stock of beach 
quality must be zero at the terminal time.  On the other hand, the coastal planner may 
want to leave a certain level of beach quality at the terminal time.  In this case, 
condition [2.21’] is the appropriate transversality condition, and we have: 
 
qT = q .        [5.10’] 
 
For illustration purposes, we may assume q = q0 = 23.5 meters; the coastal planner 
intends to leave the resource in a terminal state that is equivalent to the initial state. 
With a discount rate of δ=0.1, we have η=0.9091.  From condition [5.7], we 
see that for nt > 0, we must have: 
 
nt = 0.0015φt+1 -215.915       [5.11] 
 
Let us assume nt > 0 for t=0, ... T-1, and let us first consider the case of transversality 
condition [5.10].  If erosion were allowed to proceed unabated over the 25-year time 
horizon, average beach width at the end of the last period would measure 6.74 meters.  
(See Figure 5.1.)  Thus, q25 ≠ 0, and φ25 = 0 must be true by condition [5.10].  With 
φ25 = 0, [5.11] cannot hold for the final period, so n24=0.  This makes intuitive sense, 
as the coastal planner would not want to waste resources in the final period since the 




φt+1 >143,943.33 in any period for beach nourishment to be undertaken in the 
previous period.  Assuming an interior solution and substituting [5.11] in [5.9] gives: 
 
qt+1  - qt -0.000145φt+1  = -21.532,      [5.9’] 
 
which along with 
 
φt+1 – 1.1φt – 2,156,537.85qt = - 82,484,738.5   [5.8’] 
 
constitutes a system of first-order, linear difference equations with constant 
coefficients.  Equations [5.8’] and [5.9’] comprise the canonical form of the solution 
to the dynamic optimization problem, but this system only applies for nt > 0 for all t.  
We have seen that these equations cannot apply for all t for transversality condition 
[5.10].  The equations can apply for transversality condition [5.10’], but upon further 
inspection, the system proves to be unstable and does not have a solution.35   
Next, let us assume that nt = 0 for t=0, ... T-1.  Simulating erosion over 25 
years produces a final average beach width of 6.74 meters.  The uncontrolled 
dynamic state path is deterministic, and is depicted in Figure 5.1.  Transversality 
condition [5.10] is the relevant boundary condition for the case of “no control”, and 
thus φ25 = 0.  The dynamic path of the costate variable can be solved recursively, 
using equation [5.8] and working backwards in time.  The costate path is shown in 
                                                 
35 The roots of the characteristic equation for this system are 0.0035 and 314.796—the first is stable, 




Figure 5.2.  The costate variable is always greater than $143,943.33, and thus nt = 0 
for t=0, ... T-1 cannot be a solution. 















































This evidence suggests that the control path is intermittent.  In some periods nt>0, 
while in others, nt=0.  In order to solve the short-term problem, I use dynamic 




discretizing the state and control spaces and applying Bellman’s backward recursion 
algorithm.  The approach of backward recursion is based on Bellman’s Principle of 
Optimality, which states that an optimal policy must constitute an optimum with 
regard to the remaining periods regardless of preceding decisions.  As such, one can 
solve the problem by working backwards.  Bellman’s equation for the beach erosion 





+−= tJttntJ qVnCqWTPqV t
η ,    [5.12] 
 
where WTP* is the weighted sum across user groups (aggregate measure) of 
willingness-to-pay, following the above notation nt = Nt / l, and J represents the 
number of periods remaining.  Recall qt+1 = qt – θ + τnt.  VJ(qt) is the value function, 
which gives the sum of current and discounted future returns to beach quality 
following the optimal policy of beach nourishment. 
Aggregate willingness-to-pay becomes negative at q ≥ 85 meters, providing a 
natural upper bound on beach quality for policy purposes.  The state space was 
defined as 0 ≤ q ≤ 85, with 0.1 meter increments giving rise to a 1×851 vector of 
states.  Since q may only take on multiples of 0.1, the erosion rate can only be 
approximated.  That is, we cannot use the historical erosion rate of 0.67056 meters 
per year in the transition equation, as this would send next period’s state to an 
undefined location because q only takes on multiples of 0.1.  I use an erosion rate of 




parameter must be approximated at 0.1.  The control space was defined over 0 ≤ n ≤ 
850, with 1 square-meter increments giving rise to a 1×851 vector of controls.   
Assuming V is differentiable in q, returns from beach management are 
maximized when  
 
-∂C/∂nt + η ∂VJ-1/∂qt×0.1 = 0      [5.13] 
 
for an interior solution.  The τ parameter, which converts sand volume to beach width 
per meter of shoreline length, is approximated at 0.1 and appears as a multiplicative 
term in [5.13].  By the envelope theorem,  
 
∂VJ/∂qt = ∂WTP*/∂qt + η ∂VJ-1/∂qt+1     [5.14] 
 
Combining [5.13] and [5.14], we have 
 
∂VJ/∂qt = ∂WTP*/∂qt + [∂C/∂nt]/0.1      [5.15] 
 
for t=0,…,T-1 and J=T-1,…,0.  Substituting [5.15] for ∂VJ/∂qt and ∂VJ-1/∂qt+1 in 
[5.14] we arrive at 
 





Expression [5.16] is interpreted as follows: at the optimum, the marginal cost of an 
additional increment to beach width in period t should be equal to the present value of 
the sum of marginal willingness to pay and the marginal cost of an additional 
increment to beach width in the subsequent period (t+1).  The first term on the RHS 
of [5.16] reflects the benefits of beach nourishment, which begin to accrue in the next 
period.  The second term on the RHS of [5.16] reflects the foregone cost of beach 
nourishment in the subsequent period due to action in the current period.  Rearranging 
[5.16], we have 
 
[∂C/∂nt]/0.1 = η/(1-η) ∂WTP*/∂qt+1      [5.16’] 
 
which defines optimal beach nourishment by balancing present marginal cost with the 
present value of the flow of benefits due to nourishment in perpetuity. 
A numerical routine for estimating the value function and optimal beach 
nourishment policy was adapted following Miranda and Fackler (2002).  The program 
implements value function iteration; backward recursion is used to solve the beach 
erosion problem by starting in the last period and determining the optimal decision 
rule and resulting maximum value for each possible state.  Working backwards, this 
procedure is repeated for each previous period.  The solution at the first period 
provides the maximum attainable value, and the entire procedure provides a roadmap 
of optimal policies for each period conditional on the results of the previous period.   
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 depict the optimal state path and control paths, 




WTP*(qT).  The beach quality that maximizes aggregate willingness-to-pay is 42.07 
meters.  The magnitude of the benefits of maintaining this beach quality dominates 
that of the short-run costs.  The optimal beach nourishment policy overshoots this 
optimal level of quality in the second period and borders it in all subsequent periods, 
buffeting between 42.4 meters and 41.7 meters.  As such, the optimal solution 
approximates a steady state by maintaining the state variable in close proximity to the 
optimum.   
With a terminal value function, we maintain this pattern until period T-1.  If 
we were to neglect the terminal value, this pattern would be maintained only until T-
2.  In the former case, the optimal control is 192m3 of sand per meter of beach length 
in the initial period, 11m3/m in the second period, and buffets between 0m3/m and 
14m3/m in all subsequent periods until T-1, after which it becomes zero.  The present 
value of the stream of returns associated with the optimal policy is an immense $189 
billion.  This number is upward biased due to the overstatement of benefits associated 
with beach visitors.  (The control path is slightly different for the case of no terminal 
value, but follows the same basic pattern.) 























If initial beach quality were 58.7 meters or greater, the optimal policy would 
be no beach nourishment over the entire time interval.  At an initial level of 58.7 
meters, annual erosion reduces average beach width to 42 meters only after 24 years, 
and thus beach nourishment is not warranted.  Conversely, if initial beach quality 
were only 10 meters, the initial nourishment would consist of 327m3 of sand per 
meter of beach length (giving rise to an average of 42 meters of beach width) 
followed by 11m3/m in the second period, and the following the intermittent pattern 
of 0m3/m and 14m3/m in all subsequent periods until T-1.  This type of solution path 
is similar to the most rapid approach, and holds for all initial beach widths below 42 
meters.  The dominance of the magnitude of the benefits over that of the costs leads 
to this type of solution.  This aspect of the problem also makes the solution 
insensitive to the discount rate.  The existence of fixed costs contributes to the 
intermittent nature of the solution near the optimum state. 






















A doubling of fixed costs alters the solution.  Changing the fixed costs to 
$1,498,722 leads to larger gaps of inactivity in the optimal solution.  The optimal 




respectively.  The optimal policy still embodies a most-rapid approach, but once the 
state is in the neighborhood of the optimum the optimal policy is to place 21m3 of 
sand per meter of beach length and forego sand placement in the two subsequent 
periods.  The larger periods of inactivity are due to the increased fixed costs, and this 
pattern persists for greater increases in fixed costs.   













































The intermittent nature of the solution mirrors the structure of a typical beach 
nourishment project.  In practice, beach renourishment is usually conducted every 5-




operations are optimal, it could be that the present model misses some of the fixed 
costs.  For example, use of the beach is limited during nourishment operations, and 
the operations themselves could negatively impact the aesthetics of the coastal zone.  
These external costs may lead policymakers to increase the period of time between 
beach nourishment operations. 
Rising Sea Level (Long-term) Control Problem 
In the long run, sea level rise will cause increasing shoreline erosion.  In general, the 
long-term transition equation is given in [2.8] and [2.9], with the specific long-term 
transition equation for Tybee Island in equations [5.2a] and [5.2b].  These expressions 
depend upon the rate of sea level rise—∆S.  I consider three scenarios that span the 
current estimates of sea level rise over the next century—30cm, 55cm, and 80cm.  
These sea level rise estimates must be adjusted for the background level of sea level 
rise, assumed 20cm per century for Tybee Island.  Thus, I subtract 20cm from the 
total rise, and divide by 100 to produce an annual rate, giving 0.001 meters/year, 
0.0035 meters/year, and 0.006 meters/year, respectively.  In addition, I make the 













η    
 subject to qt  - qt-1 = - θ -∆θ(t) + τt-1nt-1,  nt ≥ 0 
   qt=0 = q0 ≥ 0   





where the cost function is now an explicit function of time, the τ parameter varies 




l)/[(M+h)-(Ml+hl)] × ∆S×t. 
As we have found that the Maximum Principle is of limited use in solving the 
beach nourishment problem, I dispense with the Hamiltonian expression from here 
on.  The dynamic programming solution algorithm for the long-term problem, 
however, is complicated by the non-stationary form of the transition equation.  I save 
the numerical solution to the long-term problem as a topic for future research, and 
from here on focus on illustrating the type of results that can be produced with such a 
model.  To accomplish this, I assume that the solution to the long-term problem is of 
the same form as the short-term problem.  Specifically, I assume that the state 
variable should bracket the optimal value (42 meters) through alternating periods of 
beach replenishment and inactivity until T-1, at which time control is terminated.  I 
call this the “short run steady state” (SRSS) solution.  Maintaining this level of beach 
quality is accomplished at escalating cost over time due to the effects of sea level rise 
on the erosion rate.  Also, the empirical cost function exhibits an upward trend, 
indicating increasing real costs over time.  I take this approach so that I can estimate 
the terminal control time under various scenarios relating to the rate of sea level rise 
and the residual value of coastal real estate without explicitly solving the non-
autonomous long run management problem.  The assumption of a SRSS solution may 
understate the terminal time, because it seems likely that the optimal width will 
diminish in later periods, reducing costs.  However, this will also reduce benefits, so 




the SRSS assumption only to illustrate the type of output I intend to produce once I 
solve the long-term dynamic programming problem. 
Condition [2.22] implicitly defines the terminal time by the equality of beach 
nourishment benefits and costs in the penultimate period.  To review, the terminal 
time is implicitly defined as: 
 
)())(,()( 1111 lnCqLqWTPRqWTPB TTT
r
T
b ×=×+× −−−− .  [2.22] 
 
Under sea level rise, the erosion rate increases monotonically.  Thus, the cost of 
producing an increment to beach width will rise monotonically as well because beach 
nourishment must compensate for increasing erosion.  Economic returns from beach 
quality, on the other hand, are bounded.  This characterization of the erosion 
management problem provides the structure by which the terminal time can be 
determined.  In the long run, the sustained absence of beach nourishment implies a 
policy of shoreline retreat.   
Recall, that we have two expressions for the economic returns from beach 
quality accruing to coastal homeowners, [5.5] and [5.5’].  The former implicitly 
assumes that residual property values—property values net of beach quality at the 
terminal time—are zero, while the latter allows for residual property values to 
maintain their current (1998) levels.  Other depreciation or appreciation schemes 
could be used to map alternate property value trajectories as well.  The distinction of 
residual property value only matters in the long run, since the constant term does not 




Figure 5.7 shows the dynamic cost functions for maintaining SRSS beach 
width under each of the sea level rise trajectories and the aggregate benefit measures 
for each residual property value scenario.  The cost function for Tybee Island is given 
in [5.6’]—costs of sand placement are trending upwards over time.  The dynamic cost 
paths in 5.7 differ only by the rate of sea level rise (∆S) which determines the long 
term erosion rate and thus affects the amount of beach nourishment required to 
maintain the SRSS beach width.  Higher rates of sea level rise are associated with 
more drastic increases in the costs of maintaining the beach.  The dynamic motion of 
beach quality is determined by the transition equations in [5.2a] and [5.2b], with the 
switching point determined as the year in which aggregate sea level rise reaches 1.5 
meters.  For the 30cm sea level rise trajectory, this occurs in period 500.  For the 
55cm sea level rise trajectory this occurs in period 273, and for the 80cm trajectory it 
occurs in period 188.  These time periods witness a discrete jump in beach 
management costs, as shown in Figure 5.7. 
Figure 5.7: Costs and Benefits of Beach 







































Homeowner returns from beach quality with no residual property value at the 
terminal time are given by [5.5], while returns from beach quality with a positive 
constant residual property value (in 1998$) are given by [5.5’].  Returns for beach 
visitors are given by [5.4].  Each return function is scaled by the relevant number of 
households for Tybee Island—2,795 coastal homeowners and 109,965 beach visitors.  
With no residual property value, the current value of aggregate benefits of 
maintaining the SRSS optimal beach width (42 meters) is just over $1.734 billion per 
year.  Aggregate benefits under the assumption of a positive constant residual 
property value are $2.083 billion per year.  Since the SRSS solution entails beach 
nourishment every other year, the benefits in Table 5.7 represent the attendant 
benefits of such operations over a two-year interval.  Again, these numbers are 
upward biased due to the apparent bias in the recreational benefits estimates of [5.4].  
Thus, the resulting time horizons should be considered upper bounds conditional on 
the residual property value assumptions. 
For the 30cm sea level rise trajectory, projected management costs are always 
well below the benefits of preserving the present coastline over 500 years, regardless 
of the assumption on residual property values.  Thus, the upper bound time horizon 
for relatively low sea level rise is indefinite.  Assuming no residual value for 
threatened coastal properties, benefits and costs equate in period 365 (213), for the 
55cm (80cm) sea level rise trajectory.  These time horizons represent an upper bound 
on the time frame, in years, under which beach quality can be expected to be 
maintained under the SRSS management solution and assuming full depreciation of 




estate maintains its average value at the terminal time (measured in constant 1998 
dollars).  Under these conditions the upper bound on the time horizon on the SRSS 
management solution extends to 481 years for the 55cm rise trajectory and 235 years 
for the 80cm sea level rise trajectory.  Thus, results of the dynamic simulations 
suggest that the upper bound on active beach management is on the order of hundreds 
of years. 
 To provide a lower bound on the time horizon estimates the same cost 
calculations are compared to the benefits measures derived for coastal property 
owners only, maintaining the aforementioned distinction between full and zero 
depreciation.  Thus, economic returns accruing to beach visitors are ignored in 
calculating the lower bound.  For clarity we will call this the restricted model.  
Focusing on only returns to coastal households, the optimal beach width with zero 
cost would be 23.1 meters, and aggregate benefits of maintaining this beach width are 
$29.596 million per year.  This aggregate benefit measure seems much more 
reasonable than the previous measure associated with both coastal property owners 
and beach visitors.  Moreover, looking at the short run solution to this version of the 
problem, we see the benefit measure does not dominate the costs as seen in the 
previous model. 
 The short run solution to the restricted model is depicted in Figures 5.8 and 
5.9.  Figure 5.8 shows the optimal state path and Figure 5.9 shows the optimal control 
path for the beach management problem when economic returns are restricted to 
coastal property owners.  In these results, we see the same pattern of over-




beach nourishment activity effectively brackets a lower level of beach quality, 
reflecting only the preferences of coastal homeowners.  Over the 25-year time 
horizon, beach quality is 23.35 meters, on average.  Secondly, the gaps of inactivity 
in beach management have increased substantially reflecting the greater relative 
magnitude of fixed costs compared to the benefits of management.  Beach 
replenishment in this case should occur only every 4-6 years.  Lastly, the solution to 
the restricted model is sensitive to the discount rate.  The optimal state is diminishing 
over time, reflecting the discount of future benefits.  The restricted solution does not 
approximate a steady state as in the previous case.  Likewise, the optimal control is 
diminishing as well. 























In order to simulate the restricted solution over a longer time horizon, I 
assume that the state variable should bracket the optimal beach quality 
(approximately 23 meters), and beach replenishment should be conducted in 5-year 
intervals.  We will call this the “short run restricted steady state” (SRRSS) solution.  




returns accruing over 5 periods.  This approach will provide only an approximate 
solution, as evidence from the SR problem indicates that the optimal state should be 
decreasing over time. 























Figure 5.10 indicates costs and benefits of beach nourishment for the 
restricted model.  Assuming no residual property value, the current value of aggregate 
benefits of maintaining the SRRSS beach width are approximately $26 million per 
year.  Over five years this amounts to a little over $115 million, assuming a 10 
percent discount rate.  Aggregate benefits under the assumption of a constant residual 
property value are $375 million per year.  Over five years this amounts to about $1.57 
billion.  Again, these numbers represent lower bounds because the recreational 





Figure 5.10: Costs and Benefits of Beach 


























Consider first the case of no residual property value.  The lower horizontal 
line in Figure 5.10 represents the benefits associated with this case.  Under the low 
sea level rise trajectory of 30cm over the next century, benefits and costs roughly 
equate in period 128.  Under the 55cm sea level rise trajectory, costs exceed benefits 
in period 38, while under the highest trajectory—80cm over the next century—the 
costs of beach management exceed the benefits in period 23.  Next, consider the case 
of a constant residual value for threatened barrier island properties.  The upper 
horizontal line in Figure 5.10 represents the benefits associated with this case.  The 
costs of beach management under the low sea level rise trajectory of 30cm are well 
below the benefits through 500 years into the future.  For the 55cm (80cm) sea level 
rise trajectory, costs exceed benefits in period 168 (98).  Thus, the lower bound time 




hundreds of years, with the most drastic case—full depreciation of threatened 
properties and 80cm sea level rise over the next century—extending only about 25 
years into the future. 
Discussion 
Using non-market valuation to quantify the returns from beach quality to different 
user groups and optimal control theory to model the management problem, I have laid 
out a conceptual model of beach erosion management.  By applying dynamic 
programming I have shown how this model can be used to determine efficient 
management of barrier island beaches in the short run.  Building upon the short run 
solution, I have also illustrated an assessment of coastal protection on barrier island 
beaches under sea level rise.  My model differs from current approaches to coastal 
erosion management by incorporating both active and passive management regimes, 
examining the dual nature of beach services, identifying and incorporating the 
benefits accruing to different user groups, and explicitly accounting for the dynamic 
adjustment process of beaches.   
I find that the Maximum Principle is of limited use in solving the beach 
management problem.  Explicitly allowing for corner solutions to the optimal 
nourishment control is a realistic part of the model in the short run and introduces the 
possibility of shoreline retreat as an optional policy in the long run.  Corner solutions, 
however, complicate the solution of the simultaneous difference equations that result 
from the Maximum Principle.  Dynamic programming was required to solve the 




I use Tybee Island, Georgia as a study site and show the optimal short run 
management strategy for Tybee’s beach.  In the short run, the magnitude of the 
benefits of maintaining the beach far outweighs the costs.  In fact, the beach should 
be maintained close to the level—42 meters wide on average—which maximizes 
aggregate (not net) benefits across the two user groups.  Since the benefits associated 
with this level of beach quality far outweigh the costs, the solution is analogous to a 
most-rapid approach.  If initial beach quality is below the optimum, beach 
nourishment in the first period should build up the beach close to the optimal.    If 
initial beach quality is above the optimum, no nourishment should be undertaken until 
erosion reduces beach width close to the optimum.  In either event, once in the 
vicinity of the optimum beach nourishment should be conducted in two-year 
intervals.  This latter result reflects the fixed costs of beach nourishment.  The short 
term solution is sensitive to changes in fixed costs, but not the discount rate.  One 
important caveat—recreational benefits are biased upwards, so the domination of 
benefits over costs is very possibly an artifact of this bias. 
Exploratory results of the management problem under sea level rise indicate 
how the model can be used to determine the time horizon of active management 
under various assumptions about sea level rise and the trajectory of property values.  
Previous research on coastal protection (Yohe, Neumann, and Ameden (1995)) 
suggests that the issue for managing barrier islands via nourishment under sea level 
rise is determining when to stop protection.  That is, at what point should we give up 
trying to preserve barrier beaches?  My model offers a framework for making a 




Assuming that costs rise monotonically with sea level but that the number of 
current users bound benefits, the terminal time can be identified by the equality of 
total benefits and costs in the penultimate period.  Upward bias in the recreational 
benefits estimates leads to an upper bound on the time horizon if such benefits are 
included in the model.  Due to the non-autonomous nature of the long-term problem, 
however, the dynamic programming solution is more complicated than the short-term 
case.  I have yet to implement a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the long-
term beach erosion management problem.  This will be the subject of future research.   
To illustrate the type of solution that may be produced, I assume that the form 
of the long-term solution is equivalent to the short run steady state solution.  Under 
these circumstances, the upper bound on the time horizon of active beach 
management on Tybee Island ranges from 215 years into the future to indefinite.  In 
the latter case, management costs are well below aggregate benefits into the 
foreseeable future.  The time horizon is clearly sensitive to the rate of sea level rise 
and the trajectory of property values on Tybee Island.  If threatened properties fully 
depreciate in anticipation of sea level rise, the time horizon of active management is 
shorter because the benefits of coastal protection are lower.   
 In order to provide a lower bound on the time horizon estimates, I solve a 
restricted model in which only benefits to coastal homeowners are considered.  When 
only homeowners are considered beneficiaries, the optimal beach width is 
considerably lower (about 23 meters).  The short run solution to this restricted model 
is marked by longer intervals of inactivity.  About 4-6 years should pass between 




dominate the costs as was seen in the previous model.  The optimal beach width 
diminishes over time, reflecting the discounting of future benefits of sand placement.   
To project benefits and costs of the restricted model, I assume that the solution 
should maintain an approximate steady state, bracketing the optimal beach width of 
23 meters through 5-year intervals of beach nourishment, though the assumption of 
an approximate steady state is not supported by the short run solution.  Again, solving 
the dynamic programming problem for the long run is an important topic for future 
research.  Nonetheless, under this assumption the time horizon of active management 
ranges from approximately 20 to 130 years if properties fully depreciate in 
anticipation of sea level rise.  The 20-year time horizon is associated with the 80cm 
sea level rise scenario.  This is a very short time horizon, and it is quite possible that 
20 years is not sufficient time to fully depreciate barrier island real estate assets.  
Under the medium sea level rise scenario, the time horizon of active management is 
about 40 years, while for the 30cm trajectory the time horizon is much greater, 128 
years.   
Under the assumption of positive constant residual property values on Tybee 
Island, the time horizons of active beach management range from 100 years to 
indefinite.  If sea level were to rise 80cm over the next century and all existing 
properties maintained their current 1998 values, the costs of beach maintenance 
would exceed the benefits accruing to property owners in period 98.  Reducing the 
sea level rise trajectory to 55cm over the next century extends the time horizon to 
about 165 years.  The 30cm sea level rise trajectory gives rise to an indeterminate 




Clearly, the time horizon is sensitive to the rate of sea level rise and the value of 
threatened property in the future. 
Conclusions 
Beach erosion is a significant problem along America’s coastline, and the prospects 
of sea level rise offer more complications and higher stakes.  There is a large amount 
of property exposed to the risks associated with living on the shore, and management 
of these risks can have dramatic effects on the beach, a valuable public resource.  
Existing analyses of short run erosion management are fairly limited in terms of fully 
specifying the dimensions, both temporal and social, of the management problem.  
Existing studies of coastal protection under sea level rise are rather abstract in terms 
of the micro-level decisions regarding management and do not consider the non-
market effects of management (i.e. on beach resources).   
The conceptual framework constructed herein focuses on the stream of 
services produced by barrier beaches.  This distinction is key, as beach resources are 
of primary importance on the many modest-sized barrier island communities on the 
East and Gulf Coasts of the U.S.  Most of the economies of these communities are 
centered on beach resources, and ignoring the effect of management decisions on 
these amenities is foolhardy.  Existing research on coastal protection under sea level 
rise (e.g. Yohe, Neumann, and Ameden 1995) can be appropriately applied to 
sheltered mainland shores, which may lack beaches, or large metropolitan areas, for 
which beaches may be a minor consideration, but seems inappropriate for modest-




One might be inclined to view the management of small to medium size beach 
towns on barrier islands as of secondary importance relative to larger metropolitan 
areas, which represent much more property wealth.  The management of these beach 
towns, however, could have large impacts on economic welfare through the influence 
of beach resources.  The relative value of beach resources will depend upon how 
other areas of the coast have responded to sea level rise.  As some portions of the 
mainland are armored, the existing beaches on barrier islands may become more 
valuable because substitution possibilities become more limited.  This fact combined 
with the prediction that the demand for beach recreation may increase with 
temperature suggests that the management of these small island communities could 
be very important.   
The model I have laid out focuses on only one barrier island beach, and is thus 
in the spirit of a partial equilibrium model.  Sea level rise is a global phenomenon, 
and thus will affect all portions of the shoreline simultaneously, but the impacts will 
vary across locations.  The social value of beach preservation in any particular 
location will depend upon how the total amount of beach resources changes in other 
locations.  Some locations may be more susceptible to erosion loss, and thus more 
costly to protect, while other locations may respond more favorably to sea level rise.  
The determination of which areas to maintain and which areas to abandon will 
depend upon (i) the relative densities and average value of properties in the various 
locations and (ii) demand for recreation and substitution possibilities at the locations.  
This type of management problem is not considered herein, but my conceptual model 





Table A.1a:  First Stage On-site Expenditures Regressions: Jekyll Island 
Ex-post demand (0) Ex-ante demand (I) Ex-ante demand (II) 
lnptr  0.298965***  190.832***  216.7789***      
(0.0326469)   (45.89128)   (30.09011) 
lnpsubs  0.051651*      2.094264       27.42192      
(0.027881)   (40.15171)   (25.36261) 
lnfinc  0.4169675***         192.629***      258.3584***        
(0.045896)   (62.65738)   (42.85662) 
mpurpose -0.651262***   -453.6888***  -339.8628***         
(0.085371)   (107.2522)   (82.61514) 
assign  -0.057272         15.0147          104.9566**         
(0.046496)   (66.1295)   (42.05494) 
summer 0.239782***    144.826          220.2095***         
(0.077011)   (96.00777)   (82.52887) 
spring  -0.018428  116.0297               72.28233         
(0.084393)   (102.9214)   (89.31281) 
male  0.020959  -17.29273  29.82432 
(0.0457654)  (63.80098)  (42.37136) 
nonwhite -0.063326  110.2624  21.04635 
(0.121906)  (180.3518)  (108.8398) 
heduc  -0.081207  80.45553  -71.92113 
(0.049460)  (72.07137)  (45.23557) 
nourish  -------------  -------------  -30.16359        
(51.16889) 
retreat  -------------  -------------  20.55067         
(52.47384) 
children 0.064551***  107.2045*  48.59842*** 
  (0.019736)  (61.42723)  (18.19849) 
children sq -0.001135**  -32.90295**  -0.7117313 
  (0.000513)  (15.03995)  (0.4462935) 
Intercept 2.414798***  -1472.409***        -2027.717***         
  (0.184594)   (257.0154)   (177.932) 
sigma  -------------  449.7548  478.6269 
  -------------  (23.37776)  (15.26393) 
lnL  -------------  -1478.398  -3943.463 
LRT  -------------  86.82   298.63 
R2  0.4635   --------------  -------------- 
F  58.24   --------------  -------------- 
N  822   222   600 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable is ln(pos×dos) for Ex-post model, pos×dos for Ex-ante models; 
*=statistically significant at α=10%; **=statistically significant at α=5%; ***=statistically 





Table A.1b:  First Stage On-site Expenditures Regressions: Tybee Island 
Ex-post demand (0) Ex-ante demand (I) Ex-ante demand (II) 
 
lnptr  0.232007***  96.33689***  107.1138***      
(0.019718)   (21.77892)   (14.52926) 
lnpsubs  0.086896***    38.13924       51.00967***      
(0.024091)   (27.1886)   (17.75367) 
lnfinc  0.405588***         87.29568**      107.6878***       
(0.033049)   (38.97942)   (23.61688) 
mpurpose -0.441450***   -107.8154*  -217.2262***         
(0.050239)   (59.95545)   (36.1914) 
assign  -0.074312**     13.10923          17.82008         
(0.035566)   (41.54195)   (25.64359) 
summer 0 .247147***   95.74139*        63.29332         
(0.051748)   (51.45533)   (46.58541) 
spring  0.259694***  88.42782               70.21834         
(0.055522)   (55.10793)   (48.97703) 
male  -0.012342  -20.45944  -28.05887 
(0.037192)  (43.48117)  (26.53271) 
nonwhite -0.217268***  -29.71418  -81.70359 
(0.081639)  (89.59495)  (59.69414) 
heduc  -0.023143  -42.10163  -7.410312 
(0.038304)  (46.59462)  (27.14314) 
nourish  -------------  -------------  48.47546        
(32.30185) 
retreat  -------------  -------------  32.6004         
(52.47384) 
children 0.115515***  51.52318***  40.5708*** 
  (0.015902)  (18.72135)  (11.35051) 
intercept 2.20756***  -789.3818***        -937.968***         
  (0.148356)   (165.0714)   (109.5517) 
sigma  -------------  354.6931  348.2594 
  -------------  (15.47979)  (9.437747) 
lnL  -------------  -2054.800  -5247.523 
LRT  -------------  81.72   282.03 
R2  0.4562   --------------  -------------- 
F  84.79   --------------  -------------- 
N  1124   320   804 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable is ln(pos×dos) for Ex-post model, pos×dos for Ex-ante models; 
*=statistically significant at α=10%; **=statistically significant at α=5%; ***=statistically 
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